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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Can care-ethics provide an argument for the moral responsibility of economic agents? In 
mainstream economic theory it is standardly assumed that economic agents are largely ration-
al, self-interested and driven by the pursuit of profit or individual utility. In this light, there 
seems to be little room for ethical considerations, let alone the values of care-ethics. 
Yet, I maintain in this thesis that the notion that economic activities lie firmly outside 
the realm of morality is both false and problematic. In fact, I argue that there is an implicit 
normative standard present in the general economic outlook that I call market thinking. In 
consequence, rational, self-interested and individualistic behaviour is not only generally ex-
pected but also implicitly accepted in economic decision-making. By contrast, the care-ethical 
emphasis on relationships and human connection opens for a profoundly different view of the 
relevance of ethics to economics. Not only are economic activities the results of human deci-
sions and human-made structures, but economic constraints also have a real impact on peo-
ple’s lives –– including their opportunities to care.  
Thus, I set forth a care-ethical argument for the moral responsibility of economic 
agents, based on the care-ethical emphasis on relationships and an active commitment to care 
and avoidance of harm. My proposition is not that economic activities and market relations 
are the same as caring practices and caring relationships. Rather, I maintain that economic 
activities are already deeply embedded in particular human relationships or larger relational 
structures. A care-ethical interpretation of responsibility as relational would therefore hold 
economic agents responsible through the particular relational context of their activities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The puzzle I want to address through the course of this thesis is that economic activities and 
considerations seem generally presumed to lie outside the realm of ethics. In mainstream eco-
nomic theory, it is standardly assumed that economic agents are largely rational and self-
interested, and seek maximised profit or individual utility. In this respect, it is difficult to see 
how any ethical considerations could have any real influence on economic decision-making –
– least of all care-ethics. After all, while economics seems to be all about rational calculation 
and individual gain, care-ethics emphasises the value of human connection and relationships, 
the fact of human dependence, and suggests an active commitment to care and avoidance of 
harm. On the other hand, economic decisions and an economic frame of mind seem deeply 
ingrained in many aspects of our everyday lives. For instance, people’s access to wage-
earning work and other basic goods, the distribution of wealth and global patterns of consum-
er relations are all questions relating to economics. In fact, I will argue that given the fact that 
economic conditions set important constraints on our choices and opportunities –– including 
our opportunities to care –– it should be acknowledged that economic considerations are not 
separate from, but deeply relevant to, the realm of ethics.  
How might care-ethics influence our thinking around economic activities and market 
relations? Could care-ethics provide an argument for the moral responsibility of economic 
agents? Looking at the question of moral responsibility through the lens of care-ethics opens 
up a very different approach compared to that of the general economic outlook I call market 
thinking. With care-ethics, the focus shifts from an individualistic ontology highlighting indi-
vidual independence to a relational ontology highlighting the relational context of persons. 
This makes it possible to bring forth concerns relating to dependencies and relational ties, and 
see the possibilities of interpreting responsibility as shared or distributed.  
However, approaching the question moral responsibility in market relations through 
the perspective of care-ethics also entails the challenge of balancing a descriptive theory with 
a normative framework. The field of economics is largely a descriptive discipline, while care-
ethics is a moral theory. Not least, they each comprise a large and diversified body of re-
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search. My method, therefore, is to first extract the main features and assumptions of econom-
ic theory and care-ethics respectively, allowing me to compare the two as distinct theoretical 
perspectives with fundamentally different ontologies. In many ways it is precisely the tension 
between the underlying assumptions and methodology of care-ethics and economics that 
makes this an interesting discussion. A care-ethical interpretation of responsibility has the 
potential of profoundly informing our whole thinking around responsibility in market rela-
tions, by providing a different and fresh approach to the topic. This is an enquiry, then, that 
both challenges our standard approach to economic questions and investigates the boundaries 
and application of care-ethics as a moral theory. 
 Thus, I begin by setting the scene in the first two chapters with general introductions 
to the main themes of economic theory and care-ethics. The first chapter presents the basic 
assumptions and principles of mainstream economic theory that underlie the general econom-
ic outlook that I call market thinking. This is a framework for thinking about human behav-
iour and decision-making in economic terms. Chapter two presents the main themes of care-
ethics, which include a focus on the importance of care, the fact of human dependence, a sen-
sitivity to context and an emphasis on relationships to particular others. I suggest that care can 
be defined as a practice and a value, as Virginia Held (2006) proposes, although I see Tove 
Pettersen (2008; 2011) as providing the best description of the normative value of care as a 
balance between the principles of extended non-maleficence and restricted beneficence. I also 
look at Daniel Engster’s (2007) account of care and discuss the difficulty of setting a precise 
boundary to the scope of care-ethical activities. Finally, I address the criticisms that care-
ethics mandates dominance or paternalism or makes caring a self-sacrificing altruistic act. 
In chapter three I present a care-ethical critique of market thinking. I argue that market 
thinking involves the dichotomy of self-interest and altruism, and rests on an assumption of 
individual independence. From a care-ethical perspective, this ignores how being dependent 
on others’ care or having caring responsibilities for others may affect one’s position in the 
competition for goods in the market. Market thinking also overlooks the possibility of struc-
tural differences manifesting over time. This discussion rests on the analyses of care-ethicists 
Eva Feder Kittay (1999) and Joan Tronto (1993; 2013), and political theorist Iris Marion 
Young (2011). I conclude by arguing that market thinking involves an implicit normative 
standard, which I suggest cannot be contained within the imagined boundaries of a pure eco-
nomic sphere. Not only do economic events often have real impact on people’s lives, but eco-
nomic events are in turn the results of human-made structures and human decisions. Thus, I 
suggest many economic questions have an influence on care-ethical concerns, and that care-
ethics in turn can challenge our thinking around economic activities and relations. 
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In chapter four I approach the subject of moral responsibility. I look into three alterna-
tive arguments for accepting the moral obligation to care, as presented by Kittay (1999), Eng-
ster (2007) and Pettersen (2011). I then discuss what a care-ethical interpretation of responsi-
bility might entail, and suggest that it would be grounded in the notions of reciprocity, shared 
commitment, the equal worth of the parties, and the relational ontology of care-ethics. This 
would open for an understanding of responsibility as arising within relationships and relation-
al structures, similar to Young’s (2011) notion of shared responsibility.  
In chapter five, I move on to discuss the relevance of a care-ethical interpretation of 
responsibility to market relations. I examine Engster’s (2007; 2011) argument for the moral 
responsibility of businesses, which forms the basis for his proposal for a care-based stake-
holder approach to business. However, I see several potential problems with Engster’s ac-
count, and as a consequence I propose an alternative care-ethical reading that could avoid 
these problems while contributing to a meaningful interpretation of the moral responsibility of 
economic agents. I suggest a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility would hold economic 
agents responsible to the extent that they take part in particular relationships or larger rela-
tional structures. While I want to avoid interpreting economic activity as a caring practice, I 
nevertheless propose that the normative values of care would be able to inform and restrain 
economic activity within its particular relational context. 
4 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MARKET THINKING 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the standard assumptions and principles of main-
stream economics.1 Together these form the general economic outlook I call “market think-
ing” — a framework for thinking about human behaviour and decision-making in economic 
terms. The standard assumptions of mainstream economic theory are that economic agents are 
rational and largely self-interested, and interact through competitive markets. Corporations 
seek to maximise their profits, and consumers seek to maximise their individual utility.2 The 
historical roots of these basic economic ideas go back to the 18th and 19th centuries with the 
works of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill. Smith (1776 [2004]) famously portrayed the 
workings of the market as an “invisible hand”, where the self-interested decisions of many 
individuals tend to promote those economic outcomes that are most efficient. Mill (1844 
[1992]) described the essential characteristics of the “economic man”, as rational and moti-
vated by a desire for material wealth.  
 Of course, the standard assumptions about economic agents and markets are not true 
representations of reality. The occurrence of market failures are recognised and studied phe-
nomena, and insights from behavioural economics have shown that the assumptions of full 
rationality, self-interest and willpower in many cases do not hold. However, the fact that mar-
ket failures occur does not necessarily undermine the market ideals themselves. Nor do be-
havioural economists completely abandon the established framework of mainstream economic 
theory. Rather, the standard assumptions serve as a useful starting point for economic model-
ling, to which more substance and detail can later be added. Indeed, the basic assumptions and 
principles of mainstream economics seem to be largely accepted as saying something essen-
tially true about economic decision-making and the workings of the market. 
 
                                                
1 I will use the term “mainstream” to refer to economic theory as it is predominantly taught at leading 
universities worldwide, and as presented through standard introductory textbooks in economics such 
as Bernheim and Whinston, 2008; Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 [2011]; and, Blanchard, Amighini and 
Giavazzi, 2010 [2013]. 
2 As an economic term “utility” refers to an individual’s satisfaction of preferences or wellbeing, and 
is represented by a numeric value (Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 114). A greater utility value rep-
resents a higher level of satisfaction. I will come back to the notion of utility later in this chapter. 
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 Economic Markets 
Mainstream economic theory is usually divided into two major categories: microeconomics 
and macroeconomics.3 Microeconomics deals with the economic decisions of individuals and 
firms, and how these decisions together reflect the aggregate supply and demand of markets. 
Macroeconomics has a wider scope and includes a national and global perspective of econom-
ic activity, for instance looking at monetary and fiscal policies and other structures that affect 
the economy at large.4 One could say that microeconomics provides the basics: It represents 
“the trunk of the tree” from which numerous other subfields of economics have branched 
(Harberger, 2008). Therefore, the focus of this chapter is mainly on the micro perspective, 
looking at human behaviour, motivation and interaction through the basic microeconomic 
assumptions.  
 In microeconomics, markets are often assumed to be perfectly competitive, and are 
thought to be efficient means of allocating scarce resources.5 In perfectly competitive mar-
kets, each agent will have full access to information and no single agent will be large enough 
to influence the market prices. This means that the relevant information needed to make in-
formed decisions is readily available. The market prices will then reflect the market equilibri-
um, which is the point where the consumers’ willingness to pay for a good exactly matches 
the price the producers are willing to charge for that good. The various market prices are de-
termined by the value assigned to the various goods, reflecting the standpoints of both the 
buyers and the sellers (Harberger, 2008). In short, the market prices reflect the demand and 
supply in the market. Organising economic activity through markets is efficient as it allows 
for specialisation, enabling different people to put their efforts and talents into different pro-
jects. 
 The generalisations of standard microeconomic theory listed above are usually la-
belled “neoclassical”, referring to the heredity of the classical economic theories of the 18th 
and 19th centuries. Smith’s (1776 [2004]) often quoted statement about the “invisible hand” 
seems to have been especially influential, providing part of the intellectual foundation for 
                                                
3 I am here ignoring what might be thought a third major branch of economics, econometrics, which 
applies empirical data and statistical methods to economic models (Hausman, 2013, 1.2). 
4 Monetary policy is the control of money supply by a nation’s national bank, which affects interest 
rates, inflation and economic activity. Fiscal policy is a government’s use of taxes and/or, public 
spending to influence economic activity. See Blanchard, Amighini and Giavazzi, 2010 [2013], p. 91-
95, 567, 570.  
5 For an overview of the central assumptions and themes of mainstream microeconomic theory, see for 
instance Bernheim and Whinston, 2008; Harberger, 2008; Hausman, 2013; Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 
[2011]; and, Weintraub, 1993. 
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neoclassical economic theory.6 Smith describes the workings of the market as an invisible 
hand: 
 
“[The individual] generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how 
much he is promoting it. […] he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cas-
es, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always 
the worse for society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes 
that of society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known 
much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good.” (Smith, 1776 [2004], p. 300) 
 
The context of the statement is Smith’s discussion of, and argument against, protectionism, 
where domestic goods are favoured over foreign. The idea of the invisible hand is that when 
combined, the individual decisions of the various agents in the market tend to promote those 
economic endeavours that are most advantageous and efficient. Smith’s statement has often 
been taken as an argument for free, unregulated markets: Markets are most efficient when left 
alone because the decisions of many self-interested agents tend to promote the welfare of so-
ciety as a whole (Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 [2011], p. 10). This interpretation of Smith’s the-
ory has left a deep impression of the efficiency of unregulated economic markets. This is a 
concept of markets as independent, self-correcting entities, functioning best when obeying 
their own rules, and of the people operating in the markets as fundamentally self-interested 
and independent individuals. 
 In macroeconomics there are two major schools of thought. One is new classical mac-
roeconomics, which rests solely on the neoclassical microeconomic foundations. The other is 
the Keynesian, or new Keynesian, approach to macroeconomics, which is developed from the 
work of John Maynard Keynes.7 New classical economists are generally sceptical to market 
intervention and see short-term dips in the economy as necessary, at least in theory, in order 
for markets to correct themselves. There is here a deep-rooted faith in the ability of market 
mechanisms to price goods correctly and to repair any imbalances in the levels of prices, pro-
duction, employment and so on, restoring them to their “natural” levels (Mankiw and Taylor, 
2008 [2011], p. 10). New Keynesian theory, on the other hand, explains slumps and reces-
sions as resulting from market failures and low overall demand. New Keynesians argue 
against the new classical view that prices and wages adjust immediately. Rather, prices are 
                                                
6 For a comment on the influence of Adam Smith’s idea of the invisible hand for contemporary eco-
nomics, see Mankiw and Taylor (2011, p. 10) and Nelson (2011, p. 38-39). Friedman (1962 [2002], p. 
133) also refers to Smith’s quote in his argument against the social responsibilities of businesses.  
7 Keynes’ major work The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money was published in 
1936. 
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thought to be “sticky”, adjusting slowly and in stages, and wages are often thought to be con-
nected to the efficiency of the workers so that cutting wages implies lowering productivity 
(Mankiw, 2008). Because prices and wages adjust slowly, there is here an argument for gov-
ernment intervention in the form of monetary and fiscal policies (Mankiw, 2008). However, 
in practice and broadly speaking, it seems that the divide between new classicists and new 
Keynesians is not so deep. Although they disagree on various issues, such as the remedies for 
unemployment or the causes of recessions, there seems to be general agreement on the fun-
damentals. The new Keynesians have adopted the idea of rational agents and efficient mar-
kets, and new classicists generally agree that prices and wages do not, in fact, adjust immedi-
ately, and that monetary policies do work (Hoover, 2008; Krugman, 2009, p. 2). In both ap-
proaches, the basic microeconomic assumptions of economic agents and markets are used as 
starting points for economic modelling.  
 
 
 Economic Man 
Economic agents are standardly assumed to be rational and self-interested, embodied in the 
notion of the “economic man”, homo economicus. The term is often associated with Smith, 
and in The Wealth of Nations he famously comments: “It is not from the benevolence of the 
butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest” (1776 [2004], p. 12). Smith points out that it is self-interest, not benevolence, that is 
prevalent in the economic decisions of individuals. If the butcher or baker had given away 
their goods in the name of benevolence, there would be nothing left to sell and their business-
es would crumble. A businessman aims to make his business thrive and the businessman’s 
driving force is his own, not other’s, success. The point is that self-interest is thought to be an 
important driving force in trade. 
 Although the concept of the economic man is often associated with Smith, it first came 
into use in the 19th century (Nelson, 2011, p. 38). In his early work on political economy, Mill 
(1844 [1992]) sought to define the field of economics as an independent, scientific discipline. 
Its aim should be to study man “... solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is 
capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end” (Mill, 1844 
[1992], p. 137). Here, Mill expresses the two basic assumptions about economic agents: They 
are motivated by material desire, and the rationale of seeking the most efficient means to-
wards that aim. In the same passage Mill states that the economic man always chooses a larg-
er portion of wealth than a smaller. Further, the desire for wealth is only checked by two per-
sistent principles: first, an aversion to labour, and second, a desire for immediate satisfaction. 
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The purpose of economics is therefore to study and predict the behaviour of people in society 
as if these desires and principles were their “absolute ruler[s]” (Mill, 1844 [1992], p. 138). On 
Mill’s account, economics deals only with a limited picture of human agency, but he does not 
pretend that this provides a full description of humans. He writes: “Not that any political 
economist was ever so absurd as to suppose that mankind are really thus constituted, but be-
cause this is the mode in which science must necessarily proceed” (Mill, 1844 [1992], p. 139). 
The concept of the economic man serves as an abstraction for the purpose of economic analy-
sis. In order to understand human agency, the idea is that one must begin by studying each 
aspect of the complex mix of desires and aversions that influence a person’s actions. The field 
of economics, according to Mill, should deal only with those parts of human conduct where 
the acquisition of wealth is the leading aim (Mill, 1844 [1992], p. 139).  
 The legacy from Smith and Mill is still present in contemporary economics, with the 
standard assumptions of economic agents as rational and generally motivated by self-interest 
(Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 7-8; Hausman, 2013, 1.1). The assumption of rationality is 
usually interpreted as the agent’s ability to consistently rank the alternatives he or she faces 
with reference to individual preferences, so that for every alternative they face they are able to 
determine whether they prefer it more or less to another, or are indifferent (Hausman, 2013, 
1.1).8 It is worth noting that the assumption of self-interest does not necessarily follow from 
the assumption of rationality. The concept of individual preferences is meant to represent all 
the considerations, feelings or motives relevant to a person’s choices (Hausman and McPher-
son, 1996 [2006], p. 46). That is, a person’s preferences are supposed to include whatever that 
person cares about. So, while many persons pursue individual material gain, others may 
choose to donate to charities or to a political cause. In principle, altruism is not be ruled out in 
economic theorising, though material self-interest is still usually assumed to be the key moti-
vation (Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 7; Hausman, 2013, 1.1; Hausman and McPherson, 
1996 [2006], p. 79).  
 What it means for corporations to be rational and self-interested is that they seek to 
maximise their profits. Consumers are assumed to maximise their individual utility, meaning 
that they will choose what they most prefer within the constraint of their budgets. Consumers 
will want a range of goods, including things like food, clothing, housing, medicines, wages, 
and leisure time. What sort of specific goods consumers prefer and how these are ranked in 
relation to one another, will vary from person to person. However, it is assumed that consum-
ers generally prefer more to less (Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 95; Mankiw and Taylor, 
2008 [2011], p. 440). Furthermore, they are likely to want a variety of goods, not just one 
                                                
8 Though see Sen (1987, p. 13) for an argument against defining rationality as internal consistency. 
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type, and a certain balance between different types of goods. Some prefer apples to bananas, 
but no one will want to live only on apples or only on bananas. Trade-offs are unavoidable. 
Buying more of one good means there is then less left to spend on another good, and the more 
the consumer has of one type of good, the less she will be willing to pay for more of the same 
(Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 95, 109-110; Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 [2011], p. 441-
443).  
 Following the assumptions of rationality and self-interest, trade will come about only 
when it is mutually beneficial to the trading parties (Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 111). 
This basic economic principle of mutually beneficial trade echoes Smith’s description above 
of the butcher, brewer and baker all going about their businesses with regard to their own in-
terest (1776 [2004], p. 12). The assumption that consumers prefer more to less, and are gener-
ally motivated by self-interest, is a continuation of Mill’s description of the economic man 
who seeks evermore material wealth. 
 
 
 Evaluating Economic Outcomes 
When a consumer compares two bundles of goods, the bundle that better represents her indi-
vidual preferences has a greater utility value. The utility value is a numeric value indicating 
the degree of satisfaction of individual preferences (Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 114). 
The utility function is then a mathematical representation of the utility values of different 
bundles of goods. This is simply a way of representing each agent’s ranked preferences 
(Hausman and McPherson, 1996 [2006], p. 48-49). The use of the term “utility” in economic 
theory indicates the historical links to utilitarianism, yet few contemporary economists would 
claim they are utilitarians. Utilitarianism comprises the moral theories that set the maximisa-
tion of total or average utility as the final good, where utility may be defined as happiness, 
pleasure, or wellbeing. In economics, utility or wellbeing is usually taken to mean the satis-
faction of individual preferences, instead of a mental state like happiness (Hausman and 
McPherson, 1996 [2006], p. 105). A person’s preferences can then simply be seen as a given 
set of considerations, and thus economists avoid the normative discussion of what people’s 
preferences should be. Economists will sometimes evaluate economic outcomes in terms of 
whether they make people better off, or increase overall welfare. However, this requires add-
ing up individual welfare and drawing up a comparison on a single scale, and economists are 
generally wary of interpersonal comparisons of utility (Hausman and McPherson, 1996 
[2006], p. 100, 135). The problem then is that if an individual’s satisfaction of preferences 
11 
cannot be identified as being better or worse than another’s, then one cannot say much about 
the overall economic welfare either.  
 However, another way of comparing economic outcomes is to use the principle of 
Pareto efficiency. An outcome is Pareto efficient if no one can be made better off without 
someone else being made worse off (Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 588; Hausman and 
McPherson, 1996 [2006], p. 136-137). Still, Pareto efficiency says little about the distribution 
of wealth, for instance, or the general level of welfare. Imagine an initial economic distribu-
tion of extreme wealth inequalities. If the very poor cannot be made better off without reduc-
ing the wealth of the very rich, even by a small amount, then the proposed change would not 
be a Pareto improvement. Yet one would think that a small amount of money would have sub-
stantially higher value in the eyes of the poor than the rich.  
 The remaining tool in the economist’s toolbox is cost-benefit analysis. This approach 
builds on the basic economic principle of opportunity cost: The cost of something is what you 
give up to get it, and the value is the benefits forgone (Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 [2011], p. 5-
6). In a cost-benefit analysis, value is set to the costs and benefits of economic policies or out-
comes, based on people’s willingness to pay for the proposed changes. This is then used as 
the basis for a comparison. Again, a problem with cost-benefit analyses is that the criteria for 
assessing the value of economic outcomes is set by people’s willingness to pay. People’s will-
ingness to pay depends on their ability to pay, and so the preferences of the wealthy will 
weigh more than the preferences of the poor (Hausman and McPherson, 1996 [2006], p. 149). 
 
 
 Unrealistic Assumptions and Behavioural Economics 
Mill was explicit in his scientific methodology, seeking first to determine the major causal 
factors, the laws, that work on individuals as they pursue their economic aims, and then study-
ing the combined consequences of these (Hausman, 2013, 3.1; Mill, 1844 [1992], p. 139). 
Mill argued that because there are so many causal factors in play when determining economic 
phenomena, one cannot simply compare, say, two national economies and hope to arrive at a 
precise conclusion as to which is the best. Instead, Mill thought that economic theory must 
focus on simpler domains and, from the results found here, deduce the consequences in more 
complex situations (Hausman, 2013, 3.1). On Mill’s account, economics is not a precise sci-
ence. Its conclusions are based on what are thought to be the main causes of economic behav-
iour, and derive from observations of simpler domains. In fact, Mill suggested that the conclu-
sions of economics must be adjusted by other causes of human agency, apart from the desire 
for wealth, in order to be fully explanatory and predictive (Mill, 1844 [1992], p. 140).  
12 
 Contemporary economists also point out that the standard assumptions made about 
economic agents in mainstream economic theory are meant for methodological purposes only. 
In consumer theory, for instance, the consumer’s decisions are construed as a problem of op-
timising preferences within constraints. This is not an attempt at a full description of human 
decision-making, but serves as a model for describing implicit psychological factors relevant 
in economic analysis (Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 [2011], p. 460-461). There is a deliberate 
simplification of human agency, leaving only those factors thought most relevant to an expla-
nation of economic behaviour. The basic approach is to start with simple generalisations and 
build on from these. Part of what it is to be a skilled economist is the ability to discern which 
features of the real world to include when building a model (Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 
[2011], p. 26). Economist and Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, a prominent advocate of neo-
classical theory, famously defended the “unrealistic” assumptions of economic theory. Fried-
man argued that one should judge an economic model on the basis of its predictability, not on 
the realism of its assumptions. What marks a model as good, on his view, is its ability to ab-
stract all factors that are not relevant, so that the model explains “much by little” (Friedman, 
1953, p. 8). 
 However, the last few decades have seen a wave of research within behavioural eco-
nomics, where the standard assumptions of full rationality, complete self-interest and unwa-
vering willpower have been questioned. Relying on controlled experiments and insights from 
psychology, behavioural economists argue, for instance, that a substantial portion of people 
are not exclusively self-interested but care about fairness and reciprocity. Experiments that go 
under the name of the Dictator Game and the Ultimatum Game are well-known in this con-
text. In the Dictator Game, one participant, the dictator, is given a certain amount of money 
that she can divide between herself and a passive recipient. The Ultimatum Game is similar, 
but here the recipient can accept what is offered or reject it. Rejecting the offer means that 
neither player gets anything. In accordance with the neoclassical assumptions of economic 
behaviour, one would expect the dictators in the Dictator Game to keep their whole initial 
sum for themselves. One would also expect the recipients in the Ultimatum Game to accept 
any offer, however low, because a small sum would leave them better off than they would be 
with nothing. Yet, results show fairly consistently that small offers, below 20% of the initial 
sum, are rejected about half the time, suggesting that the recipients are reacting with indigna-
tion or are influenced by a sense of fairness (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002, p. C5). Comparing 
the results from the two experimental games shows that the offers of division in the Ultima-
tum Game are substantially higher than in the Dictator Game, which suggests that the propos-
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er in the Ultimatum Game anticipates the other player’s reaction and adjusts her behaviour 
accordingly (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002, p. C5).  
 Behavioural economics can potentially soften the standard assumptions of mainstream 
economic theory with insights into the limitations and biases that occur in decision-making. 
Still, as behavioural economist Matthew Rabin (2002) explains, this field of research does not 
represent a complete break with the methods and assumptions of neoclassical economics. 
Rabin writes: “This research programme is not only built on the premise that mainstream eco-
nomic methods are great, but also that most mainstream economic assumptions are great. It 
does not abandon the correct insights of neoclassical economics, but supplements these in-
sights with the insights to be had from realistic new assumptions” (Rabin, 2002, p. 658-659, 
his emphasis). The behavioural economist’s stance is that many people’s actual behaviour 
departs in significant ways from the standard neoclassical assumptions, and furthermore that 
these departures are important for economic analysis. Yet, the general framework of main-
stream economics is largely kept in place. The debate seems no longer to be about whether the 
insights of behavioural economics should be taken seriously in mainstream economics, but 
rather how they can be incorporated into formal economic modelling (Rabin, 2002, p. 672-
673). 
 Nor are economists merely interested in perfect market conditions; they also study 
market failures where some of the standard assumptions about economic agents and markets 
do not hold. Externalities, for instance, occur where the costs or benefits of a transaction af-
fects others than those directly involved in the exchange. Examples are the cost to society of 
pollution from the production of certain goods, or the general benefit to society of education 
(Mankiw and Taylor, 2008 [2011], 198-204). As Olivier Blanchard and his co-authors write, 
economists no longer think of the economy as a machine: “Unlike a machine, the economy is 
composed of people and firms who try to anticipate what policy makers will do, and who re-
act not only to current policy but also to expectations to future policy. Hence, macroeconomic 
policy must be thought of as a game between the policy makers and the economy […] ” 
(Blanchard, Amighini and Giavazzi, 2010 [2013], p. 499, their emphasis). The reference here 
is to game theory, and the suggestion is that we should think of economic decisions as strate-
gic games. 
 While insights from behavioural economics and game theory add more substance and 
detail to economic analysis, an important element of the economic method is precisely to ex-
tract formal models and analyses from the confusion of reality. Granted, the standard assump-
tions of economic agents being rational and self-interested and of markets being perfectly 
competitive may be stylised and unrealistic compared to the complexity of the real world. 
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Still, these assumptions provide the starting point for theoretical analysis, to which one can 
later add more detail and accommodate various “failures”. The question is what exactly, and 
how much, to include as relevant. Nevertheless, the standard neoclassical assumptions and 
principles do seem largely accepted as pointing to an essential truth about human behaviour 
and the workings of economic markets. It is this fundamental starting point, these basic as-
sumptions and principles, that make up the general economic outlook I call market thinking. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CARE-ETHICS 
 
 
 
The focus of care-ethics is on relationships and activities of care. Caring takes place within 
relationships, and the emphasis is on particular attachment and actual situations instead of 
universal or abstract principles. Dependency is acknowledged as a basic human fact. As care-
ethicist Virginia Held comments, all people are dependent on others’ care at various stages of 
their lives, for instance as an infant or child, when old and frail, ill or disabled (2006, p. 10). 
The focus of care-ethics is therefore on interdependency and the relational context of persons, 
not on complete independence or self-sufficiency. Emotions, like attentiveness and empathy, 
are considered to be valuable guides to moral insight, accompanied by reflection and cultiva-
tion. Care-ethics thus stands in stark contrast to the dominant moral theories of deontology, 
utilitarianism and political liberalism, where rationality, impartiality, and the appeal to univer-
sally binding principles are important features. 
 This chapter serves as an introduction to the main themes of care-ethics. I begin by 
tracing the origins of care-ethics to Carol Gilligan’s (1982 [1993]) In a Different Voice and 
the broader feminist endeavour to put women’s perspectives on the agenda. Looking at the 
general care-ethical critique of the dominant moral theories of deontology, utilitarianism and 
political liberalism reveals care-ethics as a very different moral theory. I see the relational 
ontology of care-ethics as especially important in this regard.  
 The core normative value of care-ethics is care, and I follow Held’s (2006) description 
of care as a practice and a value. This opens for an understanding of care as including many 
different practical activities, while at the same time grounding care as a normative value. 
However, I suggest the normative value of care is best captured by Tove Pettersen’s (2008; 
2011) description of care as a balance between extended non-maleficence and restricted be-
neficence. I go on to discuss the scope of care-ethics, as in where to draw the line between 
potentially caring activities and other activities. Next, I address some criticisms levelled at 
care-ethics that see the focus on care as hovering dangerously between paternalism and domi-
nance, on the on the one hand, and altruistic self-sacrifice, on the other hand (Hoagland, 1992; 
Narayan, 1995; Silvers, 1998). Concerns related to differences in power, dependencies and 
needs are recurring themes within care-ethics (Noddings, 1984 [2003]; Ruddick, 1989 [1995]; 
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Held, 1993, 2006; Tronto, 1993, 2013; Kittay, 1999). I suggest care-ethics is able to handle 
the problems of dominance and self-sacrifice as long as care-ethics is interpreted as a rela-
tional ethic and in line with a notion of mature care (Gilligan, 1982 [1993]; Pettersen, 2011; 
2012). Finally, I look at the broader social, political and global relevance of care-ethics. The 
normative value of care and the relational ontology of care-ethics allows for broad analyses of 
a wide range of relational structures. This sets the scene for the discussion of market thinking 
and moral responsibility in market relations in the following chapters. 
 
 
 The Origins and Themes of Care-Ethics 
Care-ethics arose as part of the broader feminist effort to put women’s experiences on the 
agenda. It was with Gilligan’s (1982 [1993]) book In a Different Voice that the concept of an 
ethic of care was first introduced. Through her psychological research on moral development, 
Gilligan found that the girls and women she interviewed typically displayed a different kind 
of moral understanding to the male participants. The alternative voice Gilligan heard in many 
of her female participants was characterised by a special attention to care, to relationships 
developing over time, and to the responsibilities established within relationships. Gilligan saw 
this focus on care and relationships as falling outside the scope of the standard conception of 
morality and moral development. The dominant theory of moral development was focused, 
not on care and relationships, but on the concept of justice and the impartial nature of univer-
sal moral laws. Gilligan found that while the male participants in her studies typically re-
sponded well to the dominant moral framework of justice, the female participants often 
seemed evasive, unsure and timid in their responses. As a consequence, a significant portion 
of the female participants were standardly rated as displaying lower levels of moral develop-
ment than their male counterparts. However, Gilligan suggested that the typical female re-
sponse, which seemed evasive and muddled in light of the dominant moral framework, in fact 
displayed an alternative ethic of care (Gilligan, 1982 [1993], p. 24-32). She argued that this 
alternative moral viewpoint, an ethic of care, should be recognised as being of equal im-
portance to the dominant ethic of justice. Though Gilligan’s empirical findings linked a caring 
ethic to women, she did point out that the distinction between the two moral frameworks — 
that of care and that of justice — need not be an essentially gendered difference (Gilligan, 
1982 [1993], p. 2).  
 Care-ethicists have since continued to develop and refine the idea of care as a norma-
tive basis for moral theory, emphasising the importance of relationships, the fact of human 
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dependency, and paying attention to differences in power.9 Care-ethicists have also articulated 
a general critique against the dominant moral theories of utilitarianism, deontology and politi-
cal liberalism (Gilligan, 1982 [1993]; Noddings, 1984 [2003]; Held, 1993; 2006; Kittay, 
1998). In these dominant moral theories the emphasis is on universal and abstract principles, 
impartiality and rationality. Deontology, like Kantian ethics, sees the moral law as absolute 
and universally binding, necessarily acknowledged by all rational beings. Utilitarianism advo-
cates the moral good on the basis of impartial calculations of aggregate happiness, utility or 
welfare. Political liberalism, in line with John Rawls’s (1971) Theory of Justice, focuses on 
the contractual agreement between equally positioned, rational and disinterested persons. 
Care-ethics, on the other hand, focuses on the needs and vulnerabilities of particular others 
and the actual context of relationships, where emotions are included as important to moral 
decision making. 
 The care-ethical critique of the dominant moral theories is not only directed at the 
normative values of these theories, but also at their epistemological and ontological frame-
works — that is, their general method for acquiring moral moral knowledge and their funda-
mental view of the moral agent. The normative focus of deontology is on duty and the moral 
law, utilitarianism focuses on overall welfare, and political liberalism on justice and fairness. 
While the normative values of deontology, utilitarianism and political liberalism are different, 
their epistemological and ontological foundations of are fairly similar (Pettersen, 2011, p. 54-
55). The moral epistemology of the dominant moral theories involves relying on only a few 
universal and abstract principles and attaching great importance to impartiality and rationality. 
Care-ethicists have found it problematic that the complexities and nuances of actual moral 
dilemmas are left out, and that emotions and particular attachments are seen as obstacles, not 
insights, to moral decision making (Noddings, 1984 [2003]; Held, 1993; 2006; Kittay, 1999). 
In care-ethics, emotions like empathy and attentiveness are considered, alongside reason, to 
be valuable for moral judgments. The context of actual situations and relationships matter, as 
this will likely affect what kinds of needs and vulnerabilities arise and the appropriate ways to 
deal with them. Further, the broader social and political context may shed light on whose 
needs are typically noticed, and who is generally expected to meet them (Tronto, 1993; 2013; 
Kittay, 1999). The rational deduction of dominant moral theories from a set of universal prin-
ciples is replaced in care-ethics by a focus on actual experiences, the relational context, and 
ongoing dialogue and self-reflection (Pettersen, 2011, p. 55).  
                                                
9 Some important contributions to care-ethics include Nel Noddings’s (1984 [2003]) Caring; Sara 
Ruddick’s (1989 [1995]) Maternal Thinking; Virginia Held’s (1993; 2006) Feminist Morality and The 
Ethics of Care; Eva Feder Kittay’s (1999) Love’s Labor; and Joan Tronto’s (1993; 2013) Moral 
Boundaries and Caring Democracy. 
18 
 The moral ontology of the dominant moral theories is individualistic. The moral agent 
is seen first and foremost as an independent and self-sufficient individual, standing on equal 
terms with others. However, from a care-ethical perspective, this ignores the fundamental 
importance of human relationships, the unavoidable human fact of dependence and the caring 
responsibilities that arise within the relationships we are part of. With care-ethics, the perspec-
tive shifts to a relational ontology, where the basic starting point is every person’s relational 
context (Gilligan, 1982 [1993]; Pettersen, 2008; 2011; 2012; Kittay, 1999; Held, 1993; 2006). 
From the outset, all persons are situated in various relationships to others, beginning with that 
to the birthing mother and continuing through life as we each form new relationships, and 
maintain, change, repair or end others (Held, 2006, p. 52). Care-ethics sees the relational con-
text as importantly influencing people’s lives through the experiences they have, the choices 
they are able to make, and the expectations they form and are met with. The dichotomy of 
egoism and altruism seems to follow from the individualistic ontology of the dominant moral 
theories. As a result, moral problems are often seen as a conflict between the interests of the 
individual, on the one hand, and the interests of humanity in general on the other (Held, 2006, 
p. 12). Care-ethics challenges this dichotomy, and focuses instead on relationships being what 
binds each of us to particular others. 
 The feminist perspective of care-ethics has led to a critique of the history of Western 
moral philosophy. Held (1993), for instance, points out the gendered dichotomies that have 
deeply influenced moral theory. As she writes, reason was traditionally associated with mas-
culinity and placed above feminine emotion. The activities of the public sphere, like culture, 
politics and production, to which generally only men had access, were set above the private 
sphere associated with women’s natural reproduction (Held, 1993, p. 43-63). Arguing that a 
gender-neutral ethic should value the experiences of women as equally significant for moral 
theory as those of men, care-ethicists began examining and evaluating the activities tradition-
ally assigned to women, and the moral dilemmas they faced. Thus, concerns associated with 
the private sphere, such as caring responsibilities in close relationships and child rearing, were 
brought to the forefront. Questions also arose concerning inequalities in dependence and vul-
nerabilities, power relations, and the dangers of dominance (Noddings, 1984 [2003]; Ruddick, 
1989 [1995]; Held 1993; 2006; Kittay, 1999). Care-ethicists have found that the activities 
traditionally assigned to women were often deeply infused by moral dilemmas and moral rea-
soning. Furthermore, these insights are seen as truly important to moral theory, relevant far 
beyond the initial focus of close relationships in the private sphere. Care-ethics discards the 
dichotomous thinking of the philosophical tradition, which has seen reason as opposed to 
emotion, the public sphere versus the private sphere, culture versus nature, egoism versus 
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altruism. Instead, it is suggested that we should investigate the area in between these ex-
tremes. 
 
 
 Defining Care 
At the core of care-ethics lies the moral value of care, but what does care, in this context, real-
ly mean? As there is no clear consensus among care-ethicists, I will bring together elements 
from a few different theorists as the care-ethical position of this thesis. I want a definition that 
sees care as both a value and a practice, so as to capture the moral significance of care and 
allow for different activities of care (Ruddick, 1989 [1995]; Held, 2006). In determining the 
normative value of care, I will lean on Tove Pettersen’s (2008; 2011) suggestion of seeing 
care as a balance between active non-maleficence and restricted beneficence. I further want a 
framework for analysing the broader social, political and economic context of care, and will 
later use this as the basis for the discussion of moral responsibility in market relations. In this 
regard, I will look to Kittay (1999) and Tronto (1993; 2013), who both discuss the structural 
consequences of differences in power and dependencies, and the distribution of caring respon-
sibilities. I will also look into Daniel Engster’s notion of care. He proposes a specific care-
based business approach, which will be discussed in the two last chapters. 
 In care-ethics the need for care is seen as basic to all humans, and necessary for human 
survival, development and flourishing. The appropriate activities of caring will vary according 
to the specific situation, the type of relationship and the particular needs that require attention. 
Think of the range of activities involved in feeding an infant, teaching a class how to read or 
write, dressing a wound, or helping an elderly person get up in the morning. The care relevant 
to care-ethics must encompass all these activities as potentially caring. However, the im-
portance of care for human development and survival will be nothing more than a descriptive 
fact unless care is also given moral significance. There must be a way of evaluating care as 
good or bad with reference to a normative standard or value. As Held comments: “[…] we 
need an ethics of care, not just care itself” (2006, p. 11, her emphasis). So, the care relevant to 
care-ethics must also capture the normative value of care. I suggest therefore that Held (2006) 
is right to describe care as both a practice and a value, meaning that care involves the practical 
activities of caring, but also a moral value or ideal of care that we should strive to meet.  
 When Held (2006) defines care partly as a practice, she is building on Ruddick’s 
(1989 [1995]) initial description of the care involved in mothering as formed by the maternal 
practice. According to Ruddick, the maternal practice is as other practices; it is defined by 
certain aims and sets certain requirements for the practitioner. Ruddick writes that just as “re-
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spect for experiment is imposed on scientists and racing past the finish line is imposed on 
jockeys”, the mother is required to preserve the life of the child, foster its growth and raise it 
to be an acceptable person in light of its social group (1989 [1995], p. 17). Defining care as 
partly a practice stands in contrast to Noddings’s (1984 [2003]) initial description of care as 
an attitude and ideal.10 Here, Noddings describes caring as meeting and receiving the other, 
and tuning into the other’s projects and ends. She differentiates between natural and ethical 
care, where the first arises naturally as with the mother’s overwhelming impulse to respond to 
her child, while ethical care involves the choice to respond to the other and to sustain the rela-
tion through an ideal of care (Noddings, 1984 [2003], p. 30-33, 80-83). Noddings’s account 
was criticised for laying too much weight on care as a personal ideal, and also for focusing 
too much on one-to-one relationships. The concern was that if care is seen as a private dispo-
sition and limited to personal relationships, it would lead to a romantic and sentimental notion 
of care that would fail to take into account the work involved in caring and the relevance of 
care to a broader set of relationships (Tronto, 1993, p. 103, 118; Held, 2006, p. 16). 
 Caring, then, can take the form of many different activities, and has relevance beyond 
personal relationships. Yet, as Held writes, the practice of care is more than “a series of indi-
vidual actions”, for it also includes normative standards for evaluating care (2006, p. 36, 38). 
There are certain values, requirements and standards that are common to all caring activities 
and mark them as caring. Held suggests that caring practices are defined by attentiveness, 
sensitivity, and responding to needs — from basic survival needs to more subtle cultural, 
emotional and psychological needs (Held, 2006, p. 36-43). Tronto initially listed attentive-
ness, responsibility, competence and responsiveness as the values or ideals of care, later add-
ing plurality, communication, trust, respect and solidarity (1993, p. 127-136; 2013, p. 34-35). 
Engster similarly describes the ideals of care as comprising attentiveness, responsiveness and 
respect (2007, p. 30). While all these values seem relevant to care in different ways, it seems 
unsatisfactory to ground the practice of care in a long list of positive-sounding ideals. Why, 
for instance, are these particular values chosen above others? I believe a deeper foundation for 
the normative value of care is found in Pettersen’s (2008; 2011) reasoning. 
 Pettersen (2008; 2011) suggests that the normative value of care resembles the princi-
ples of non-maleficence and beneficence. She refers to Gilligan (1982 [1993]), who initially 
describes the ethic of care as a commitment to non-violence, to not hurting others, and as a 
commitment to good, to wellbeing in relationships, and to human flourishing. Building on 
Gilligan’s work, Pettersen interprets the normative basis of care as involving first the princi-
                                                
10 See also Michael Slote’s (2010) Moral Sentimentalism for an alternative account of care-ethics as a 
form virtue ethic. 
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ple of non-maleficence where it is extended to include active intervention, and second the 
principle of beneficence where it is restricted to prevent systematic self-sacrifice. Pettersen 
argues that simply refraining from actively harming, as the principle of non-maleficence im-
plies, is not always enough, as care-ethics entails an active involvement in others’ wellbeing 
and a commitment to maintaining good relationships. On the other hand, the principle of be-
neficence may in its extreme form lead to self-sacrifice, whereas Gilligan initially pointed to 
the importance of caring for oneself as well as others (Pettersen, 2008, p. 33-34, 40-43; 2011, 
p. 54).  
 I prefer Pettersen’s proposal of grounding care-ethics in the principles of extended 
non-maleficence and restricted beneficence, because this reflects both the core focus and the 
key dilemmas of care-ethics. Caring implies doing good, actively helping particular others 
and being attentive to their needs; it also implies avoiding damage, hurt and pain. This reso-
nates with the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence. On the other hand, the dilem-
mas of caring involve balancing care for others with care for oneself, the care for one person 
with care for others, and awareness of the potential damage of neglect, ignorance and lack of 
involvement. The principles of extended non-maleficence and restricted beneficence 
acknowledge the limits to our care resources and the importance of active involvement.  
 
 
 The Scope of Care 
While caring activities may take very different forms, not all activities are caring. The ques-
tion is where to draw the line. Tronto (1993) gives perhaps the broadest definition of care as 
the “activity that includes everything we do to maintain, continue, and repair ‘our world’ so 
that we can live in it as well as possible” — as Tronto explains, ‘our world’ includes our bod-
ies, our selves and the environment. She follows up by pointing out that this extends to caring 
for objects (1993, p. 103). Held comments that Tronto’s definition of care could include many 
forms of economic activity from retail sales to house construction and professional cleaning, 
and she therefore sees it as “almost surely too broad” (Held, 2006, p. 31-32). Held touches on 
an important point: If the definition of care is stretched too wide, the meaning of care is dilut-
ed. If everything we do is caring, then there seems to be nothing very special about care. 
Tronto’s examples of caring activities range from providing food for starving children to tun-
ing a piano (1993, p. 106-107). She readily agrees that her definition is broad, but she also 
suggests that some activities are not generally caring, like playing, pursuing pleasure, creative 
activity, production and destruction (1993, p. 104). On the other hand, Held includes very 
different activities in her examples of caring practices, for instance, organising global food aid 
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and hanging up curtains to decorate a room (2006, p. 39). In light of her criticism of Tronto, it 
is surprising that Held mentions hanging up curtains as a potentially caring activity.  
 An important difference between Tronto’s definition and other care-ethicists’ descrip-
tions of care, is that Tronto includes caring for objects and ideas. When Held mentions hang-
ing up curtains as caring, this is meant as an example of an attentive and sensitive response to 
someone’s more subtle cultural need for a cosy home (2006, p. 39). Imagine someone helping 
a frail elderly person who is unable do this herself. On the other hand, Tronto’s example of 
the tuned piano is about caring for the piano itself. She writes of the “object of care” respond-
ing to the care it receives, as the piano sounding better after being tuned (1993, p. 107). How-
ever, the piano can only “respond” to being tuned in the sense of a forced mechanical change. 
There is no dialogue, communication or live response in a relation to an object. It is of course 
possible to care about an object in the sense of repairing a bike or cherishing a book, and to 
care about an idea, like the political idea of democracy. Still, I agree with Engster that the 
moral dimension of care demands interaction between human, or at least living, beings (Eng-
ster, 2007, p. 21). Engster gives no satisfactory answer as to why this is so, but I suggest this 
is implied through the relational ontology of care-ethics, where the focus is on care in rela-
tionships. This implies some level of communication, reciprocity and commitment. I see this 
as demanding a living relationship in some sense, and so excluding care for objects or ideas 
from the ethics of care.11 
 Engster (2007) limits caring activities to those that are directly aimed at meeting a 
person’s biological and developmental needs. To care, on his account, is to help meet the vital 
biological needs of individuals, foster their basic capabilities and alleviate unnecessary pain or 
suffering. According to Engster, a person’s vital biological needs include access to food, 
clothing and shelter. Next, fostering basic capabilities means helping to maintain and develop 
a person’s innate capacities for movement, emotion, affiliation, reason, speech, and so on, and 
in most societies today, literacy and numeracy (Engster, 2007, p. 26-31). In sum, Engster’s 
definition includes a minimum of abilities that enable persons to function in society and care 
for themselves and others. When considering whether or not an activity is caring, Engster 
poses the test question: Could the activity be successfully completed without meeting the di-
rect aims of caring? Housebuilding and economic production are generally not caring activi-
ties, on Engster’s view, as these are usually not directly aimed at meeting the biological or 
developmental needs of persons. Rather, the direct aim of housebuilding is the transformation 
                                                
11 This is not an easy question. Does this limit the care of care-ethics to relationships between living 
beings, and so exclude care for future or past generations? What about care for non-human beings, like 
other mammals? What about care for insects and plants, who presumably cannot communicate, recip-
rocate or commit to relationships with us, yet are important to our natural environment? 
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of building materials into housing, and the direct aims of economic production are more gen-
erally the manufacturing, transport, shipping or selling of goods. Still, Engster suggests that 
housebuilding, for example, could be caring if it were done for the explicit purpose of provid-
ing shelter for the homeless. In this case, the aim of the housebuilding would not be success-
fully completed until it housed the homeless, which would involve meeting their biological 
need for shelter (Engster, 2007, p. 29, 32-33, 121-122). 
 I see a potential problem with Engster’s account in that the direct and indirect aims of 
an activity are not always easily distinguishable. Engster suggests that housebuilding can be 
caring if the activity is part of a larger caring aim, as providing shelter for homeless, though 
generally it is not caring as the usual aim is transforming physical material and making mon-
ey. Engster must mean that the direct aim of the housebuilding activity is significantly differ-
ent in the two cases — shelter for homeless or sale on the market. Yet, the building will likely 
house somebody either way, thus meeting some person’s biological need for shelter. Engster 
clarifies that it is not the activity as such, but the aims and virtues of the activity that make it 
caring. Nor has the distinction to do with whether the work is paid or not (Engster, 2007, p. 
33, 121-122). So, Engster is not simply arguing that housebuilding is caring when it is a vol-
unteered non-profit activity, while generally not caring when it is a for-profit business activi-
ty. The need for shelter is obviously very acute for the homeless, but Engster’s reason for see-
ing housebuilding as caring in this example is the direct aim of the activity, not the urgency of 
the need.12 It may be true that housebuilding generally involves creating human shelter, and as 
such it may perhaps be a more caring than other building projects. However, if the purpose of 
the finished building is seen as being part of the direct aim of the building activity, then it 
seems that all building activity directed at the purpose of housing would be caring. Yet, Eng-
ster’s stance is that housebuilding is not generally caring. As I see it, Engster’s example con-
fuses the questions of who the building is meant to house and how housing is distributed. All 
people have a biological need for shelter. The homeless, however, are not able to gain access 
to housing through the usual means of buying or renting through the market. Providing hous-
ing for the homeless involves an economic cost however it is organised, whether it is a result 
of social volunteerism, governmental subsidies, or private initiative. These are concerns of 
whose needs are prioritised and how basic resources are distributed.  
 This discussion shows how difficult it is to make a sharp distinction between caring 
activities and other activities. It also shows how care-ethical concerns are closely tied to the 
prioritisation of needs, fairness and the economic distribution of the basic resources necessary 
                                                
12 Engster does also discuss how to distribute care resources in accordance with the urgency of the 
need, among other considerations, and I will come back to these principles of prioritisation towards 
the end of the thesis (2007, p. 56-58). 
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for care. Nevertheless, we can draw out some clear characteristics of caring activities. Caring 
activities are part of a care-ethical practice, which I suggest is grounded on what Pettersen 
(2008; 2011) sees as the normative core values of care: extended non-maleficence and re-
stricted beneficence. Further, care is relational which I interpret as excluding care for objects 
or ideas from the care-ethical notion of care. 
 
 
 Dangers of Dominance 
Philosophers Uma Narayan (1995) and Anita Silvers (1998) have each pointed to the dangers 
of paternalistic care, where those who have the role of carer have authority and power to con-
trol the relation, leaving those cared for vulnerable to domination and exploitation. Narayan 
sees the traditions of Western colonialism as infused by a discourse of care. She argues that 
colonialism was generally morally justified as being for the good of the colonised — it was 
the “white man’s burden” to civilise and Christianise the dark corners of the world (Narayan, 
1995, p. 134-135). Silvers (1998) argues that persons with disabilities who are dependent on 
the care of others may find themselves stuck in dominant or abusive relationships. Because 
many disabled persons crucially need the care of others, ending an abusive or dominant rela-
tionship with their carers may not be an option. On the other hand, dominance is not only a 
potential problem for the person cared for. Philosopher Sara L. Hoagland (1992) argues that 
altruistic care involves self-denial on the part of the carer, who is constantly attending to the 
other’s needs before one’s own. In this type of caring relationship it is the cared-for who has 
power over the carer, and it is the carer who is vulnerable to manipulation and dominance. In 
short, care-ethics has been criticised for setting too little weight on equality and individual 
autonomy, and too much weight on vulnerability and the meeting of needs. The argument is 
that those providing care may be mistaken in what they perceive as needs, or wrong in their 
approach to meeting them. They may be abusive or dominating. Again, those in a position to 
claim others’ care may be manipulative or inconsiderate. 
 Many caring relationships are asymmetrical in terms of differences in power, authority 
and dependency. This fact is recognised within care-ethics. The relationship between mother 
and child, for instance, has served as the prime example of a caring relationship where the 
parties have very unequal standing (Noddings, 1984 [2003]; Ruddick, 1989 [1995]; Held, 
1993; 2006). Although the mother is the one who has superior physical power and authority in 
the relation, this is of little use when the aim is to empower the child and encourage its devel-
opment into a responsible person (Held, 1993, p. 209). As Held writes: “We are accustomed 
to thinking of power as something that can be wielded by one person over another, a means 
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by which one person can bend another to his will. [… But the mother] neither wants to 
‘wield’ power nor to defend herself against the power ‘wielded’ by the child” (1993, p. 209).  
 Kittay (1999) has focused especially on asymmetrical caring relationships, bringing 
with her the perspective of caring for a severely disabled child. She concentrates specifically 
on the caring relationship between a person crucially dependent on the care of another in or-
der to function or survive, who she calls the “charge,” and the person taking care of the 
charge, the “dependency worker” (1999, p. 30-31). Kittay points out that both parties in an 
asymmetrical relationship are in a position to exploit the other’s vulnerability, and to be ma-
nipulative, dominant or abusive towards the other. Therefore, she sees both parties as having 
to trust each other and as bearing equal responsibility for not letting the relationship become 
abusive (Kittay, 1999, p. 33-35). The point is dominance and exploitation are not necessary 
consequences of asymmetrical relationships. From a care-ethical point of view, there will al-
ways be relationships that are characterised by differences in dependencies, needs and abili-
ties. Being aware of asymmetries in relationships will likely provide better tools for address-
ing problems of dominance than simply assuming that every person is independent, equally 
positioned to others and that every relationship is voluntarily chosen. 
 
  
 Problems of Altruistic Care 
Part of Hoagland’s (1992), and also Silvers’s (1998), criticism of care-ethics is that it is a con-
tinuation of traditional gender stereotypes. They see the focus on care as a focus on what have 
been traditional feminine virtues: self-sacrifice and altruistic care-giving. Hoagland sees care-
ethics as overly focused on the person cared for, demanding in return only minimal reciproci-
ty in terms of an acknowledgment of the care given. As she writes: “this [reciprocity] merely 
amounts to acknowledging the caring — a baby wiggling in delight as she is bathed, for ex-
ample” (Hoagland, 1992, s. 83). This comment is directed at Noddings (1984 [2003]), who 
initially saw an ethic of care as a feminine ethic, informed by attentiveness and a willingness 
to receive the other. Noddings describes care as symbolised by the approach of the mother 
with focus on the particulars of actual relationships — a significant contrast to the traditional 
ethics of the father based on the logics of abstract principles (Noddings, 1984 [2003], p. 36-
37). Other care-ethicists have since argued that care-ethics is not a feminine, but a feminist 
ethic — concerned with what has traditionally been women’s perspectives, though relevant 
for both sexes (Held, 2006, p. 20; Ruddick, 1989 [1995], p. 41).  
 Yet, attentiveness towards the needs of others is an important aspect of care-ethics. 
Kittay (1999) describes how the very nature of care in asymmetrical relationships requires the 
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carer to have a transparent self, where the needs of the other are observed and felt almost as 
keenly as her own. She argues that the more dependent and vulnerable the person cared for is, 
the more the carer is required to prioritise the dependent’s needs before her own. An infant 
waking in the night, from hunger or fear, has a justified claim on the carer’s attention even 
though the carer herself may be exhausted (Kittay, 1999, p. 51-52). Kittay recognises how the 
asymmetrical relationship between the carer and the dependent seems “to hover between ser-
vitude on the one hand, and paternalism on the other” (1999, p. 37). She describes the carer as 
having a transparent self, which makes her vulnerable as her self-respect is in part tied to how 
well she cares. On the other hand, the carer stands in an obvious position of power in relation 
to the dependent. Part of the problem, as Kittay sees it, is that the carer is relatively powerless 
with respect to others outside the dependency relation, while potentially too powerful in rela-
tion to the dependent. Addressing the social position of the carer will likely remedy some of 
the risks of both paternalism and servitude. Kittay writes: “One who has her interests taken 
care of in an appropriate and just manner will be less, not more, likely to live her life through 
the charge, and less, not more, likely to find other ways to discharge ambition and power than 
through paternalistic behaviour” (1999, p. 37). 
 Pettersen (2012) describes the archetype of altruistic care as a selfless act, provided 
unconditionally and spontaneously to particular persons for the sake of their best interests. 
She goes on to identify several problems with this understanding of care. Altruistic care, ac-
cording to Pettersen, involves consistently setting the other’s interests before one’s own, 
which implies that one person’s interests are given priority over the other’s. She suggests that, 
at least in principle, the interests of each party should count equally. Pettersen further argues 
that altruistic care construes the act of care as a spontaneous gift, where no questions are 
raised concerning why the needs have arisen, how the responsibility for meeting the needs is 
distributed or how to prioritise between those who need care. Lastly, because it is a one-sided 
understanding of care, it may easily turn into paternalistic or dominant form of care directed 
at a passive recipient, or alternatively allowing the cared-for to exploit and deplete the carer’s 
caring resources (Pettersen, 2012, p. 368-376).  
 Pettersen (2012) concludes that an altruistic understanding of care is grounded in an 
individualistic ontology, and suggests we look to the relational ontology of care-ethics for a 
better understanding of care. She points out that Gilligan initially saw moral maturity as in-
volving an ability to balance one’s own and others’ interests (Pettersen, 2012, p. 377; Gilli-
gan, 1982 [1993], p. 54, 73-74, 82). Pettersen sees mature care like an Aristotelean mean be-
tween excess and deficit, being the intermediate position between the extremes of selfishness 
and self-sacrifice. She sees reciprocity, dialogue, a principle of equal worth and an emphasis 
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on the relational context as important to mature care (Pettersen, 2012, p. 376-378). Pettersen 
points out that although an equal exchange of care work is not possible in asymmetrical rela-
tionships, reciprocity is still possible in terms of mutual recognition of each party’s equal 
worth and in that both parties contribute in some way towards the aim of the relationship. She 
acknowledges that the nature of asymmetrical relationships is to focus on the person cared for 
— the mother is concerned with her child’s flourishing and the nurse is concerned with her 
patient’s health — yet usually both parties must contribute to the aim of the relationship, for 
instance, by exchanging information, knowledge or emotions (Pettersen, 2012, p. 381-382). 
 Sometimes, and in certain types of relationships, one must attend to the other’s needs 
and set aside one’s own. In this light, there is an element of altruism and self-sacrifice in car-
ing, which Hoagland warns against. Still, care-ethics does not encourage a systematic neglect 
of the carer, on the contrary it is emphasised that the needs of the carer must also be met. 
Even Noddings, to whom Hoagland directed her criticism, sees the importance of being atten-
tive to one’s own needs in order to care for others (Noddings, 1984 [2003], p. 105). The rela-
tional focus of care-ethics sets limits to self-sacrificing care. As Pettersen points out, the carer 
cannot care boundlessly for one person only, as she is likely to have others to care for too and 
must also care for herself (2012, p. 379). With the relational ontology, the focus shifts from 
the exclusive perspective of either of the persons in the relationship, to a focus on their shared 
aims through the relationship and their shared responsibility for making it a caring relation-
ship. With an individual ontology, on the other hand, the perspective is either that of the care-
giver who altruistically, dominantly or paternalistically gives care to a passive recipient, or 
that of the person cared for who is able to dictate the conditions of the relation and exploit the 
carer’s resources. In this light, “caring” relations are no more than a struggle for power and 
dominance, or alternatively, involve a demand for one of the party’s boundless benevolence. 
What is missed here is that care is not merely something one person gives to, or demands of, 
another — end of story. Rather, care is an ongoing relational activity requiring cooperation, 
dialogue and shared aims. Nor should caring relationships be thought of as single, closed enti-
ties. Being aware of the wider relational context of particular caring relationships opens up 
questions about how caring responsibilities are distributed in a social and political framework.  
 
 
 The Social and Political Relevance of Care-Ethics 
In her book Caring, Noddings (1984 [2003]) makes the distinction between “caring about” 
and “caring for”. Caring about starving children in a distant country might simply involve 
sending a small amount of money, not even knowing if the money will be spent on food or 
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lost to corruption — it is “too easy” (Noddings, 1984 [2003], p. 112). As she argues, we 
might care about things, ideas, persons or causes in a general way, while caring for another 
entails commitment and active involvement in that person. Noddings’s point is to avoid the 
hollow notion of universal care, for, as she argues, it is not possible to genuinely care for eve-
ryone (1984 [2003], p. 18, 21). Held later adds to the discussion that the distinction between 
“caring about” and “caring for” is sometimes blurred: Really caring about world hunger will 
usually lead us to do something about it, and then a connection is established between our-
selves and those we are trying to help (2006, p. 30). Tronto (1993; 2013) explicitly includes 
“caring about” in her description of caring as a process consisting of several stages. On Tron-
to’s account, “caring about” is the first stage of care, involving the recognition of a need for 
care, which is a precondition for the next stage of “taking care of” the need, which again is 
followed by the direct act of “care-giving” and the response to the care in “care-receiving” 
(Tronto, 1993, p. 106-108). 
 On closer inspection, Tronto’s first stage of “caring about” is not that different from 
Noddings’s (1984 [2003]) description of the person caring tuning into the other’s point of 
view. On both their descriptions, attentiveness is required: Noddings describes caring as an 
engrossment in the other and as receiving the other’s point of view, and Tronto writes that 
caring about involves “a suspension of one’s self-interest, and a capacity genuinely to look 
from the perspective of the one in need” (Noddings, 1984 [2003], p. 17, 30-33; Tronto, 2013, 
p. 34). Neither think giving money involves direct caring, but see it rather as a way of ena-
bling care (Noddings, 1984 [2003], p. 112; Tronto, 1993, p. 107, 110). One of the main dif-
ferences in their descriptions, as I see it, is their views on the scope of the caring process. 
While Noddings argues that “caring about” is not at all the same as “caring for”, Tronto in-
cludes elements of both notions in her description of care as a process. Tronto would surely 
agree that simply “caring about” is not enough to ensure proper care, for on her view it must 
be followed up through the next phases of care. On Tronto’s account, good care is marked by 
the integrity of the caring process, i.e. that the different phases and moral qualities of the car-
ing process come together as a whole (1993, p. 136). Tronto, then, provides a wider analysis 
of caring, opening for the possibility of different persons and groups being involved at differ-
ent stages of the process. Broadening the perspective of care-ethics allows us to see care in a 
wider social and political context. Questions arise concerning the distribution of care work: 
Who cares for who? Who cares for those who have caring responsibilities for others? What 
are the structural causes of needs and dependencies?  
 Tronto argues, for instance, that there are systematic differences in terms of power and 
status associated with the different stages of caring, and that in the low-status stages care 
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work is typically performed by those of low social standing in society. She argues that the 
relatively privileged in society will often be in a position to ignore basic caring responsibili-
ties as they are not involved in the direct care work. While someone might say they pay their 
au pair or cleaner the “going rate”, they do not question whether the going rate is sufficient 
for the au pair or cleaner to be able to take care of her own and her family’s needs (Tronto, 
1993, p. 105, 121-124). This is what Tronto calls privileged irresponsibility — where some 
are in a position to ignore certain types of responsibilities and overlook their own privilege in 
being excused from the discussion (1993, p. 120-122; 2013, p. 103-106). 
 Kittay also provides important analyses of the broader social and political context of 
care and caring relationships, crucially paying attention to the question of who is to care for 
the carer (1999, p. 65). She contrasts the situation of the carer and her dependent “charge”, to 
the ideals of equality, independence and voluntariness that are the pillars of political liberal-
ism. Kittay argues, for instance, that because the carer must direct much of her time and re-
sources to her care work, she is in danger of falling behind in the competition for goods in the 
market and is often dependent on a third party to provide for her and her charge (1999, p. 39). 
Kittay argues that everyone is entitled to a relationship in which they can be adequately cared 
for, but they are also entitled to social support so that they can take on caring responsibilities 
without jeopardising their own well-being (Kittay, 1999, p. 66). Kittay raises questions con-
cerning the dependencies, vulnerabilities and responsibilities both within caring relationships 
and in the wider context of the carer’s social position outside the caring relationship. 
 Political scientist Fiona Robinson (1999) argues for the global relevance of care-
ethics. She asks how care-ethics, being a morality of closeness rather than of distance, is ap-
plicable to the context of global relations: “Surely it is precisely that distance — the physi-
cal/spacial, cultural, and psychological distance between moral agents — that we must ad-
dress and accommodate in thinking about international or global ethics?” (1999, p. 44-45, her 
emphasis). On the one hand, Robinson argues that distances seem to shrink in the contempo-
rary globalised world, due to communication, transport, the internet and people being more 
equally vulnerable to ecological threats. She thinks it a mistake, however, to overestimate 
how a globalised world leads to increased solidarity and unity, for the increased interrelated-
ness takes place within the context of profound differences (Robinson, 1999, p. 45-46, 99-
100). She mentions, for instance, how a globalised economy brings with it greater interde-
pendence, but also “... increased competition, deepening hierarchies and patterns of exclu-
sion” (1999, p. 99). Robinson suggests an ethic of care is needed in order to understand how 
social, political and economic relations are extending and becoming more intertwined, but 
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also in order to recognise these as relations of power, and be aware of the potential for exploi-
tation and dominance (Robinson, 1999, p. 101, 110, 128, 132).  
 Care-ethics, then, has moved beyond the domain of the personal and private, and now 
includes important analyses of many social and political issues. While care-ethics focuses on 
care in relationships, this extends to a wide range of relationships — from personal to profes-
sional, national to international, between two persons or between groups of people, between 
individuals and institutions. The relational ontology of care-ethics recognises that each person 
or group is again part of a larger relational structure. This implies interdependence, not inde-
pendence; the importance of particular attachment, not impartiality and separation; the possi-
bility of cooperation, not competition. Together the relational ontology of care-ethics and the 
normative value of care can open our eyes to the importance of care and relationships. Fur-
ther, this perspective shows how care concerns are affected by the broader context of social, 
political and economic structures. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A CARE-ETHICAL CRITIQUE OF MARKET THINKING 
 
 
 
From the perspective of care-ethics, there are several problems with the underlying assump-
tions and principles of mainstream economic theory. It is standardly assumed that economic 
agents are rational and largely self-interested, interacting through mutually beneficial market 
transactions with the aim of maximising profits or individual utility. This general economic 
outlook of market thinking seems fundamentally opposed to the perspective of care-ethics, 
where the focus is on care in relationships, dependencies, care responsibilities, and the balanc-
ing of one’s own interests with those of others. 
 In this chapter I argue that market thinking involves a dichotomy between self-interest 
and altruism, seeing these as two separate and opposing human motives. The implicit assump-
tion seems to be that, while self-interest is relevant to economic decisions, it is clearly sepa-
rate from ethics where the appropriate motive is benevolence. With the standard assumption 
of self-interest in economics, it is difficult to explain where the motivation to care for others 
comes from. Nor is it easy to interpret how caring responsibilities occur when each person is 
seen as independent and free — neither dependent on anyone in particular, nor having anyone 
in particular to care for. I argue that economic decisions are often not clearly separable from 
concerns relating to care. Having caring responsibilities, or being dependent on care, can easi-
ly lead to unequal bargaining positions in the market that over time form unjust structures 
(Kittay, 1999; Tronto, 2013; Young, 2011). However, these concerns are not easily addressed, 
or even noticed, within the framework of market thinking.  
 To be fair, mainstream economic theory is not a moral theory. The standard assump-
tions of rationality, self-interest and perfectly competitive markets are meant as models or 
tools for economic analysis, not as full descriptions of human agency or society. Economics is 
an independent field of study, interested in certain types of questions and equipped with cer-
tain tools for answering them. Economics is also generally thought a mainly descriptive disci-
pline, concerned with factual analysis and predictions of economic events. Indeed, at first 
glance it is difficult to see how any ethical viewpoint, let alone care-ethical considerations, 
might fit in with the image of economics as only having to do with rational calculations and 
individual gain. Yet, I argue that market thinking has influence beyond what might be thought 
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a pure economic domain. Market thinking sets a standard, a norm, for human interaction and 
the organisation of our society. As such, it is not value-neutral, but a normative framework for 
thinking about persons and society. Nor are economic activities always easily separable from 
other areas of human life. Economic events are the result of human decisions and often have 
real impact on people’s everyday lives — including their opportunities to care. I suggest 
therefore that economics is relevant to care-ethics, and that care-ethics can help us re-think the 
purpose of economic life and re-interpret the consequences of our economic structures.  
 
 
 Self-Interest and Rationality 
As we saw in chapter one, Smith made the point that it is self-interest, not benevolence, that is 
the driving motivation of economic decision-making. Indeed, it is the self-interested decisions 
of the many individuals in the market that together tend to promote those businesses that are 
most efficient and therefore benefit society as a whole (Smith, 1776 [2004], p. 12, 300). Thus, 
the market mechanisms serve as an invisible hand, implicitly promoting the most efficient 
businesses through the sum of the decisions of many self-interested individuals. On Mill’s 
description, the economic man is motivated by the desire for wealth, and is able to rationally 
consider the most efficient means towards this end (1844 [1992], p. 137). The legacy from 
Smith and Mill is still present in contemporary economic theory. Economic agents are stand-
ardly assumed to be rational and self-interested, meaning that corporations seek to maximise 
profits and individuals seek to maximise their preferences (Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 
7-8; Harberger, 2008; Hausman, 2013, 1.1). Smith and Mill captured what seems to be an 
essential truth about economic interaction, namely that self-interest is the backbone of trade. 
The butcher, the brewer and the baker, to whom Smith referred, each create successful busi-
nesses by selling, not giving away, their goods (1776 [2004], p. 12). For trade to work, the 
various parties must focus on their own interests. When they do, the compound effect on a 
large scale is the market mechanisms, described by Smith as the invisible hand (1776 [2004], 
p. 300).  
 When Smith and Mill emphasised self-interest as the prevalent motive of economic 
decision-making, did they mean this as a factual statement or were they suggesting that self-
interest ought be the prevalent motive? As mentioned in chapter one, while self-interest is a 
very common assumption in contemporary economics, it is not a necessary requirement that 
follows from the other standard assumption of rationality (Hausman and McPherson, 1996 
[2006], p. 46). If rationality is interpreted as the agent’s ability to consistently rank the alter-
natives she faces with reference to a set of individual preferences, then altruism is not in prin-
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ciple excluded (Hausman, 2013, 1.1). Precisely what each person’s preferences consist of is 
left outside the discussion. A person’s preferences are supposed to include whatever that per-
son cares about. In practice, however, self-interest is a common additional assumption that 
simplifies economic analysis. Trade between equally rational and self-interested individuals 
will come about only when the result of the transaction is judged by each party as beneficial 
to themselves. This is summed up by the economic principle of mutually beneficial trade 
(Bernheim and Whinston, 2008, p. 111). As equally rational and self-interested, the trading 
parties will each try to ensure the best deal for themselves, and only trade for goods they 
themselves actually want. The impression is that rationality and self-interest are prevalent in 
economic decisions, and furthermore that they ought to be.  
 Philospher Daniel M. Hausman and economist Michael S. McPherson (1996 [2006]) 
point out that the standard economic assumption of rationality is both expressive and norma-
tive. Saying, for instance, that it is rational to have an insurance policy is at the same time 
expressing approval and suggesting that people generally ought to be insured (Hausman and 
McPherson, 1996 [2006], p. 43). The same point can be made about the assumption of self-
interest. In stating that self-interest is prevalent in economic decisions, it is implied that self-
interest ought to be prevalent. If trade is the result of an exchange between equally self-
interested persons, and further, if trade then tends to promote the most efficient businesses, 
and by implication the most efficient economy, this suggests that self-interest is required for 
trade or for ensuring the best economic outcomes.  
However, as mentioned in chapter one, research in the field of behavioural economics 
has shown that a substantial portion of people are not motivated by self-interest in their eco-
nomic decisions, but seem to make decisions based on ideas of fairness and reciprocity (Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2002; Rabin, 2002). These findings suggest that in actual situations, self-
interest is not the main motive for a significant number of people. On the other hand, it also 
shows that a substantial portion of the participants do in fact make decisions in line with the 
assumption of self-interest (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002, p. C4; Rabin, 2002, p. 665). Appar-
ently, then, there is a plurality of motives in actual economic decision-making. Yet, these re-
sults neither confirm nor disconfirm whether self-interest ought to be the main motive of eco-
nomic decision-making. 
 As a thought experiment, how might one make sense of care in relationships on the 
basis of the economic model of rational and self-interested individuals? If we assume that a 
person’s preferences are exclusively rational and self-interested, caring seems to make no 
sense unless it is seen as a mutually beneficial exchange of services or as an insurance for the 
coverage of future care needs. If caring for others is motivated by the person’s self-interest 
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alone, it must mean that the carer expects something back. In line with the economic principle 
of mutually beneficial trade, the carer will expect something in return for her care that, in her 
eyes at least, is as valuable as her investment in this care. Some caring relationships may in-
volve a fairly equal exchange of care, as for instance, between friends or partners. Yet, many 
caring relationships are asymmetrical in their nature, like the relationship between the mother 
and her infant child, the doctor and the patient, or the caring relationship to a severely disa-
bled person. Here, attention to one party will demand much of the relationship’s focus, or the 
degree of dependence of one party may exclude any possibility of an equal exchange.  
 If caring relationships are nothing more than a mutually beneficial exchange of ser-
vices, then presumably parents care for their children only in order to ensure care for them-
selves in their old age. What motivation would parents have to care for a child that is severely 
disabled? The disabled child will never be able to return the parents’ care. In any case, no 
child is ever in a position to freely accept or decline a contract demanding an equal exchange 
of care services with her parents. At least not until the child has reached a certain level of ma-
turity, by which time she will necessarily already have relied extensively on the parents’ care, 
or at least someone’s care. Perhaps it could be argued that the child implicitly agreed to the 
contract simply by being born and being looked after. Furthermore, if she benefitted from her 
parent’s care, does she not owe them some form of repayment? I would argue that the parents 
may hope that their child will return their care and even their love, but surely, from a self-
interested perspective, this is a risky endeavour. Why, if we are motivated by self-interest 
alone, should we invest so much time, money, energy and emotion in a relationship that may 
never yield returns that match the investment? It would be more rational to spend that time 
and energy working or pursuing other interests, and save money as a means to pay for what-
ever care services we need when elderly and frail. The self-interested economic agent seems 
to have no incentive to care for others without adequate “payment”. The motivation to care is, 
here, reduced to personal material gain and the caring relation itself to a disinterested ex-
change of services.  
 If we instead discard the assumption of complete self-interest, and open for the possi-
bility of other-regard as part of the individual’s preferences, caring for others makes more 
sense. For example, having children to care for, a parent may prefer to work less in order to 
spend more time at home. The parent may, then, choose a different work-leisure balance than 
a young, single person without children. On the other hand, the parent may choose to work 
more, rather than stay at home, in order to earn enough money to adequately provide for the 
children. Meanwhile, the young, childless person can live on less, and may choose to have 
more leisure time. This model can then include care in the individual’s preferences, which can 
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explain why some people choose to work more, or less, in order to care for others. However, 
this gives the impression that choosing to care is a simple preference, as some people prefer 
chocolate to bananas.13 An important fact, which is not immediately apparent here, is that the 
“preference” for care is a consequence of having caring responsibilities. Nor are caring re-
sponsibilities always freely chosen, but may arise within the relationships the person is al-
ready involved in. 
 From a care-ethical point of view, care should neither be reduced to an individual 
preference for personal gain, nor to an individual preference for benevolence. If the carer is 
assumed to be completely self-interested, it makes no sense to talk of her caring for any rea-
son other than for her own personal gain. To be self-interested means, not simply that one 
follows one’s individual preferences, but that these preferences are for one’s own good 
(Hausman and McPherson, 1996 [2006], p. 79-80). Thus, a self-interested person does not 
truly care about anyone, except as a means for achieving personal gain. If care is interpreted 
as an individual preference where this is not completely self-interested, caring becomes an 
individual preference for benevolence. While there is an element of benevolence in caring, I 
argued in chapter two that care is fundamentally relational. As Pettersen (2012) points out, in 
principle, the interests and needs of the carer and the cared-for have equal weight (2012, p. 
376-382). So, in the long run and through the various relationships we are part of, a balance 
should be sought between the carer’s own needs and the needs of others. The persons in a 
caring relation are not competing for each other’s benevolence, nor should a commitment to 
care be thought simply as some people’s individual choice to be altruistic (Held, 2006, p. 34; 
Tronto, 2013, p. 32). The point is, if care is interpreted simply as an individual preference, 
care is reduced to the individual’s personal taste for doing good. The relational quality of care 
is lost, along with the weight of care as a form of responsibility, which may demand more 
than one prefers. As the feminist economist Julie A. Nelson writes: “‘The economic man’, in 
contrast to real humans, neither ever needs care nor has any responsibility or desire to give it” 
(2011, 39).  
 
 
                                                
13 Fehr and Fischbacher end their paper thus: “People differ not only in their tastes for chocolate and 
bananas but also along a more fundamental dimension. They differ in regard to their inclination to 
behave in a selfish or reciprocal manner, and this does have impact on economic consequences” 
(2002, p. C30). 
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 Independence versus Caring Responsibilities 
The economic principle of mutually beneficial transactions implies that each party is free to 
independently accept or decline an exchange of goods or services. Coupled with the assump-
tion of the economic agent as rational, the principle further implies that each person knows 
their own best. This is sometimes referred to as the principle of individual sovereignty (Bern-
heim and Whinston, 2008, p. 9). The image, then, is of individuals as free to pursue their own 
interests, independent of all ties except those freely chosen and those beneficial to one’s self. 
Thus, individuals seem to stand in relation to others in positions of equal bargaining power. 
What is lost in this picture is the fact that not every person is in the ideal circumstances of an 
independent adult or head of household (Held, 2006, p. 81). Care-ethics makes a point of hu-
man dependency. Every person is dependent on others to various degrees and at various stag-
es of their lives. Even the ability to make independent decisions is not simply given, but learnt 
over time and within relationships to others (Held, 1993, p. 189-190; Tronto, 2013, p. 125). 
Assuming that every person knows their own best, for instance, means overlooking the obvi-
ous fact that small children, some mentally disabled adults or demented elderly cannot make 
their own decisions, and actually need others to make informed decisions for them. Further, 
some responsibilities and obligations are not simply freely chosen contractual agreements, but 
are the results of relationships or structures we find ourselves part of. Due to differences in 
age, health, social ties and responsibilities, levels of education, wealth, and so on, people are 
not equally, but radically unequally, positioned in the market. 
 Kittay (1999) argues that a conception of society as a free competition of goods be-
tween equally positioned self-interested and independent individuals overlooks the human 
fact of dependencies and responsibilities for care. She points out that not only does this con-
ception ignore how some people are crucially dependent on the care of others, like children, 
frail elderly or disabled persons; it also ignores how the carers themselves are dependent on a 
third party to provide for them and their dependents, and to provide resources for sustaining 
the caring relation itself (Kittay, 1999, p. 29, 44-46). Here, Kittay describes two types of ine-
quality: an inequality of capacity and an inequality of situation. The first type of inequality is 
found between the person caring and the person cared-for. As mentioned in chapter two, Kit-
tay focuses on those crucially dependent on the care of others in order to function or survive 
in their environments, whom she calls the “charge” (Kittay, 1999, p. 31). The charge is de-
pendent on care because she is not capable of taking care of herself, and thus, by virtue of the 
relation of care, there is an inequality of capacity between the carer and the charge (Kittay, 
1999, p. 45-46). However, Kittay explains that an inequality of situation also arises between 
the carer and a third party or provider. As an example she refers to the traditional family mod-
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el, where one adult, the head of household, provides for the family by participating in the 
economy while the other adult has the primary responsibility for their dependents — their 
children or elderly relatives. With the traditional family model, the provider makes available 
external resources on which the carer is dependent. Kittay argues that the carer vis-à-vis the 
provider is in a worse bargaining position because she is dependent on the cooperation of the 
provider in order to secure the resources necessary for meeting her own needs as well as sus-
taining the caring relation to her charge (Kittay, 1999, p. 43).  
 It may be argued that Kittay’s distinction between an inequality of capacity and an 
inequality of situation is often blurred in reality. An inequality of capacity will likely involve 
an inequality of situation. For instance, a severely disabled person will always be highly de-
pendent on others’ care in a way that a fully functioning adult will not. There is then a differ-
ence in capacity and in situation. However, it seems Kittay wants to highlight that inequalities 
mainly arise from differences in situation, and not from differences in capacity as such. While 
the carer and provider, in her example, both have fairly similar capacities, they stand in radi-
cally different positions. The carer is bound by her caring responsibilities towards her charge, 
while in turn she is crucially dependent on the provider for the resources necessary to sustain 
the caring relationship. Yet, one might point out that the provider too, presumably is bound by 
a responsibility to provide for the carer and her charge. Kittay argues, however, that the car-
er’s exit options are more restricted than the provider’s. She explains this as being due in part 
to the carer’s moral and emotional commitment to her charge and in part to the fact that her 
role as carer makes her more likely to tune into another’s needs and to accept them as her own 
(1999, p. 43-44). Kittay’s point seems to be that inequalities can arise not only from differ-
ences in capacities, but also from differences in caring responsibilities towards others, which 
again may lead to differences in the access to necessary resources for themself and their de-
pendents. Thus, in discussing inequalities between persons one must also pay attention to dif-
ferences in their situations. 
 Kittay looks especially at unpaid care work, where the carer is kept outside the compe-
tition of goods because of her caring responsibilities (1999, p. 39). Her discussion shows how 
the perspective of market thinking ignores the positions of those outside the market and leaves 
unanswered the question of how they are to access market goods. With market thinking it 
seems to be simply assumed that individuals are free to enter the market if they choose, and 
once they enter, it is assumed that they will be equally positioned with others in the competi-
tion for goods. Kittay comments that, on the liberal model of society, the competition for so-
cial goods is like “a competition on a playing field, which, if not level, then is one in which 
the unevenness is uniformly distributed” (1999, p. 48). Yet, as she continues, those who enter 
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this competition with ties of responsibility “enter a race with one leg tied to a drag”. It may be 
argued that the lack of economic independence, the situation in which Kittay’s unpaid carer 
finds herself, is remedied by professionalising care work. As Kittay points out, professional 
care work may be directed towards others’ needs and have a non-self-interested character, in a 
similar way to the unpaid care work she initially focuses on. However, Kittay sees the poten-
tially other-directed character of professional work as balanced by detachment, autonomy and 
achievement appropriate to the profession. She mentions how the doctor, for example, sets a 
diagnosis and prescribes medicine or further care that others carry out. Professional work is 
specialised, while the care work Kittay focuses on is more generally directed at sustaining the 
charge and the charge’s various needs. Kittay adds that specialised professional work includes 
honorary and monetary rewards — symbols of achievement and status. While more general 
care work is either unpaid or poorly paid, and has low status (Kittay, 1999, p. 38-40). Even if 
general care work were more widely professionalised, which is largely the case in Norway 15 
years after the publication of Kittay’s book, still, some care work must fall on personal rela-
tions rather than on professional relations.14 For example, the main responsibility for the care 
of children is left to the parents, at least for the first months or years. Even where there is ac-
cess to child care, like day care centres and after-school programmes, the parents still have the 
main responsibility for ensuring that their child’s needs for care are properly met. Publicly or 
privately funded parental leave or welfare leave15 are examples of a ways to economically 
compensate caring responsibilities in personal relations. However, it is only possible to ad-
dress these issues if it is first acknowledged that caring responsibilities arise within relation-
ships, that someone must take on these responsibilities, and that their care work has value. 
With market thinking these issues are hardly even visible. Following the lead of the market 
view would mean developing a society of complete individual independence, where care ser-
vices are exclusively distributed through the market. 
 
 
                                                
14 It seems the Norwegian welfare system provides access to at least some of the general care services 
Kittay alludes to, exemplified by the general access to child day care centres for children from the age 
of one, after-school programmes, professionalised care of the elderly, and government-subsidised 
health care for children up to the age of 15. Yet, like any political system, the Norwegian welfare sys-
tem is not set in stone, and is vulnerable to political changes in the direction of liberalisation and pri-
vatisation of social care programmes. 
15 I refer here to the Norwegian “velferdspermisjon” which is a fairly common right for employees to 
take leave of absence for personal reasons, like a death in the family, moving home, or going to the 
doctor.    
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 Structural Inequality 
Tronto (2013), like Kittay (1999), looks into the problems of unequal bargaining positions, 
though focusing on the consequences not for those outside the market, but for those within the 
market. Tronto argues that unequal bargaining positions in the market, when multiplied thou-
sands of times, lead to structural inequalities. She explains that this is due to the fact that one 
exchange in the market often sets the standard for the next, so having a less powerful bargain-
ing position the first time round means a similarly weak position the next time. Tronto illus-
trates her point, in the same paragraph, with the negotiation of an employment contract: The 
power of the employee’s position will affect the wage agreed on, and this sets the standard for 
the next time the parties meet to renegotiate (Tronto, 2013, p. 126). The market view brings 
with it a sense of timelessness where each transaction in the market is seen as starting anew, 
as if from neutral, ahistorical ground. Though in fact the history of earlier transactions will 
have an influence on the outcome of present transactions. The framework of market thinking 
only seems to be able to explain differences by the extent to which different people are will-
ing to work hard. As Tronto points out, individualism seems to lead to a work ethic that im-
plies that hard work is followed by success. Thus, those who do not work hard will not get 
what they need (Tronto, 2013, p. 83-85). With market thinking it is not acknowledged, nor 
even noticed, that problems of structural differences may develop over time. In care-ethics, on 
the other hand, time is an important dimension: Relationships are developed over time, de-
pendency evolves and changes with time, and thus, personal and social history affects a per-
son’s sense of identity, autonomy, and future relations. 
 Structural problems are also analysed by political scientist Iris Marion Young 
(2011),16 who specifically looks into what she called structural injustice. She defines structur-
al injustice as social processes that systematically and negatively affect the positions of cer-
tain groups of people, reducing their opportunities to develop and exercise their capacities. As 
she writes: “Structural injustice occurs as a consequence of many individuals and institutions 
acting to pursue their particular goals and interests, for the most part acting within the limits 
of accepted rules and norms” (Young, 2011, p. 52). This form of injustice is a wrong that is 
difficult to pin to anyone or anything in particular, whether individual actions or political pol-
icies. As Young explains, this is because those who partake in these structures are often una-
ware of the unjust processes they are part of (2011, p. 45, 52). Young mentions the situation 
of garment workers in the global garment industry as an example of structural injustice. She 
argues that the whole market structure of production and distribution diffuses the responsibil-
                                                
16 Young’s (2011) Responsibility for Justice was published posthumously on the basis of Young’s 
manuscripts and edited by Martha Nussbaum. 
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ity for the working conditions at the bottom of the supply chains. She explains that at each 
level of the distribution and production chain, the parties will see themselves as operating on 
the margin in a highly competitive market, and thus their situation is felt as a constraint on 
their opportunities to act or choose differently (Young, 2011, p. 125-134).17 
 Kittay, Tronto and Young all point at the consequences of differences in power and 
positions within a market structure. Kittay (1999) describes the difficult position of those who 
stand outside the market, either because they are dependent on the care of others, or because 
they are responsible for another’s care and dependent on a third party for the resources to con-
tinue their care work. Tronto (2103) argues that differences in power in terms of market posi-
tions increase over time and result in unequal structures. Young (2011) addresses such unjust 
or unequal structures, and points to the difficulty of pinning blame on any particular action or 
policy; for it is the structure itself that is the problem rather than any particular individual ac-
tion. With market thinking, on the other hand, it seems simply to be assumed that everyone 
stands on an equal footing. The arena of economic markets appears to be a space of free 
choice and a level playing ground. However, in reality it is an arena where structural inequali-
ties easily take root, and lie concealed under the proclaimed ideal of free choice.  
 
 
 Unrealistic Assumptions 
The standard assumptions of mainstream economic theory have been criticised from different 
quarters for being overly simplistic. For instance, economist Paul Krugman comments on the 
state of economics after the financial crisis of 2008, and concludes that “[…] economists need 
to abandon the neat but wrong solution of assuming that everyone is rational and markets 
work perfectly” (2009, p. 8). His point is that reality, contrary to theory, is usually neither 
simple nor elegant. However, as discussed in chapter one, the standard assumptions of eco-
nomic theory are not meant as full descriptions of reality. They highlight the elements thought 
most central to economic behaviour. Mill explicitly pointed out that his notion of the econom-
ic man was a deliberate simplification of human beings, and similar cautions are made by 
contemporary economists (Mill, 1844 [1992], p. 139; Mankiw and Taylor, 2011, p. 25-26). As 
also mentioned in chapter one, Friedman (1953) has further argued that it is the usefulness, 
not the realism, of the assumptions that are of consequence for economic theory. Does it mat-
ter whether the underlying assumptions of economic theory are realistic, as long the model 
leads to correct predictions? It seems reasonable to presume that the more accurately the 
                                                
17 I will return to the case of responsibility in the garment industry in the last chapter. 
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model represents the actual conditions of human decision-making, the more accurate the pre-
dictions that can be made. Yet, a model, by its very nature, cannot incorporate all aspects of 
reality, for it would then simply mirror real events rather than reveal the underlying causal 
patterns. Some assumptions must be made about what aspects of human life are to count as 
relevant. The economist and Nobel laureate James M. Buchanan defended the use of certain 
abstractions in economic modelling, arguing that: “Any theory is abstracted from the reality 
perceived by the senses, and theory derives its potential value precisely because it is so ab-
stracted” (1987, p. 51, his emphasis). As I see it, there are two issues related to the criticism 
that the standard assumptions of economic theory are unrealistic: One is the use of models 
based on overly simplistic assumptions to explain and predict real events and human interac-
tion; the other is the use of models that are based on simplistic and mistaken assumptions to 
explain real events and human interaction.  
 First, explaining human interaction with models that rest on too simplistic assumptions 
will mean that much of the detail of the actual situations is ignored. As Buchanan argued, the 
very nature of a model requires some simplification. General mechanisms are then required as 
explanatory tools, and these must be fairly universal, holding generally for most people in 
most situations. Assuming that economic agents are rational ensures that every agent will act 
according to the same principles, given similar conditions. Similar conditions are provided 
through the assumption of perfect markets. From a care-ethical point of view, the simplifica-
tion involved in economic modelling is problematic in that it relies on extreme generalisations 
and universal principles. Part of the care-ethical critique of dominant moral theories like 
Kantian ethics, utilitarianism and political liberalism has been directed at their reliance on 
abstract and universal principles (Gilligan, 1993; Noddings, 2003; Held, 1993; 2006). The 
principle of impartiality, for instance, creates a distance to the complexity of actual moral 
dilemmas. Care-ethics, on the other hand, is concerned with the particular and actual, bearing 
a sensitivity to the situational context. The complexity of the situation is thought to hold the 
key to understanding how the moral problems arise in the first place and the appropriate 
means of addressing them. From a care-ethical point of view, extreme simplification is in it-
self problematic. Yet, care-ethics is also a theory attempting to make sense of a complicated 
real world, and so some simplifications will be necessary here too. I suggest simplistic as-
sumptions are not the main problem. Rather, it is a question of which elements of the real 
world are brought to the forefront. 
 This leads to the second concern that economic theory may rely on simple and mistak-
en assumptions. From a care-ethical point of view, the standard assumptions of economic the-
ory are, if not completely mistaken, then at best present only a sliver of actual human agency 
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and human interaction. At worst, the standard assumptions lead to a false view of persons as 
exclusively rational and self-interested, where the reality of dependency and caring needs — 
along with the possibility of unjust structures — is ignored. As argued in the previous sections 
of this chapter, rationality and self-interest alone cannot explain why we take on caring re-
sponsibilities, except as part of a mutually beneficial exchange of services. Asymmetrical care 
relationships, where the needs of one of the parties demand most of the other’s attention, 
make little sense on the market view. Even with the modifications suggested by research in 
behavioural economics, much is left out that care-ethicists would include in a theory relevant 
to human interaction. A crucial difference is that the general economic outlook leads to an 
individualistic perspective, focused as it is on individual independence and assumed equality 
and freedom of choice. This leaves out the problem of unequal structures forming over time, 
or the consequences of being bound by caring responsibilities. Care-ethics, on the other hand, 
is fundamentally relational, emphasising how each person is situated within a web of relation-
ships. Care and responsibilities make sense in that they arise within relationships, and the way 
these needs are met has consequences for a larger relational structure. 
 
 
 The Normative Implications of Market Thinking 
It may be protested that economic theory is, after all, not a moral theory. The aim of economic 
theory is to explain economic events and economic behaviour, not care, social relations or 
responsibilities. Generally, economists will separate positive economic analysis from norma-
tive analysis, leaving questions of what ought to be the case to politicians or others. Friedman 
has explicitly argued for a separation of positive and normative economic analysis, stating 
that “positive economics is, or can be, an ‘objective’ science, in precisely the same way as any 
of the physical sciences” (1953, p. 2). In fact, there seems to be a culturally accepted gap sep-
arating economics from other areas of human life: “While we may grant that interpersonal, 
family and civic life are laden with meaning, ethical depth and opportunities for care, we may 
believe that, in contrast, modern capitalist, market oriented, competitive economic life obeys 
its own impersonal and mechanical rules” (Nelson, 2011, p. 35). It is as if economic activities 
belong to a separate sphere, steered entirely by their own market mechanisms. These mecha-
nisms are formed through the numerous, uncoordinated decisions of economic agents, each 
rationally seeking their own interests. Thus, ethical considerations, relevant in social, politi-
cal, and personal life, seem alien in economic markets. It is as if economic activity neither is 
nor could be relevantly influenced by ethics. On a first glance, then, there seems to be no 
room for ethics in the domain of economic decision-making, let alone care-ethics which sets 
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the importance of care, relationships and responsibilities at the forefront. Yet, as the discus-
sion so far in this chapter has suggested, I see market thinking as infused by a normative 
standard, and economic conditions as bearing influence on concerns of care and responsibili-
ties. Market thinking is a framework for thinking about human behaviour and decision-
making in economic terms, and is based on the standard assumptions and principles of main-
stream economic theory.  
 My reasons for seeing market thinking as infused by a normative standard rest on two 
points. First, I consider an implicit normative standard to be present in that market thinking 
identifies certain elements of human behaviour and interaction as relevant at the exclusion of 
others. The assumptions of rationality, self-interest and individual independence, meant as 
descriptive tools for economic analysis, easily slip into a normative standard — both within 
and outside a purely economic setting. This leads to the second point, that economic activity 
does not belong to a sphere that is separated from the rest of human life. Economic events are 
the results of human decisions and human-made structures, and often have real impact on 
people’s lives. As such, many economic decisions have moral significance. 
 Consider, first, the implicit normative message present in the standard assumptions of 
economic theory. Together the assumptions of rationality and self-interest, and the principle 
that economic agents generally prefer more to less, imply that we each seek ever more materi-
al gain. In putting precisely these assumptions and principles at the centre as relevant to eco-
nomic decision-making, the implication is that these are the only features relevant to econom-
ic decision-making. While insights from behavioural economics can in part soften the stand-
ard assumptions of neoclassical theory, still, the framework of individual preferences is the 
same. From a care-ethical point of view, thinking in terms of individual preferences will in 
itself make it difficult to see caring as anything more than a personal taste for benevolence. 
The point is, simply by picking out certain features at the exclusion of others, as those most 
relevant to the theory, will in itself set a normative standard. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, Hausman and McPherson (1996 [2006]) argue that the assumption of rationality is 
both expressive and normative, and I suggest that the same is true of the assumption of self-
interest. Stating that it is rational to, for example, choose the cheapest of two alternatives, is at 
the same time stating that one ought to choose the cheapest. Or, stating that any employee will 
try to negotiate for the highest possible pay for herself is at the same time stating that she 
ought to negotiate for the highest possible pay — she would be a fool not to. The normative 
message, then, is that rationality and self-interest are both acceptable and expected in econom-
ic decision-making. While self-interest is perhaps not required for good economic judgement, 
it is often implied that not being self-interested would be both unexpected and a bit stupid — 
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even irrational. If it is irrational for an employee not to try to secure the highest possible pay 
for herself, this implies that being self-interested is part of what it is to be rational, or that be-
ing self-interested is in this setting a good thing. However, it cannot be the case that rationali-
ty must entail self-interest. As economist and philosopher Amartya Sen comments: “Why 
should it be uniquely rational to pursue one’s own interest at the exclusion of everything 
else?” (1987, p. 15, his emphasis). Sen concludes that this would be absurd, as it would be the 
same as claiming that other-regard is in principle always irrational (1987, p. 15). Yet, the 
statement that it would be irrational for an employee not to try to maximise her pay level uses 
the word “irrational” in the normative sense of being a bad choice. This suggests that while 
self-interest is not strictly required by rationality, it is at least expected in economic decisions. 
 Thus, the notion of rationality works both as a descriptive and a normative concept. 
Self-interest is not only present in many economic decisions, but seems expected as part of 
good economic decision-making. In sum, we are left with the impression that material gain is 
a valid goal both at a personal and at a broader macroeconomic level. The general purpose of 
economic activity seems in turn to be economic growth. When economic growth is set forth 
as the purpose of economic activity, by implication it also becomes the ideal and measure-
ment of economic success. When economic growth is the justified end of economic activity, 
then increases in efficiency, productivity and demand are justified means towards this end. 
Questions of sustainability or fair distribution may be difficult to fit into this framework, and 
this is precisely when, or because, they stand in the way of increased economic growth. In this 
way, the ideal of economic activity spills over into other domains as a general ideal for per-
sonal, social and political life. We are left with a framework for thinking about persons and 
social interactions in market terms. I argue that market thinking is not value-neutral but based 
on a set of normative propositions, emphasising certain themes — rationality, efficiency, in-
dependence and personal gain — but leaving out others. 
 
 
 Economics is not a Separate Sphere 
The second point in my reasoning that market thinking is infused by a normative standard is 
that not only is there a normative ideal present in market thinking, but this ideal cannot be 
ignored as it has relevance beyond what might be thought a pure economic sphere. Economics 
is not simply about monetary affairs: “Virtually every human decision involves the use of 
some scarce resources” (Mankiw and Taylor, 2011, p. 10). Economist and sociologist Gary S. 
Becker has perhaps drawn the market methodology and ideology the furthest, looking at vari-
ous topics such as marriage, divorce, crime and discrimination through the lens of economic 
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theory. For instance, it was Becker who introduced the notion of human capital, referring to 
the economic value associated with human resources like education, training and skills.18 The 
term is now both common and fairly uncontroversial, which exemplifies how economic con-
cepts are, perhaps increasingly, used to think about persons and their motives. In his research, 
Becker does not adopt a narrow view of human motivation as exclusively self-interested or as 
driven by material gain, but he does assume that “[…] individuals maximize welfare as they 
conceive it, whether it be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic” (Becker, 1996, p. 
139, his emphasis). Thus, the framework of individual preferences is still firmly in place.  
 Becker’s research serves an example of how market thinking has an influence beyond 
what might have been thought purely economic issues. Held (2006) also argues that market 
thinking is spreading. Held sees the ideal assumptions of economic theory not as mere theo-
retical abstractions, but as a standard applied increasingly to new areas in the United States 
(2006, p. 107, 110). She writes: “We can recognize domains in which the individual pursuit of 
self-interest and the maximisation of individual satisfactions are morally permissible […]” 
(Held, 2006, p. 120). But, she continues, other domains such as education, child and health 
care, culture and protecting the environment should be kept outside market norms “because 
markets are unable to express and promote many values important to these practices, such as 
mutually shared caring concern” (2006, p. 120). Held’s proposal is that we keep caring activi-
ties outside the realm of markets in order to ensure they are not corrupted by market ideals, 
such as profit maximisation.  
 Held’s arguments assume that the market ideals can be contained within their appro-
priate domains. As long as the market ideals are held within these boundaries, she seems to 
conclude that they are morally permissible. Smith (1776 [2004]) and Mill (1844 [1992]) simi-
larly implied that the field of economics can be separated from other enquiries and that differ-
ent activities and questions belong to different domains. Smith’s quote about the butcher, 
brewer and baker pursuing their business activities with self-interest, not benevolence, as their 
main motives, suggests that the two motives are set up against each other (Smith, 1776 
[2004], p. 12). Mill’s account of the economic man suggests that human motivation is divisi-
ble into separate parts. While Mill considered a full description of human agency to involve a 
complex mix of desires and aversions, for the purpose of economic analysis he regarded the 
relevant motivation to be the desire for wealth (Mill, 1844 [1992], p. 139). In sum, the im-
pression is that self-interest is the correct guide in economic decisions, while moral considera-
                                                
18 See Becker, 1964, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to 
Education, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
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tions ask for something else, benevolence perhaps.19 What should one do, then, if the issue at 
hand has both economic and moral implications? Is it self-interest or benevolence that is the 
right guide? And, does the simplified notion of the economic man still hold as a useful tool 
for analysis? 
 In practice, I see it as very difficult to achieve a clear delineation between a purely 
economic domain and other domains. It is clear that some economic issues, at least, are close-
ly linked to moral issues. As Hausman and McPherson comment, moral ideas are perhaps not 
very relevant to the economist forecasting the price of wheat, but they are relevant to the 
economist concerned with improving the standard of living in poor countries, for instance 
(1996 [2006], p. 4). Further, think of the impact of the financial crisis of 2008. Beginning 
with the burst of a housing bubble in the United States, it spread through the financial markets 
via complex financial products and resulted in the collapse of several large banks, increases in 
national debts, and lasting unemployment in many countries (The Economist, 2013). What 
looked like purely economic phenomena — the trade of collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs) — in fact had real and lasting consequences for ordinary people’s lives. As many 
people have lost their homes and their jobs, and seen their pensions and other social benefits 
decline, it has become clear that economic events also bear moral significance. Economic 
outcomes can cause real harm. Again, consider the typical economic reality of a garment 
worker in Bangladesh, for instance, who works long hours for little pay and is hardly able to 
support herself and her family.20 She is fully aware that economic constraints can hinder the 
choices and opportunities one has, including one’s opportunities to care. Engster (2007) 
points out that economic resources are necessary for care, being the means to attain access to 
basic commodities like food, water, clothing and energy. He argues that we all depend on 
work, or on the work of others, in order to meet our own caring needs and the needs of our 
dependents (Engster, 2007, p. 117, 123). Economic conditions, then, are relevant to care-
ethical concerns, both as potentially fostering or hindering care. 
 Not only do economic decisions and events have an influence beyond what might be 
thought the appropriate boundaries of “pure” economics, Nelson (2011) argues that social 
values and norms also influence economic activity itself. She considers the idea that economic 
                                                
19 The so-called Adam Smith Problem addresses what is an apparent contradiction in Smith’s work 
between altruism and egoism. His moral theory in The Theory of Moral Sentiments seems to explain 
morality as resting on a natural sympathy for others, though self-interest seems to be the prevalent 
motivational factor in his The Wealth of Nations. However, the debate seems now largely resolved, as 
most contemporary scholars reject such a simplistic interpretation of either of Smith’s works. See 
Weinstein (2008) for an overview of Smith’s theories. 
20 See the reports Bangladesh: Seeking Better Employment Conditions for Better Socioeconomic Out-
comes by the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2013) and Living Wage in Asia: Report by the 
Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC, 2014). 
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activity belongs to a sphere separable from society, government and social values is a myth. 
Rather, according to Nelson, economic transactions depend on each of the party’s trust and 
cooperation, and on social institutions like the legal system, governmental regulations, rating 
bureaus and business reputation. She concludes that if people did not care at all about social 
compliance or ethical norms, but rather were purely opportunistic, then “[…] every economic 
transaction would need to be tightly policed … and then someone would have to police those 
doing the policing, and so on ad infinitum” (Nelson, 2011, p. 48). Nelson’s point is that eco-
nomic markets are not, and could never be, self-sufficient entities, solely obeying their own 
rules and steered by their own mechanisms. The sphere of economic markets is infused by 
values, norms and social institutions borrowed from society as a whole. This underpins my 
argument that the border between the economic domain and other domains is blurred. Both 
influence each other: The influence of market thinking seeps into social, political and ethical 
issues, while market thinking itself rests on a set of value-laden assumptions and creates a 
normative standard. Again, economic decisions and events have moral significance, to the 
extent that the consequences of economic decisions may cause harm or foster care in people’s 
lives. In turn, market transactions themselves rest on social values and norms borrowed from 
society as a whole. 
 Part of the care-ethical critique of dominant moral theories was the point that the dis-
tinction made between the private sphere and the public sphere has been deeply gendered, and 
has involved an exclusion of issues relating to care, relationships and child rearing from the 
domain of morality (Held, 1993, p. 43-57). From a feminist perspective, there is no absolute 
boundary between the public and the private, because the one affects the other. From a care-
ethicist’s perspective, it is clear that personal, political and global relations can encourage 
caring practices and caring relationships — or distort and undermine them. Generally, the 
same applies to market relations, as the consequences of economic decisions can cause harm 
by reducing people’s opportunities to care, or good by providing the resources necessary for 
care. 
 
 
 Rethinking the Purpose of Economic Life 
Engster (2007) asks whether a caring society could be a capitalist society, and answers that in 
principle there is no reason it could not (2007, p. 139). Nevertheless, he does add a fairly ex-
tensive list of principles and policies that would have to be in place, regulating economic in-
stitutions and ensuring minimum support for caring practices. He mentions, among other 
things, policies that would ensure a decent minimum wage, restrictions on working hours, and 
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government-subsidised care services (Engster, 2007, p. 140-148). With Engster’s vision of the 
policies required by a caring society to regulate the economy, it is clear that he does not en-
dorse a free-market version of capitalism. Tronto (1993) answers tentatively “no” to the ques-
tion of whether a caring society could be a capitalist society. In Moral Boundaries she states 
that care-ethics is “probably ultimately anti-capitalistic because it posits meeting needs for 
care, rather than the pursuit of profit, as the highest social goal” (1993, p. 175). However, she 
also writes here that care is not a new cast of the old models of socialism either. Later, in Car-
ing Democracy, Tronto (2103) opens for the possibility that markets can be caring, stating 
that it depends on how we think about markets and their purposes. She argues that as care is 
not a commodity in the standard market sense, we stand in danger of distorting the importance 
and value of care if we only use market terms to understand its place in society (2013, p. 115, 
129). This is similar to Held’s (2006) position, when she points to an inherent conflict be-
tween the aims of care-ethics and the aims of markets. The overarching principle of markets, 
according to Held, is that of maximised economic gain, and the only value recognised is a 
thing’s instrumental, not intrinsic, value (Held, 2006, p. 109-110). Yet, even Held (2006), 
who is perhaps the most sceptical to markets, writes that: “Economies could produce what 
people really need in ways that contribute to human flourishing” (2006, p. 120, her emphasis). 
 While Tronto (2013) and Held (2006) refer to markets in general, it is clear that they 
both direct their criticism specifically at a neoliberal free-market system. Tronto explicitly 
states that her problem lies not with markets as such, as the means for providing care in socie-
ty. The main problem, in her view, is the neoliberal market’s aims: “If, however, the market’s 
ends are taken to be only those that fit with the neoliberal preferences for entrepreneurship, 
accumulation of wealth, driving prices for all goods as low as possible, then such a market 
will interfere with, rather than support, making just arrangements for care” (Tronto, 2013, p. 
129-130). It is clear, then, that neither Engster (2007), Tronto (2013) nor Held (2006) see 
care-ethics as compatible with a neoliberal free-market version of capitalism. While Held 
suggests that caring practices should be kept firmly outside the reach of economic markets, 
Tronto seems at least open to the possibility of providing care within economic markets, as 
long as market values and aims are appropriately redefined to accommodate care. Engster 
certainly sees the possibility of care being part of a market-oriented society, as he attempts to 
define the political and economic institutions necessary for a caring society.  
 As I see it, the real question is not whether care-ethics is compatible with capitalism in 
general, as opposed to socialism. While this might be an interesting topic in itself, posing the 
question as a comparison implies that the answer is either the one or the other. However, we 
live in a nuanced reality, a fact care-ethicists generally like to emphasise. What is of real in-
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terest is where, between the two extremes, we think it right to draw the line. I suggest, there-
fore, that our real concern is how to fit the values of care-ethics in with an already market-
oriented society. This involves opening our eyes to the implicit normative values of market 
thinking, and re-considering their usefulness and moral status. We can then move on to re-
interpret the purpose of economic activity, and look at the relational structures of market 
transactions with new eyes. 
 Engster argues that the basic goal of a caring economy is to organise economic activi-
ties to support and accommodate caring practices (2007, p. 121). He sees a link of mutual 
dependence between care work and economic production. On the one hand, caring practices 
are a necessary foundation for economic production in that caring practices sustain and repro-
duce the labour force that makes economic production possible. He mentions that it is through 
caring practices that workers are replenished, the temporarily sick are nursed, and children are 
nurtured and educated so as to engage in economic production when they become adults. On 
the other hand, and as mentioned above, Engster argues that economic resources are necessary 
for making available the basic goods needed for care. From there being a mutual link of de-
pendence between caring practices and economic production, Engster concludes that econom-
ic production is most fundamentally orientated around the moral goal of supporting human 
caring (Engster, 2007, p. 117, 121-123). Tronto similarly concludes that: “The purpose of 
economic life is to support care, not the other way round” (2013, p. 170). Production, Tronto 
argues, is not an end in itself but a means towards living as well as we can. On her view, one 
of the major problems with neoliberal market-based democracies is that the neoliberal market 
values of economic growth and production are put in the foreground, pushing the values of 
care to the background (Tronto, 2013, p. 139). The question, then, is how to make room for 
caring values within a market-oriented society. 
 While there are some serious problems with market thinking from a care-ethical per-
spective, there are aspects of economic activity that resonate with care-ethical themes. Coop-
eration, shared aims, interdependencies and relational structures are features present in both 
economic activity and caring practices. As mentioned earlier in this chapter and the first, trade 
seems fundamentally rooted in competition and self-interested motives. When Smith empha-
sised the self-interest of the butcher, brewer and baker, he pointed to an essential aspect of 
market transactions being the result of individuals’ concern with their own interests (1776 
[2004], p. 12). Competition suggests an ongoing tension between the parties’ opposing inter-
ests, and as a consequence a conflict between positions of power. Think of the textbook ex-
ample of the buyer and seller negotiating a price: The buyer wants to buy at the lowest price 
possible and the seller wants to sell at the highest price possible. On the other hand, I also see 
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an aspect of cooperation present in market relations. Once someone teams up with another, as 
the entrepreneur teams up with shareholders and employees, they are partners in trade. As 
partners, they are engaged in some common aim that binds them together in an economic rela-
tion. At a more general level, some cooperation and trust is required for market transactions to 
be possible at all. This is what Nelson is pointing out, when she states that the economic 
sphere in fact rests on a whole system of norms and social institutions (2011, p. 48). Thus, 
cooperation seems important to economic activity, alongside competition. Cooperation sug-
gests that individuals in the market also form relations built on common interests and shared 
aims.  
 Furthermore, individuals in the market are interdependent, depending on each other 
and on the general workings of the national and international economy at large. Fundamental-
ly, economic markets are about the exchange of goods and services. This means that the need 
for self-sufficiency is replaced by the possibility of specialisation. Increased specialisation 
means increased interdependence. In modern economies, almost all persons crucially depend 
on economic markets for access to work, housing, savings accounts, loans or other basic 
commodities and services. It is true that the neoclassical assumptions of “perfect” market 
conditions, rule out any form of particular dependence between economic agents in the mar-
ket. So, ideally no agent is large enough to influence market prices, or the demand or supply 
of goods. However, with market failures, such as the existence of monopolies, particular de-
pendencies and power relations are in fact at the core of the issue.  
 Cooperation through shared aims and relational structures of interdependence are im-
portant themes in care-ethics. However, the care-ethical perspective can also recognise and 
address differences in power and structural inequalities. This is useful as it can present an 
alternative understanding of market relations and economic activity, compared to the perspec-
tive presented through market thinking. For example, consider the notion that markets will 
meet the needs that arise through consumer demand. In Caring Democracy, Tronto (2013) 
argues that a major problem with markets is that they are centred towards meeting some peo-
ple’s wants, not all people’s needs. She quotes the political scientist Robert E. Lane: “The 
market gratifies the wants of those with money, which already excludes the most miserable 
and impoverished individuals, and among those with money, it gratifies preferences according 
to the amount of money they have, not according to the urgency of different people’s wants 
and certainly not according to needs” (Lane in Tronto, 2013, p. 122). The quote shows how 
the notions of needs and wants, and value and price become conflated on the standard market-
view. With the perspective of market thinking, people’s needs and people’s wants are reduced 
to the same thing, namely market demand. The value of a good becomes the same thing as the 
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good’s market price. From a care-ethical perspective, it is easier to notice the difference be-
tween needs and wants, and value and price, as these notions are understood in the light of the 
normative values of care. Value is then not simply the same as market price or people’s will-
ingness to pay, but connected to the principles of extended non-maleficence and restricted 
beneficence (Pettersen, 2011). Similarly, people’s needs are understood in terms of their 
needs for care, not simply as their wants or their ability to pay. In short, with care-ethics there 
is a clear difference between the willingness to pay and the ability to pay. In consequence, it is 
possible to notice that with the standard market system, power and freedom are associated 
with financial resources, because having the means to pay entails having the opportunity to 
voice one’s needs and wants, and to ensure one’s own needs are prioritised. 
 I see market thinking as presenting one way of approaching questions of human inter-
action and social organisation, while care-ethics presents another way. I have argued in this 
chapter that market thinking involves an implicit normative standard. This is due in part to the 
fact that simply by selecting certain features as relevant to economic decision-making, other 
features are left out. While the features of rationality, self-interest and individual preferences 
are highlighted in market thinking, other features are overlooked, like care, dependence and 
responsibilities arising within relationships. I have argued, for instance, that with the emphasis 
on individual preferences and self-interest, market thinking implies a dichotomy between self-
interest and benevolence. With care-ethics, on the other hand, this would be downplayed and 
the focus would instead be on the shared aims of caring relationships. I further argued that 
market thinking is normative also in the sense that the selected assumptions seen as relevant 
to economic decision-making are by implication taken as being required for economic deci-
sion-making. Rationality and self-interest seem both expected and acceptable in economic 
decision-making, and economic growth seems to be the all-purpose aim of economic activity 
in general.  
 The normative implications of market thinking are of interest to care-ethics, because 
market thinking seems to be spreading as a framework for analysing many issues that are not 
purely economic. In my view, market thinking cannot simply be contained within an econom-
ic sphere separable from other spheres of society and politics, because the imagined bounda-
ries between economics and the rest of human life are blurred. Economic markets are not in-
dependent, self-regulating entities, but human-made structures. Nor are economic decisions 
made by exclusively rational and self-interested economic agents, but by real human beings 
with a complex set of motives. Again, the consequences of actual economic events and peo-
ple’s actual economic situations have real impact on people’s lives, including their opportuni-
ties to care for themselves and others. Recognising that economic events are the results of 
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human structures and decisions, and that economic decisions have real impact on people’s 
lives, should lead us to see that many economic considerations are also of moral concern. I 
suggest therefore that economics is relevant to care-ethics, and that care-ethics is in turn rele-
vant to economics.  
 My position is not that economic activity should be interpreted as a caring activity, or 
that market relations are in some sense relationships of care. Rather, I suggest that with the 
relational perspective of care-ethics and the normative value of care, we are equipped for an 
alternative analysis of economic decisions and economic structures. Market transactions can 
be seen as relational structures, and economic agents can be given moral responsibilities. I 
have argued that some features of economic activity resonate with care-ethical themes, like 
cooperation through shared aims and interdependence through relational structures. This ex-
emplifies how market thinking and care-ethics can highlight different aspects of economic 
activity. It is partly a question of which features we choose to take notice of and emphasise, 
and which we choose to downplay. Market thinking, based on the assumptions of mainstream 
economic theory, provides an alluring model of human behaviour; it is both simple and ele-
gant. The danger is that we forget that this model assumes “perfect” conditions, and that it 
ignores important information about human beings and their social environments. Certain 
facts of the human condition, like being dependent on the care of others, having caring re-
sponsibilities, standing in unequal positions in relation to others and forming particular at-
tachments, are not visible in the market model centred around individualism and independ-
ence. The question, as I see it, is how a society informed by care should live with, respond to, 
or change the conditions of our economic lives.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A CARE-ETHICAL INTERPRETATION OF RESPONSIBILITY  
 
 
  
The perspective of care-ethics makes it possible to challenge our standard way of thinking 
about economic activities and market relations, as we saw through the discussion in the previ-
ous chapter. In this chapter I set out to explore what a care-ethical approach might amount to 
in terms of providing a positive contribution to the same questions. Specifically, what would a 
care-ethical interpretation of moral responsibility entail?  
I begin by looking into three alternative care-ethical arguments for our moral obliga-
tion to care, as presented by Kittay (1999), Engster (2007) and Pettersen (2011). These are 
arguments for why we should accept the care-ethical approach in the first place. They are im-
portant, as our acceptance of a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility depends on the un-
derlying question of why we should bother about care at all. As we will see, Kittay (1999) 
links the entitlement to care to a particular human relationship, Engster (2007) argues from 
the universal fact of human dependence, and Pettersen (2011) appeals to a universal experi-
ence of care. I suggest that Kittay’s and Pettersen’s arguments are the most promising. From 
there I discuss the notion of social responsibility for care, as set forth by Kittay (1999), and 
compare this to a minimal interpretation of personal responsibility, which Tronto (2013) sees 
as a characteristic feature of neoliberalism. Yet another approach to responsibility is found in 
Young’s (2011) discussion of shared responsibility, which I suggest resonates well with a 
care-ethical perspective. However, I also discuss some troubling aspects of this notion. In 
particular, it seems at risk of being so far-reaching and vague that the specifics of each per-
son’s share of responsibility are lost. Finally, I sum up what I see as the most important fea-
tures of a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility. I suggest it would be based on the rela-
tional ontology of care-ethics with an emphasis on reciprocity and relational commitment. I 
further suggest that a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility would be somewhat flexible, 
being able to approach questions of responsibility from different angles. 
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 Our Moral Obligation to Care 
In an attempt to make clear what a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility might amount 
to, the first question that springs to mind is why we should care at all. On Kittay’s (1999) ac-
count it all comes back to the fundamental importance of human connection. She writes: “We 
are all — equally — some mother’s child” (1999, p. 25, her emphasis). With this statement 
she points to the fact that we have all equally been highly dependent on the care and concern 
of a mother or some mothering persons. The premise is that we are all, metaphorically speak-
ing, entitled to the care, respect and love of a mother. Kittay explains that while philosophical 
theories usually start an argument for equality on the basis of some property we as individuals 
possess in common, as for example rationality, she suggests we instead base the notion of 
equality on the notion that we are all some mother’s child (1999, p. 25). That we are all equal-
ly some mother’s child, involves the postulate that we are equal by virtue of our relation to 
others, not by virtue of some individual property we have in common with others. That is, we 
are equal in terms of our relation to another, or rather, in terms of another’s relation to our-
selves. Respecting a person as some mother’s child involves recognising how human connec-
tion is made possible, argues Kittay, and honouring the importance of human connection it-
self. She writes: “When we respect an individual as some mother’s child, we honor the efforts 
of that mothering person and symbolically of all mothering persons” (Kittay, 1999, p. 69).  
 From the acknowledgement that we are all some mother’s child, Kittay (1999) argues 
for an understanding of equality as connection-based, as opposed to a conception of equality 
as always equal in reciprocity. She explains that the connection based equality assumes a fun-
damental need for human relationships, and involves both the entitlement to care, if and when 
we need it, and to social support, if and when we must care for others. She further argues that 
the moral obligation to care rests on the real needs of a vulnerable person, who also in some 
way stands in a prior relation to the person assuming the role as carer. Kittay maintains that 
we have an unqualified obligation to assume responsibilities for care when the other’s needs 
are basic, the vulnerability is extensive, and their prior relation to ourselves involves a moral 
warrant for taking on the care work (1999, p. 64-66). Moreover, Kittay states, the obligation 
to care requires that the carer assumes her caring responsibilities even at substantial cost to 
her own immediate interests and projects: “This is what every mother and every father who 
gets up at four o’clock in the morning to tend a sick child knows so well” (Kittay, 1999, p. 
65). Yet, who is to care for the carer? Kittay argues that we also have a moral obligation to 
meet the carer’s needs. On her account, we owe to the carer, who set’s aside her own projects 
and interests in meeting her caring responsibilities, that these responsibilities are not unjustly 
forced upon her. If we disregard this obligation towards the carer, Kittay continues, we in fact 
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treat the carer as of lesser worth than both the person she cares for and those who have thrust 
upon her the role as carer. If we are all equally some mother’s child then we are all, including 
the carer herself, equally entitled to the respect and care of being some mother’s child (Kittay, 
1999, p. 65).  
 Engster (2007) builds a somewhat similar argument to Kittay’s (1999), grounding the 
obligation to care in our common dependence and need for care. He assumes first that we all 
as human beings generally value our survival and development. Further, he sees it as a fact 
that we all depend on the care of others to survive, develop and maintain our basic capabili-
ties. Thus, Engster suggests we all, at least implicitly, value caring as a necessary good and 
make claims on others to care for us if and when we need it. Next, he argues, in claiming care 
from others we imply that those capable ought to care for those in need, at least when they can 
do so without overly compromising their other caring obligations. Engster concludes that be-
cause we all depend on the care of others and because we implicitly claim that capable indi-
viduals should care for others in need if and when they can do so, we should also recognise 
that we ourselves are morally obliged to meet others needs for care. According to Engster, this 
holds at least when doing so does not involve significant danger, long-term compromise of 
our functioning, or undermine our ability to care for others. He therefore states that those who 
fail to recognise their moral obligation to care, not only disregard the logical principle of non-
contradiction, but also leave unacknowledged the web of caring relationships that their own 
lives, society, and human life in general depend (Engster, 2007, p. 46-49). With the principle 
of non-contradiction, as Engster explains, an individual’s claim on others for their care is ra-
tionally justified by the fact they too have claimed the care of others for themselves. Engster 
writes: “We have duties to care for others because we have appealed to others for care, and 
other individuals have duties to us because they have appealed to still others” (2007, p. 50).  
 On Engster’s account, then, we are obliged to care because we have already necessari-
ly made claims on others for their care simply by virtue of our dependence as human beings. 
As a consequence we have obliged ourselves to similarly acknowledge the moral validity of 
other’s claims on ourselves to care for them in turn. A potential problem with Engster’s ar-
gument is that it seems to jump fairly quickly from is to ought: From the fact that we are all 
dependent on others’ care, he argues we should recognise the moral obligation to care. The 
question is why one should acknowledge that our dependence on care makes us in turn moral-
ly obliged to care. Why not free ride on others’ care, and disregard their claims on us to care 
for them in turn? In part, Engster provides an answer to this criticism by his suggestion that 
everyone implicitly values caring as necessary to their survival and flourishing. Yet, one 
might imagine some self-centred persons as valuing their own survival and flourishing, but 
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still not caring much about others’ survival and flourishing. By contrast, Kittay (1999) rests 
her argument for the obligation to care in the broader context of her criticism of Rawls’s 
(1971) A Theory of Justice. She argues that a commitment to care should be recognised as a 
primary good, on line with those initially suggested by Rawls, such as basic liberties and the 
social bases of self-respect. She writes: “A justice which does not incorporate the need to re-
spond to vulnerability with care is incomplete, and a social order which ignores care will itself 
fail to be just” (Kittay, 1999, p. 102). Thus, Kittay seems to avoid the problem of free riding 
and a sudden shift from is to ought, by appealing to the notion of fairness, and grounding the 
obligation to care in a conception of justice. Engster (2007) does acknowledge a certain circu-
larity in his argument, but holds fast that although there might be some point in the distant 
history of evolution where the first claim for care was made, he maintains that here and now, 
the fact is we have all made claims on others for care. On his view, it therefore follows that 
we are all obliged to care for others in turn. He argues that refusing to accept other’s claims 
on our care involves a logical inconsistency and is simply a contradiction. He explains that it 
is not the contradiction itself that makes the refusal morally wrong. Rather, it is wrong be-
cause it undermines the web of caring relationships and the value and practice of care that 
have made our lives possible, along with our society and humanity in general. He writes: 
“[…] what is immoral about refusing to care for others is that it involves us in acting contrary 
to moral principles that we are all implicitly committed to by the very nature of our dependent 
existence” (Engster, 2007, p. 52). Engster’s intention, then, is to ground the moral obligation 
to care by the fact of human dependence, and appeal to logical consistency as the reason for 
acknowledging the universality of the obligation. 
Pettersen (2011) provides a third argument for why one should accept the obligation to 
care. She presents two reasons for why a narrow concern for oneself or a particular group 
should instead be replaced by the recognition of mature care. First, Pettersen argues, care-
ethics appeals to a common experience of care. She suggests that the values and themes of 
care are part of a shared human experience, and can be revived in almost all persons. As dis-
cussed in chapter two, Pettersen interprets the core normative values of care as a balance be-
tween the principles of extended non-maleficence and restricted beneficence. Pettersen ex-
plains that the experience of care should not be seen as a subjective set of emotions or senti-
ments, or as grounded in a specific culture, religion or class. Instead she suggests the experi-
ence of care is virtually universal to all humans. Thus, she sees the experience and values of 
care as recognisable to almost all people, even to those who are hostile, aggressive or violent. 
As she points out, those who are abusive or aggressive in one situation may nevertheless be 
excellent carers in another, and will certainly have experienced care themselves. They may 
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therefore feel the appeal to the shared experience of care as acutely as others. Pettersen’s se-
cond reason for why a self-centred person should accept an appeal to mature care is that it is 
rational. She suggests that by recalling the experience of care, the person will also recognise 
the importance of care for others. It is rational to accept the appeal to care, because one cannot 
consistently claim something for oneself and at the same time deny others the same oppor-
tunity (Pettersen, 2011, p. 54, 58-59). 
Thus, both Engster (2007) and Pettersen (2011) appeal to reason in their arguments for 
the obligation to care. They point out that consistently claiming something of others, while 
denying their claims on us in turn, involves a logical contradiction. However, Pettersen, un-
like Engster, specifically addresses the question of why a self-centred person should recognise 
and accept an appeal to care. If care is a shared, virtually universal human experience, as Pet-
tersen suggests, then it seems likely that all people potentially can remember and revive the 
values and knowledge of care. Of course, some may simply refuse to listen to such an appeal, 
or refuse to extend their caring beyond the limited scope they care within. Pettersen addresses 
this by arguing that if the person in questions is able to care within a limited scope, then an 
appeal to their reason should make them recognise how care is equally important to others. By 
comparison, Engster’s appeal to reason is an appeal to the recognition that as we ourselves are 
dependent on others’ care, so others in turn our dependent on our care. His account seems not 
to provide a completely clear answer as to why the fact of dependence in itself involves a 
moral claim on care.  
On the other hand, there are some unanswered questions relating to Pettersen’s argu-
ments too. Hers rests on the assumption that care in fact is a shared, almost universal, human 
experience, and that virtually all people can and do care even if only within very limited set-
tings or groups. Yet, she does not spell out what the common experience of care amounts to, 
nor how easy or difficult it would be to broaden the scope of care to include a wider group of 
people. For instance, does the common experience of care rely on conscious memories? Does 
it require memories of mature care? What is it about the experience of care that makes it al-
most universal in its nature? Still, Pettersen (2011) is clear that a naive understanding should 
be avoided. She does not think that simply by appealing to people’s empathy or reason, all 
harm, violence and conflict should dissolve. She acknowledges that some people are truly 
unable to emphasise and identify with others, perhaps due to pathological disorders. Yet, she 
suggests appealing to rational identification and empathy represents two possible approaches 
made available by care-ethics (Pettersen, 2011, p. 59). 
While Pettersen’s description of a shared human experience of care might be inter-
preted as involving conscious memories of care, Kittay’s emphasis on the particular human 
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relationship of mother and child seems rather to appeal to appeal to the importance of human 
connection and human relationships in general. Again, while Kittay and Engster both appeal 
to human dependence, Kittay emphasises the relational context of dependence. The relation-
ship between mother and child represents the fundamental fact of human dependence, but also 
points to the fundamental importance of human connection and relationships. Kittay, then, 
grounds her argument for our obligation to care in a particular human relationship, which 
works as a metaphor for human dependence and connection in general. Engster grounds his 
argument in the rational recognition of the universal fact of human dependence, while Petter-
sen argues from the basis of a universally shared human experience of care and a rational 
identification with others. Of the three, I prefer Kittay’s argument as it rests so fundamentally 
on the relational connection of human beings. Yet, as her argument for the obligation to care 
works as part of her re-interpretation of a fair conception of social justice, it will perhaps not 
work as well when taken out of this context. Pettersen’s arguments, on the other hand, stand 
firmly on their own ground. I see Engster’s arguments as the least solid of the three, as he 
seems not to provide a clear reason for why the fact of dependence justifies a moral claim. 
 
 
 Social Responsibility 
Kittay extends the entitlement to care to a social and public concept of care, which she calls 
the principle of “doulia”. Her term “doulia” is based on “doula”, the caregiver who in some 
cultures attends to the mother after giving birth, enabling the mother to care for her newborn 
child. Kittay’s principle of doulia captures the obligation to care also for those who have car-
ing responsibilities for others. She writes that: “Just as we have required care to survive and 
thrive, so we need to provide conditions that allow others — including those who do the work 
of caring — to receive the care they need to survive and thrive” (Kittay, 1999, p. 107). The 
principle of doulia involves acknowledging that every person is entitled to care, both those 
dependent on direct care for their survival and functioning and those who have caring respon-
sibilities to others. Kittay sees the principle of doulia as mandating, both a social responsibil-
ity to enable caring relationships that are satisfactory to the cared-for and carer, and social 
institutions that enable carers to meet their caring responsibilities without being held back in 
the competition for goods and benefits in society (Kittay, 1999, p. 109).  
 Kittay’s principle of doulia encompasses the social responsibility of care, and from 
here she argues for social welfare policies of care. First, Kittay argues that with the principle 
of doulia, it should be recognised that all care work, whether caring for children, the ill, the 
aged or disabled, are social contributions that should be acknowledged and reciprocated. She 
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explains that it should not be up to the person cared for to repay or return in equal amounts the 
efforts of the carer, but instead up to the larger social circle in which the caring relation is 
placed. Second, Kittay argues, the concept of doulia involves acknowledging the carer’s ef-
forts as work where the care worker, like other workers, should have the right to holidays, exit 
options and retraining if their caring work changes in nature or comes to an end (1999, p. 
143). She maintains that care work, like other types of work, should not be gendered. Third, 
Kittay argues that with the principle of doulia care work should be well-paid (1999, p. 144). 
She points out that in the United States paid care workers are the most poorly paid workers 
relative to their education and that female-headed households are the poorest of families. Fi-
nally, Kittay sees doulia as accepting all types of family constellations as long as the care 
work is adequately realised (1999, p. 140-145). 
 The basic logic of Kittay’s argument is clear. The more dependent a person is on oth-
ers’ care, the more difficult it will be for her to return the care she receives or repay the carer 
for her efforts. Think for example of a severely disabled person highly dependent on another’s 
care for her own survival and functioning. It is impossible for her to reciprocate in equal 
amounts the care she receives. Nor will a severely disabled person be likely to have a personal 
income from wage-earning work. Thus, her funds for paying for the care she receives are also 
likely to be limited. The example shows how the very nature of a caring relationship to a 
highly dependent person demands that the care flows in her direction. Such a relationship is 
centred on the care of the dependent person. However, Kittay’s argument further applies a 
similar logic to the case of the carer. The more demanding the carer’s responsibilities are, the 
less time and energy is left for her to meet her own needs and secure the resources necessary 
for sustaining her care work. Thus, the social responsibility entailed in the concept of doulia, 
involves recognising that care work requires sustenance and resources from the larger social 
web that surrounds the caring relationship.  
One should remember that Kittay defines the person cared for as the “charge”, a per-
son who is highly dependent on others’ care for her own survival and functioning (1999, p. 
31). It may be argued that not all caring relationships are asymmetrical, nor are all asymmet-
rical caring relationships so unequal as the example of the severely disabled person suggests. 
For instance, partners, friends or colleagues may generally be expected to reciprocate on fairly 
equal terms the care they give to each other –– at least over time. Other caring relationships 
that are asymmetrical, like that between a dentist and a patient or between a teacher and a 
pupil, do not necessarily involve the same crucial dependence as Kittay’s account suggests. 
For instance, it seems likely that one would be able to function and survive without ever see-
ing a dentist, though one might have bad teeth. Again, while a minimal amount of knowledge, 
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like literacy and numeracy, are important for functioning in today’s society, mastering a for-
eign language may not be. However, precisely by focusing on highly asymmetrical caring 
relationships, Kittay is able to make the point that asymmetries and dependencies in caring 
relationships cannot simply be taken as exceptions from normality. Asymmetries are not only 
common in caring relationships, but also crucial to human survival and functioning in general. 
In Kittay’s words: ”[dependencies] are unassailable facts about human existence” (1999, p. 
29). Her focus on asymmetrical caring relationships makes it clear that care is often justified 
in flowing towards the person cared for –– the dependent. Yet, I see her argument as also 
holding generally for all types of caring relationships. At the core, it shows the importance of 
acknowledging the effort involved in caring, the value of care work and the necessity of re-
sources, like time and money, that make it possible to sustain caring relationships. That caring 
involves an effort and that the carer herself also has needs that must be met are facts that hold 
for any caring relationship. While some caring relationships may involve a fairly equal distri-
bution of effort on both parties over time, as might be the case for relationships between 
friends or partners. Still, at any point in time where the one needs the care of the other, the 
caring party must have access to the resources which makes it possible to sustain the effort of 
care there and then. In the end, it is a question of the distribution of care work. How should 
care work be acknowledged and compensated? Who stands in a position to do so? Kittay’s 
proposition is that the responsibility for care should be distributed as a social responsibility, as 
entailed in her principle of doulia. 
 
  
 Social Welfare versus Privatised Care 
Kittay (1999) discusses the traditional family model as one possible approach to meeting the 
social responsibilities of care. She explains that the idea behind the traditional family model is 
that the family, as a unit, is self-sufficient. The “provider” of the family is employed through 
the market, supporting the family members with the necessary resources for care. No addi-
tional social support should then be necessary. Yet, as Kittay argues, the apparent self-
sufficiency of the family unit is no more than “[…] a chimera of the capitalist economy” 
(1999, p. 141). As she explains, the provider of the family depends on an employer and an 
economy that values the skills or services offered, similarly to how the carer of the family 
depends on the provider. Kittay’s point is that neither the provider nor the carer is completely 
independent. She finds a second problem with the traditional family model in that it presup-
poses the existence of adequately paid employment, while in fact not all providers are able to 
find employment, let alone employment sufficient to support a family (1999, p. 141). As a 
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final point, Kittay adds that the carer in the traditional family is especially vulnerable in her 
relationship to the provider. As mentioned in the discussion in chapter three, Kittay argues 
that the carer stands in a worse bargaining position and has limited exit options, compared to 
the provider. On her account this is in part due to the carer’s moral and emotional commit-
ment to her dependents and in part due the fact that to her role as carer leads her to easily tune 
into other’s needs and makes her susceptible to accepting them as her own (1999, p. 43-44). 
Kittay concludes that the traditional family model does not ensure that care work is properly 
valued and fairly compensated.  
Instead of meeting care responsibilities through the traditional family, Kittay proposes 
a universalised and socialised compensation system for care work, for instance through gov-
ernment funding (Kittay, 1999, p. 141-143). She mentions compensating mothers who care 
for their children or providing them with the option of day-care, enabling a son or daughter to 
care for an elderly parent or providing them with financial support to pay someone else to do 
it for them. She sets as requirements that the level of compensation is sufficient for the carer 
and dependent not merely to survive but have adequate resources to care well. Also, determin-
ing the specifics of the arrangements of compensation must involve the care workers them-
selves (Kittay, 1999, p. 142-143). In short, she argues for a social welfare system that sup-
ports caring practices. Engster (2007) similarly sees the need for social, political and econom-
ic institutions that will support care in society. He argues that through our moral obligation to 
care, we are further obliged to establish and support institutions that provide care for those we 
cannot ourselves care directly for. He writes: “Since we can personally care for only a few 
individuals by ourselves, our obligation to care for others further directs us to establish collec-
tive caring institutions that can aid and support individuals beyond our reach or means” (Eng-
ster, 2007, p. 123).  
Tronto (2013), like Kittay (1999), questions the traditional family model as providing 
a fair distribution of care responsibilities. She argues that with the neoliberal framework re-
sponsibility is interpreted as meaning only personal responsibility. The ideological message is 
that we are each responsible only for our close family, our local community and ourselves 
(2013, p. 37-38). Personal responsibility, in Tronto’s view, is not enough because it ignores 
how patterns of exclusion and inequality have an effect on individual’s and public life. In 
Caring Democracy, Tronto (2013) is concerned with the questions of how care responsibili-
ties are distributed in society. Who controls the setting of responsibilities? Why are some 
granted a free pass out of being assigned responsibilities? Particularly, she asks whether mar-
kets can work as appropriate institutions for providing care. Tronto argues that those who an-
swer yes to this question typically invoke two “responsibility passes,” as she calls them, 
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namely the “bootstrap pass” and the “charity pass”. She sees these as two sides of the same 
coin, working together as an argument for a minimal interpretation of personal responsibility 
and for seeing economic markets as sufficient instruments for providing care in society. Tron-
to describes the bootstrap pass as the idea that individuals meet their own needs through the 
market. Thus, people should care for themselves, or ensure the care they need by creating 
families, buying insurances or care services directly through the market. Tronto describes the 
charity pass as the claim that since some people actually do choose to give to charities, those 
who are truly unable to care for themselves will in fact often be taken care of. At the bottom 
line, the bootstrap and charity passes see the meeting of caring responsibilities in society as a 
matter of personal responsibility and individual charity (2013, p. 58, 117-118). 
 Tronto’s description of the neoliberal interpretation of personal responsibility and the 
accompanying responsibility passes, fits with the American model of a market oriented socie-
ty with a fairly minimal social welfare system. In a system with minimal or non-existent so-
cial welfare, the bootstrap pass involves the assumption that either all persons are independ-
ent, healthy, working adults, or that they are part of a traditional family structure where one 
working adult acts as provider and the other has the main caring responsibilities for children 
or relatives. In such a context, the bootstrap pass simply ignores the situation of the single 
parent who must both earn wages and care for children, or the long-term or permanently disa-
bled person with no provider. As the argument of the charity pass goes, some may choose to 
care for those who are especially unfortunate. Yet, the possibility of systematic background 
causes that create inequalities or make some more dependent than others, easily goes amiss. 
As we saw Kittay pointed out above, the possibility that there exists jobs where the pay is 
insufficient to live on, or insufficient to provide for a family, would on this view be interpret-
ed as no-one’s responsibility other than the workers themselves who accepted the low-income 
job in the first place. Tronto argues that with the charity pass the claim that some people de-
rive positive utility from being charitable is used as an excuse for the rest of us to avoid think-
ing seriously about other’s needs for care (2013, p. 118). The neoliberal interpretation of per-
sonal responsibility implies that contributions to charities are personal choices. The question 
of whether to donate, to whom, and how much, is answered solely by the individual’s own 
conscience, interests and preferences. Tronto argues that wants and interests, not necessarily 
needs, determine what gets met through charity, so that in the end there is no “reason to think 
that enough, or the right kinds, of charitable contributions will be made” (2013, p. 120-121).  
 Certain parallels between Kittay’s (1999) and Tronto’s (2013) discussions are appar-
ent. Both are concerned with the distribution of care work and care responsibilities in society, 
and both argue against a purely privatised arrangement for care. According to Tronto, the no-
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tion of personal responsibility and the accompanying bootstrap and charity passes mark the 
ideological background of a neoliberal market system. This interpretation of responsibility 
stands in stark contrast to Kittay’s (1999) notion of social responsibility. From a care-ethical 
point of view, the problem with the personal responsibility of neoliberalism is that structural 
causes of inequality or injustice are not addressed, nor even noticed. In principle, it is a ques-
tion of how we choose, as a society, to organise care work, assign caring responsibilities and 
meet caring needs. The personal responsibility of neoliberalism rests on the assumptions of 
individualism and independence also present in market thinking. This leads to the understand-
ing of responsibilities as restricted in scope to a limited group, and also makes it difficult to 
explain how responsibilities can be anything other than voluntarily assumed obligations. By 
contrast, Kittay’s discussion shows that a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility would 
rest on the grounding premise of a relational ontology. The focus then shifts from an underly-
ing assumption of the independence of individuals, to an underlying assumption of their rela-
tional interdependence. With a relational ontology, the emphasis is on the relational context of 
persons and on responsibilities as arising within relationships. Thus, responsibilities need not 
be presumed voluntarily assumed commitments, but may be seen as arising in the form of 
justified claims that are tied to particular relationships and social structures. Rooting responsi-
bilities in particular relational contexts means it is possible to extend the scope of responsibil-
ity from the individual level to the broader social level. This is because every particular rela-
tionship is again part of a larger social web of relationships. The scope of responsibility on 
this relational interpretation will likely include a responsibility to one’s family or local com-
munity, as the personal responsibility of neoliberalism also does. Yet, the relational interpreta-
tion of responsibility would not automatically limit responsibility to these groups only, nor 
would it exclude others from bearing part of the responsibility for these same groups. 
 
 
 Shared Responsibility and Structural Injustice  
Young (2011) defines structural injustices as social processes that systematically and nega-
tively affect the positions of certain groups of people, hindering their opportunities to develop 
and exercise their capacities. While we usually think of injustices as caused by the particular 
actions of certain individuals or institutions, structural injustices are the results of the actions 
of many individuals and institutions pursuing their own aims, largely acting within the law 
and accepted norms, and often unaware of the structure their actions are part of (Young, 2011, 
p. 48, 52). Young points out the difficulty in addressing structural injustices within the stand-
ard framework of moral and legal responsibility. On the standard model of justice, Young 
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argues, moral and legal responsibility is connected to the particular actions of an agent. She 
calls this standard framework the “liability model of justice”. On the liability model an agent 
is held responsible only if the particular harm is the result of a voluntary act, which can be 
said to be causally connected to the harm inflicted, and which was done with knowledge of 
the consequences and circumstances of the situation. An agent may also be held responsible 
for what was not, but should have been, done as with the concept of culpable negligence. 
Young argues that the liability model is concerned with assigning responsibilities for the pur-
pose of sanctioning, exacting compensation or demanding redress, and as such it is backward-
looking and equates responsibility with blame. As she argues, the difficulty in addressing 
structural injustices within this standard model of justice is that no-one in particular is to 
blame, yet some people nevertheless face injustices (Young, 2011, p. 96-98).  
As a response to the problems of using the liability model for assigning responsibili-
ties in relation to structural injustices, Young introduces the alternative framework she calls 
the “social-connection model of justice” with the accompanying notion of “shared responsi-
bility” (2011, p. 105-113). According to Young, the social connection model does not isolate 
a guilty party, but focuses on the background conditions of the injustice. She explains that the 
purpose is not to assign responsibility as a backward-looking blame-game, but rather to see 
responsibility as a forward-looking move towards change. In cases of structural injustice, 
Young suggests that those who participate with their actions towards the unjust outcomes 
rightly bear a responsibility for them, but they are not directly at fault as they have usually 
acted within the law and accepted norms (2011, p. 106). Thus, Young differentiates between 
responsibility and blame. On her account, bearing a shared responsibility does not necessarily 
mean that one is to blame, but neither will acting within the law and accepted norms automat-
ically absolve ones responsibility in being part of an unjust structure. She argues that if we 
accept the existence of a particular structural injustice, we are at the same time claiming that 
some of the accepted rules and norms we act in accordance with are morally questionable 
(Young, 2011, p. 107).  
 According to Young’s account, the responsibility part of the social connection model 
of justice is shared and only discharged through collective action (2011, p. 105, 109-113). She 
writes: “As I understand it, a shared responsibility is a responsibility I personally bear, but I 
do not bear it alone. I bear it in the awareness that others bear it with me; acknowledgement of 
my responsibility is also acknowledgement of the inchoate collective of which I am a part, 
which together produces injustice” (Young, 2011, p. 109-110, her emphasis). Young differen-
tiates her notion of shared responsibility from collective responsibility. She explains that a 
collective, like a corporation, may be held responsible for something without any of the per-
65 
sons working for the corporation being personally and determinately responsible for it. With 
shared responsibility, Young argues, each is personally responsible for the outcome but in a 
partial way: “[…] the specific part each plays in producing the outcome cannot be isolated 
and identified, however, and thus the responsibility is essentially shared” (Young, 2011, p. 
110). Notice that while both Young (2011) and Tronto (2013) use the term personal responsi-
bility, they are describing two very different interpretations of responsibility. Young’s shared 
responsibility is a responsibility born personally by each and every agent who contributes to 
the processes and structures that produce unjust outcomes. It is a shared form of responsibility 
in the sense that it is distributed between all those who partake in these structures. When 
Tronto writes of the personal responsibility that accompanies neoliberalism, she is also de-
scribing a responsibility we each personally bear, but unlike Young’s shared responsibility, 
this is a responsibility limited in scope to only oneself, one’s closest family or local communi-
ty. It is also worth noting that Young does not intend to replace the liability model, nor is 
Tronto necessarily against personal responsibility. Young’s point is that the liability model of 
justice is inappropriate in certain contexts because it cannot address structural injustices. Pre-
sumably, her social connection model is meant as a supplement to the liability model, specifi-
cally addressing structural injustices. Tronto, on the other hand, argues that the neoliberal 
interpretation of personal responsibility is insufficient in ensuring a fair distribution of care 
work.  
 Young’s (2011) notion of shared responsibility resonates to some extent with Kittay’s 
(1999) notion of social responsibility. Although Kittay’s describes a responsibility specifically 
for ensuring social support for care, it is also a responsibility that is shared with others. 
Young’s shared responsibility extends to all those who contribute with their actions to unjust 
social structures, while Kittay’s social responsibility, extends to those who form the larger 
social web surrounding particular caring relationships. On both descriptions many agents are 
bound to a common responsibility, and as such both descriptions involve an acknowledge-
ment of how responsibilities are knit together in personal and social relations. Also, compared 
to the personal responsibility of neoliberalism, the scope of social and shared responsibilities 
extends broadly to social structures or political and social institutions. Kittay, for instance, 
uses her notion of social responsibility as part of her argument for a social welfare system that 
would ensure a fair compensation for care work (1999, p. 142-143). The scope of Young’s 
shared responsibility is even broader, transcending national boarders and including all forms 
of structural injustices. Her notion of shared responsibility involves a personal responsibility 
for one’s participation in diffuse, complex and far-reaching social structures — so complex in 
fact that she argues it is impossible to trace the exact extent to which each agent’s actions con-
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tribute to the unjust outcome. This is why Young maintains that shared responsibilities are 
only discharged through collective action (Young, 2011, p. 109-111).  
There are some problematic aspects relating to Young’s account of shared responsibil-
ity. As a consequence of it being a forward-looking responsibility where the aim is not to pun-
ish a guilty party for past injustice but to inspire to change, it seems culprits can “get away” 
with harmful actions. Demanding compensation, for instance, as a form of punishment for 
illegal activity seems important in order to set a principle for accepted conduct. It also ensures 
some form of acknowledgement and repayment to the injured party. However, Young’s point 
seems to be that this is not sufficient for creating structural change. The required compensa-
tion on the guilty party would only work as a superficial remedy, though have no lasting ef-
fect on background causes. As long as the social connection model of justice is meant as a 
supplement, not a replacement, to the standard liability model, there seems to be no real prob-
lem here. As two complementary approaches, those found guilty of injustice in the liability 
sense would still be punished or required to pay compensation for the harm inflicted. Yet, 
those who inadvertently contribute to unjust structures would also be held responsible for cre-
ating change, although not directly to blame. 
However, a further problem arises with Young’s insistence that shared responsibility can only 
be discharged through collective action and that it is impossible to determine the exact degree 
of each person’s contribution to unjust outcomes. As a result it seems practically impossible 
to go about creating change, because what one’s responsibility actually amounts to seems 
vague and the prospect of collective action towards structural change seems completely over-
whelming. Young acknowledges that the sheer enormity of having shared responsibility for 
all the structural processes we contribute to through our actions, is an overwhelming, even 
paralysing, prospect. Yet, she argues, not accepting such a responsibility on the grounds that it 
demands too much of us will allow us to complacently tell ourselves that we are doing enough 
and all that can be expected of us. Young suggests we instead move towards action (Young, 
2011, p. 123-124). Nevertheless, the question of how we should move towards action is not 
satisfactorily answered by this response. The specifics of one’s own degree and share of the 
responsibility still seems lost in the sea of all those contributing to the social processes that 
bring about the injustice. If it is impossible to determine the exact extent of each individual’s 
contribution to the structural injustice, is seems contra intuitive that the notion of shared re-
sponsibility is a personal responsibility. There is a certain ambiguity in Young’s discussion. 
On the one hand, she writes: “Because the particular causal relationship of the actions of spe-
cific individuals or organizations to structural outcomes is impossible to trace, there is no 
point in trying to seek redress from only and all those who have contributed to the outcome, 
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and in proportion to their contribution” (Young, 2011, p. 109). But she also mentions the intu-
ition that different people bear different degrees of responsibilities, stating that: “Such differ-
ences, I suggest, derive in large measure from the social positions agents occupy in relation to 
one another within the structural processes they are trying to change in order to make them 
less unjust” (Young, 2011, p. 144, her emphasis). While the above quotations seem to pull in 
opposite directions, they also suggest that Young’s notion of shared responsibility is less 
vague and overwhelming than first implied. It seems clear that Young does not believe it is 
possible, nor useful, to divide a shared responsibility into exact individual portions as each 
person’s contributions to the injustice is, I her eyes, impossible to trace. Yet, it also seems 
clear that she nevertheless does think it useful to differentiate between degrees of responsibil-
ity of persons or groups and their abilities for creating change. This becomes clearer when she 
next moves on to discuss what she calls parameters for reasoning about a shared responsibility 
for change. I will discuss these in the following section. 
 
 
Tools for Thinking About Responsibilities 
oung’s (2011) parameters for reasoning about the course of action towards change are tools 
for thinking about the shared responsibility for structural injustices. They include considering 
the parties’ social positions of power and privilege, the parties’ interest in change or status 
quo, and the collective ability of the parties to use already existing social groups as vehicles 
for change (Young, 2011, p. 144-147). Young suggests that social positions of power involve 
the actual or potential power to influence unjust processes, which imply that those in positions 
of power hold a greater share of the responsibility. She mentions how large multinational ap-
parel corporations, for instance, may be appealed to in relation to unfair working conditions 
for garment workers. She explains, that while the multinational corporations may not be re-
sponsible in the liability sense for their suppliers, they may nevertheless have the power to 
pressure the suppliers to change their practices. Young points out that those who are in a posi-
tion of power in relation to a structural injustice generally also gain some privilege from their 
position, and other less powerful groups will likely benefit from the structure as well. For ex-
ample, Young mentions how middle-class consumers in the developed world are privileged in 
that they benefit from cheap clothing as the result of low production costs of low-income na-
tions. Young argues that as beneficiaries of the structural process, the privileged bear a greater 
share of the responsibility to change the structure. Furthermore, as privileged beneficiaries the 
cost of creating change will likely not be so high for this group, as it might be for others 
(Young, 2011, p. 144-145). 
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Young also discusses how those who stand in positions of power or privilege often are 
not interested in creating change. Instead they may be interested in the continuation of status 
quo. She points out that while the powerful and privileged do not necessarily intend the injus-
tice that results from the established structure, they may be reluctant to change it involve the 
loss of their benefits (Young, 2011, p. 147-148). Young’s discussion here bears similarities to 
Tronto’s (2013; 1993) notion of “privileged irresponsibility”. Tronto describes privileged irre-
sponsibility as a mechanism that allows relatively privileged groups to ignore certain respon-
sibilities or certain hardships, simply due to their social positions. She sees this as a moral and 
political problem as it lets some individuals or groups shrink from responsibilities, which are 
then left to, or forced on, others (Tronto, 1993, p. 120-121; 2013, p. 58, 103-105). Thus, 
through Young’s and Tronto’s discussions we see the importance of considering power, privi-
lege and differing interests in an analysis of responsibility. Young further argues for the im-
portance of considering the interests of those individuals and groups who suffer from structur-
al injustices themselves. She suggests that as these are likely to be most interested in creating 
change, they should also bear a share of the responsibility for bringing an end to the injustice 
they suffer. She mentions how low-income factory workers in the garment industry in part 
contribute to the structural processes that are unjust, simply by accepting unfair working con-
ditions and low wages. Her point is to emphasise how those suffering under structural injus-
tice should not be seen merely as passive victims. While she makes clear it should not be up 
to those suffering the injustice to alone create change, they should be the ones who call atten-
tion to the harm inflicted and voice what needs must be met (Young, 2011, p. 146-147).  
 
 
 A Care-Ethical Interpretation of Responsibility 
From the perspectives, themes and problems discussed in this chapter, certain features stand 
out as characteristic to a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility. I suggest the most im-
portant feature of a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility is that it is grounded in a rela-
tional ontology. As highlighted by Kittay’s (1999) notion of social responsibility, caring re-
sponsibilities arise within relationships and meeting these responsibilities requires support 
from a larger social network. On her account, the obligation to care rests on the vulnerability 
of another person, but also on that person’s prior relationship to oneself. Fundamentally, she 
grounds the entitlement to care in an acknowledgement of human relationships and human 
connection itself (Kittay, 1999, p. 25, 64-65, 107-109). As discussed in chapter two, the rela-
tional ontology of care-ethics is important in order to avoid paternalistic, dominant or overly 
self-sacrificing care. As Pettersen (2012) argues, a relational ontology characterises mature 
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care, which sets weight on reciprocity, dialogue, the ability to balance interests and the 
acknowledgement of each party’s equal worth. 
 Seeing responsibility as grounded by the relational ontology of care-ethics, implies 
that responsibility is reciprocal, linked to a shared commitment and tied to a relational con-
text. This does not necessarily mean that both, or all parties, in a relation are responsible for 
contributing in equal amounts. Rather, I suggest it implies that both, or all, parties are respon-
sible in terms of being equally committed to the aim of the relationship and to it not becoming 
a harmful one. This interpretation resonates with Kittay’s notion of a connection-based equali-
ty, as opposed to seeing equality as an equal exchange. As discussed in chapter two, Kittay 
also makes the point that while the person caring has a special obligation towards the person 
cared for, both are responsible for not letting the relationship become dominant or abusive 
(1999, p. 34. 66). The interpretation of responsibility as relational is also supported by Petter-
sen’s (2008; 2011) proposal that the core normative values of care involve a balance between 
the principles of extended non-maleficence and restricted beneficence. Thus, a care-ethical 
interpretation of responsibility suggests an active commitment to the wellbeing of others and 
our relationships to them, while also acknowledging the limit to each individual’s care re-
sources. That an individual’s care resources are limited rests on the fact that one person can-
not alone care for everyone, nor can one alone sustain the care demands of a highly dependent 
person over time, without social support or access to material resources. The recognition of 
the limitations of an individual’s care resources and the acknowledgement of the relational 
context of care, makes a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility open for distributing or 
sharing responsibilities through social networks or relational structures. This is explored in 
Kittay’s (1999) discussion of a social responsibility for care, and her argument for a social 
welfare system that supports care and distributes care responsibilities. Engster (2007) similar-
ly maintains that we are obliged to support care through social, political and economic institu-
tions that distribute care in a wider social setting. Young’s (2011) notion of a shared responsi-
bility for structural injustice, takes the idea of shared and distributed responsibilities even fur-
ther. Young’s shared responsibility involves an acknowledgement of the interdependence of 
individual persons through social structures and it emphasises responsibility as an active 
commitment. Without forcing her ideas into the mould of care theory, I nevertheless suggest 
her analysis deeply resonates with a care-ethical approach to thinking about responsibility. 
The care-ethical perspective is generally sensitive to the particular relational context of 
moral dilemmas. Yet, a particular relational context may stretch far into the social and politi-
cal arena with relational structures that either foster or hinder care. Young’s (2011) analysis 
addresses such complex structures, which may transcend the boundaries of the traditional 
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family unit, the local community or a nation’s borders. While a care-ethical interpretation of 
responsibility would tie responsibilities to particular relationships or larger relational struc-
tures, what relationships to include in the scope of the responsibility would likely vary de-
pending on the specific questions at hand. Moreover, instead of determining responsibilities 
on the basis of a few universal and absolute principles, a care-ethical approach will likely ap-
proach these questions through dialogue or public discourse. As each party is assumed to have 
equal worth and as the responsibility rests on a shared commitment and active engagement in 
maintaining or changing relationships, it seems important that each party has an opportunity 
to influence the process of responsibility setting. Like Young’s (2011) parameters for reason-
ing about responsibilities for structural injustices, considering questions of power, privilege 
and interest seem important to a care-ethical process of assigning responsibilities. I suggest, 
each party’s degree of dependence and vulnerability, and their additional care burdens, should 
also be taken into account. After all, questions of human dependence and the distribution of 
care responsibilities are recurring themes in care-ethics, present for instance in Kittay’s 
(1999), Tronto’s (1993; 2013) and Engster’s (2007) discussions. 
 In sum I suggest a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility would rest on the rela-
tional ontology of care-ethics, which I see as entailing an emphasis on reciprocity through 
shared commitment and an active engagement in the wellbeing of others through one’s rela-
tionship to them. It would entail that responsibilities are tied to, and shared within, relation-
ships and relational structures. In assigning and determining responsibilities, each party’s po-
sitions of power, privilege, interest and dependence should be considered. Further, it would 
involve a focus on the particulars of specific relational contexts, while at the same being 
aware of how background conditions and structures influence particular moral dilemmas. I 
therefore see a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility as somewhat flexible, both in being 
open to a dialogue in the process of determining and assigning responsibilities and in being 
able to alternative between the different perspectives of a narrow and a wide context.  
 Keeping these general features of a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility in 
mind, we can now move on to the more specific discussion of the moral responsibility of eco-
nomic agents in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN MARKET RELATIONS 
 
 
While the previous chapter focused on the reasons for accepting an appeal to care and exam-
ined a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility as social and shared, this chapter discusses 
the relevance of a care-ethical approach to responsibility for market relations. Could a care-
ethical interpretation of responsibility extend all the way into economic markets? Could it 
justify holding economic agents morally responsible for their actions? I approach these ques-
tions by looking in detail at Engster’s (2007; 2011) arguments for the moral responsibility of 
businesses. In “Care Ethics and Stakeholder Theory”, Engster (2011) attempts to extend the 
notion of a social responsibility for care to include businesses’ moral responsibility for certain 
groups that are especially dependent on the business’s activities. He grounds this approach in 
what he sees as a fundamental link of dependence between business activities and caring prac-
tices.  
Examining Engster’s (2007; 2011) arguments is a useful starting point for discussing 
the problems and possibilities of a care-ethical justification of the moral responsibility of 
businesses, and by extension, the moral responsibility of economic agents in general. As I see 
it, the problem at the core of this discussion is that, as it is standardly assumed that the aim of 
economic activity is individual gain or profit maximisation, it is not obvious why or how the-
se aims should be restrained by moral considerations. Furthermore, while it is not easy to 
grasp how economic agents in general should be held morally responsible, the moral respon-
sibility of businesses seems an especially slippery concept. After all, businesses and corpora-
tions are not persons in the usual sense, but are made up of collectives of persons. A discus-
sion of the moral responsibility of businesses therefore seems a good place to start for under-
standing the moral responsibility of economic agents in general.  
In order to provide a context for Engster’s (2011) arguments for the moral responsibil-
ity of businesses, I compare his position to Friedman’s (1962 [2002]; 1970) rather well known 
arguments against businesses’ social responsibility. While I see Engster’s care-based business 
approach as an interesting starting point to the question of businesses’ moral responsibility, I 
also discuss several potential problems with his account. The first relates to the problem of 
free riding on care, which I see as following from a weakness in Engster’s underlying argu-
mentation. The second relates to the question of businesses’ moral personhood, which I sug-
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gest can be successfully countered. The third relates to the standard business aim of profit 
maximisation. Here I suggest that the problem is not with the pursuit of profit in general, but 
with unrestrained profit maximisation. I end by suggesting that the main problem with Eng-
ster’s account is that, contrary to his intention, it seems to interpret economic activity as a 
caring practice. I will instead set forth an alternative care-ethical argument for the moral re-
sponsibility of businesses that rests on the relational ontology of care-ethics and the normative 
values of care.  
 
 
From Social Welfare to Business Responsibility 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Kittay (1999) and Engster (2007) argue for a social wel-
fare system that provides and supports care in society. While the discussion in the previous 
chapter focused mainly on Kittay’s reasons for distributing care responsibilities through a 
social welfare system, this chapter turns to Engster’s account, which is more focused on the 
practical application. Engster (2007) sees it as following from our moral obligation to care 
that we should establish and support institutions, including economic institutions, that pro-
mote care in society. He then moves on to draw up a list of the economic principles and poli-
cies a caring government should implement. These include the general responsibility to ensure 
a sufficient level of economic productivity and a minimally fair distribution of economic re-
sources in order to meet the population’s needs for basic goods, like food, energy and infra-
structure. His list also includes policies that are meant to ensure access to work, decent work-
ing conditions and social support for care. Specifically, he mentions access to work with fair 
wages and feasible work hours, and support and accommodation for care through sick leave, 
parental leave, and assistance for the unemployed. Finally, he also mentions individuals’ enti-
tlement to retain a portion of their resources to secure their own and their dependents’ care 
needs (Engster, 2007, p. 123, 141-148). Engster thereby provides a practical framework for 
governmental regulation of economic institutions appropriate to a caring society. However, 
Engster (2011) goes further still with his proposal for a care-based approach to business. 
Through the following discussion, we will see that he uses the notion of social responsibility 
to support care, not only to justify the organisation and regulation of political and economic 
institutions, but also to justify businesses’ moral responsibility. In effect, his project is to ex-
tend the scope of social responsibility for care from the individual, social and political levels 
right out to the economic sphere of business activity. 
 Before pursuing Engster’s (2011) arguments for a care-based approach to business, I 
will first set the scene by introducing Friedman’s (1962 [2002]; 1970) by now classic argu-
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ments against businesses’ social responsibility. Friedman’s position involves a minimal inter-
pretation of the social responsibility of businesses. As he states, in a free economy “[…] there 
is one and only one social responsibility of business — to use its resources and engage in ac-
tivities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is 
to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud” (1962 [2002], p. 
133). His position has become known as the stockholder theory, as it emphasises the respon-
sibility of the business manager to the stockholders. A business manager, according to Fried-
man, has direct responsibility to the particular shareholders who own the business, and the 
manager is duty bound to run the business according to their aims. As he makes clear, the 
shareholders’ aims are usually, though not necessarily, to maximise profits. On Friedman’s 
view, the relation between the shareholders and the manager is a voluntary contractual agree-
ment like that between employer and employee. The only constraints are that the manager 
keeps the business’s activities “within the rules of the game”, meaning in line with free mar-
ket competition and in accordance with the law and ethical custom (Friedman, 1962 [2002]; 
1970).  
 Stakeholder theory is often set up as an opposing position to the stockholder theory. 
With stakeholder theory the scope of businesses’ responsibilities is broadened beyond their 
responsibility to the shareholders to include all those who have a “stake” in the business.21 A 
business’s stakeholders are generally thought to include its employees, suppliers, customers 
and the local community, in addition to the business’s shareholders. However, other groups 
may also be included, like the business’s competitors, special interest groups, the media or the 
government. In the Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art, Freeman and his co-authors 
(2010) resist a definite description of stakeholders and argue instead for a pragmatic ap-
proach. They explain that on the stakeholder theory, the primary responsibility of a business is 
to create value for its stakeholders. They argue that the best way to do this is not by single-
mindedly focusing on maximising profits, but instead by focusing on the business’s purpose 
and its stakeholder relationships. Yet, they point out that the stakeholder approach is not in 
fact fundamentally opposed to Friedman’s stockholder position. They see both approaches as 
aimed at creating as much value as possible for the business, and on both approaches this is 
seen as the main aim of business activity. The difference lies in how the aim of creating value 
is achieved and who this value is created for (Freeman et al., 2010, p. 10-12, 24-29, 206-211). 
On the stakeholder theory, the success of a business depends on its ability to build good rela-
tionships between stakeholders with shared interests and a common aim. The focus on rela-
                                                
21 The origin of stakeholder theory is associated with R. Edward Freeman’s (1984 [2010]) Strategic 
Managment: A Stakeholder Approach, but see also Friedman and Miles (2006) and Zakhem et al. 
(2007) for an overview of the stakeholder literature. 
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tionships, shared aims and interests are features that clearly resonate with the general ap-
proach of care-ethics. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that Engster sees the possibility 
of combining a stakeholder approach to business activity with a care-ethical approach. Eng-
ster (2011) suggests that care-ethics could inform a stakeholder approach by providing a phil-
osophical justification for why corporations have a moral responsibility towards their stake-
holders, and further clarifying who the stakeholders are and how to prioritise among them. I 
will mainly focus on Engster’s reasons for why businesses should have a moral responsibility 
in the first place, as this provides the basis for the whole approach. Which groups should 
count as the stakeholders and how they should be prioritised are of secondary concern.  
 
 
Engster’s Argument for the Moral Responsibility of Businesses 
Engster’s (2011) argument for why businesses have a moral responsibility to support care 
rests on what he sees as a fundamental link of dependence between business activities and 
caring practices. His argument consists of two stages. First, he states that the most fundamen-
tal social and moral purpose of economic activity is to support human life. As he writes: “We 
farm, mine manufacture, transport, and buy and sell goods most fundamentally in order to 
produce and obtain the goods necessary for our survival and functioning” (Engster, 2011, p. 
100). Caring, on his view, involves using the goods and resources made available through 
business activities to caring ends, which on his view means directly to support human survival 
and functioning. As examples he mentions that when we use food as nourishment or clothes 
for cover and protection, we are involved in caring (Engster, 2011, p. 100-101). He elaborates 
on this point in The Heart of Justice, stating there that productive work provides us with the 
resources necessary for care and as such, “[…] commodity production may be said to be most 
fundamentally oriented around the moral goal of supporting human caring” (2007, p. 119-
127). The second stage of Engster’s argument is that he sees the existence of business activi-
ties themselves as depending on care. He points out that caring activities are necessary for the 
reproduction of human life and society, including business activity itself (Engster, 2011, p. 
100-101). In The Heart of Justice he writes: “Caring practices sustain and replenish workers 
so that they can engage in commodity production, prepare children to enter the work force, 
and help temporarily sick and disabled individuals to return to work” (Engster, 2007, p. 117).  
In sum, Engster’s position is that businesses have a moral responsibility to support car-
ing practices. His argument is that as the fundamental purpose of business activity is to sup-
port care and as business activity itself fundamentally relies on caring practices for its own 
existence, so businesses should in turn acknowledge their responsibility to support care. Thus, 
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Engster (2011) concludes, when business activity hinders caring practices, this in fact under-
mines the internal moral and social justification of business activity itself. He writes: “If the 
fundamental moral and social purpose of business activity is to support caregiving, then it 
would seem wrong by the moral and social logic of business activity itself to engage in activi-
ties that controvert this goal” (Engster, 2011. p. 100). In short, Engster’s argument is that 
businesses have a moral responsibility to support care because not only do caring practices 
fundamentally depend on resources being made available through economic production, but 
also business activity itself fundamentally relies on background care for sustaining, maintain-
ing and reproducing the human resources necessary for business activity.  
However, Engster’s argument is not without its problems. In the following I will look 
at three objections to his position and use this as the basis for a general discussion of the prob-
lems and possibilities of justifying the moral responsibility of businesses. I will finally sum-
marise what I see as the essential problem at the heart of Engster’s position, and propose an 
alternative care-ethical reading. 
 
 
The Problem of Free Riding on Care 
The first objection to Engster’s argument is that even if it is true that business activity relies 
fundamentally on practices of care for its existence, yet, one may argue, this is only at the 
very general level of all human activity fundamentally relying on caring practices for its ex-
istence. While one may accept that society and humanity in general depend on care, the ques-
tion remains why any particular business should accept responsibility for supporting such 
general care. Why should a business not free ride, benefiting on others’ care work without 
contributing to the care of others? The problem of free riders is especially difficult to tackle in 
relation to businesses. If the primary aim of businesses is to maximise profits and free-riding 
helps them do just that, then it seems logical that businesses both would and should free ride 
whenever that yields the highest profits.  
  Engster does not discuss the problem of free riding. However, in my opinion Eng-
ster’s best hope for countering this objection would be to appeal to his initial argument for the 
moral obligation to care. As discussed in the previous chapter, Engster (2007) argues that be-
cause we implicitly value care as a necessary good due to our dependence on care for our sur-
vival and functioning, so we are implicitly stating that those capable of caring ought to care. If 
we then fail to recognise that we in turn are morally obliged to care for others, we are, accord-
ing to Engster, not only involved in a logical contradiction but also undermining the web of 
caring relationships that make our own lives and society as a whole possible. He next extends 
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the moral obligation to care directly for others to a social responsibility for indirectly support-
ing care through social and economic institutions that foster a caring society (Engster, 2007, 
p. 46-49, 123). Engster could attempt to meet the objection that businesses would free ride on 
background care, by transferring his argument for the moral obligation to care to the case of 
businesses. This seems to be his intention, as he states that business activities that hinder care 
are in fact undermining their own internal social and moral justification by depleting the so-
cial structure of care that made their existence possible in the first place (2011, p. 100-101). 
Engster could then argue that in the long run it is not sustainable for businesses to withhold 
support for care because this means depleting the pool of care resources while adding nothing 
to it. While the human and social resources made available through caring practices are not 
perhaps in immediate danger of being “used up”, this is only due to the fact that many persons 
nevertheless do care. Engster might argue, as Kittay (1999) and Tronto (2013) have done, that 
when the work involved in caring goes unnoticed and its value unacknowledged, the result is 
an unfair distribution of care work. For instance, as we saw in chapter three, Kittay (1999) 
argues that those burdened with considerable care responsibilities are not on an equal footing 
with others in the competition for goods in the market. Similarly, Engster might argue that it 
is morally wrong for businesses to disregard their responsibility to support care because they 
are then reaping the benefits of others’ care work while not acknowledging, or supporting, the 
efforts of the carers. 
 However, again there are problems with my proposed defence of Engster’s account. 
The argument has now turned into an argument about fairness: It is not fair that businesses 
free ride and use the resources made available through caring practices without supporting 
caring practices in turn. Yet, why should businesses care about fairness? This already assumes 
that businesses do in fact acknowledge a moral aim beyond the standard business aim of max-
imising profits, which in this case involves the moral framework of justice. What is lacking in 
my proposed defence of Engster’s account is an argument for why businesses should 
acknowledge a moral framework and an accompanying moral responsibility in the first place. 
According to Engster, as we saw above, businesses that fail to recognise the moral responsi-
bility to support care undermine their own existence. This could also mean that businesses 
thus undermine the internal reason for their existence. If, as Engster suggests, the fundamen-
tal purpose of business activity is to support caring practices, then it follows that business 
practices that hinder care are involved in a logical contradiction. But again, this already as-
sumes that the fundamental purpose of business activity is to support care –– which is precise-
ly the question up for discussion. Furthermore, if it is true that the fundamental aim of busi-
ness is to support care, how does this relate to the standardly assumed business aim of profit 
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maximisation? Does the fundamental purpose to support care trump the profit aim? If so, the 
question is when and why. 
 It seems reasonable that business activity fundamentally relies on caring practices for 
its existence in the very general way that all human activity relies on caring practices. Never-
theless, an acknowledgement of this fact seems too weak to bind any particular business to a 
moral responsibility to support care in turn. An additional argument based on fairness is need-
ed. Furthermore, Engster does not make it clear when the general responsibility to support 
care should trump the standard business aim of profit maximisation. Thus, I suggest the prob-
lem of free riding points to an underlying weakness in Engster’s argumentation. 
 
 
The Problem of Businesses’ Moral Personhood 
The second objection to Engster’s argument for the moral responsibility of businesses relates 
to the notion of the moral personhood of businesses themselves. One might accept that per-
sons are bound by a moral obligation to care and a social responsibility to support care, yet it 
does not necessarily follow that this form of responsibility also applies to businesses. One 
could point out that the care-ethical notion of social responsibility, in line with Kittay’s (1999) 
principle of doulia and Engster’s (2007) arguments for supporting caring social institutions, is 
a responsibility held by individual persons, albeit individual persons together. With regard to 
businesses, the question is on whom or what precisely this social responsibility should fall. 
Should one, for instance, see the business as a collective of individual persons or as an entity 
in its own right? Or is it the business executive or the shareholders who bear this responsibil-
ity? Friedman (1970) questions the notion of a social responsibility of business on precisely 
these grounds, arguing that only persons have responsibilities and pointing out that corpora-
tions are not real, but merely artificial, persons. Friedman concludes therefore that if busi-
nesses do have social responsibilities, these must lie with the corporate executive. He contin-
ues: “As a person, [the corporate executive] may have many other responsibilities that he rec-
ognises or assumes voluntarily — to his family, his conscience, his feelings of charity, his 
church, his clubs, his city, his country. […] If these are ‘social responsibilities’, they are the 
social responsibilities of individuals, not of business” (Friedman, 1970). Friedman’s point is 
that corporate executives, as private persons, may have many and varying responsibilities. In 
their roles as corporate executives however, they are responsible only to their employers, 
namely the shareholders. Engster (2011), in turn, is unhelpfully vague in his discussion of a 
care-based business approach with regard to who or what precisely is bound by the responsi-
bility to support care. He writes, for instance, that “businesspeople” should take into account 
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the impact of their actions on people’s ability to care; he mentions how “business activity” 
and “business practices” can be judged moral or immoral; and he writes interchangeably of 
the “firm’s”, the “employer’s” and the “manager’s” obligations to certain stakeholders (Eng-
ster, 2011, p. 100-104).  
Nevertheless, I suggest it is possible to make a successful argument for the moral per-
sonhood of businesses, based on a care-ethical approach. Consider again Friedman’s argu-
ment against the social responsibility of businesses. As we saw at the beginning of this chap-
ter, he argues that the one and only social responsibility of businesses is generally to maxim-
ise profits as long as the business’s activities stay within the rules of the game. By this he 
means that businesses should avoid deception and fraud, and adhere to the law and ethical 
custom (Friedman, 1962 [2002], p. 133; 1970). He writes: “ [The executive] has direct re-
sponsibility to his employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance 
with their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while con-
forming to the basic rules of society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethi-
cal custom” (Friedman, 1970). Friedman’s view is clear: The notion of a business’s responsi-
bility only makes sense in terms of its executive’s responsibility to the shareholders, and 
shareholders generally expect the executive to maximise the business’s profits. Note, howev-
er, that in effect Friedman’s argument presents both the possibility of businesses bearing some 
kind of responsibility and the possibility that the standard business aim of profit maximisation 
should be restrained to some extent. I will discuss these possibilities in what remains of this 
section. 
When Friedman states that the business executive bears a responsibility only to the 
business’s shareholders, he is in fact stating that the business executive bears responsibility 
for the business’s activities in ensuring as high profits as possible. Thus, it need not be 
thought impossible or absurd for the business executive to be held responsible for the busi-
ness’s activities as such. The question is what kind of responsibility the executive holds, and 
to whom the executive is accountable. I believe Friedman is mistaken when he makes a clear 
division between the business executive as a private person holding many voluntarily as-
sumed responsibilities, and the business executive in the role as executive holding only a re-
sponsibility to the shareholders. I argued in the previous chapter that a care-ethical interpreta-
tion of responsibility would not rest on the assumption that responsibilities are simply volun-
tarily assumed commitments. Instead, the emphasis would be on the relational context of re-
sponsibility. Therefore, the weight of others’ claims on us would in part depend on whether 
the relationships or larger relational structures we are already part of renders us especially 
responsible to them. In line with Young’s (2011) analysis, this would depend on the parties’ 
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differing positions of power, privilege or interest, but I also suggested the degree of depend-
ence of each party and their share of care burdens would be important. From a care-ethical 
perspective, then, it seems odd that the role of executive automatically absolves her from all 
responsibility apart from that to the shareholders, while her role as a private person may in-
clude several responsibilities as voluntarily assumed commitments. Friedman’s position im-
plies that the responsibility of the executive to the shareholders is a strong, binding and non-
negotiable type of responsibility, and one that overrides all other potential responsibilities. It 
also implies that the private person’s responsibilities to family, country or conscience are 
weaker forms of responsibility or even optional commitments. The reason for this distinction 
seems to rest only on the different roles the person has as executive or private person, though 
no argument is given for why this difference in roles is of importance.  
By contrast, a care-ethical perspective would see the degree, type and weight of re-
sponsibility as grounded in the relational context of the person. It would then seem reasonable 
that the executive bears some responsibilities to the employees, for instance, in addition to the 
shareholders, as the employees are crucial to the joint venture that the business in fact is. 
Without employees there would be no business. Though, without shareholders and without an 
executive there would likely not be a business either. Thinking about responsibility in terms 
of relationships would involve recognising that the executive, shareholders and employees are 
all tied to a common relational structure by their contributions to the purpose, aims and activi-
ties of the business. It would also entail some degree of reciprocity between the parties. So, 
while it seems reasonable that the business executive bears an important share of the respon-
sibility for the business’s activities, a care-ethical approach would not see the executive as 
bearing this responsibility alone. The employees and shareholders are also likely to bear a 
share of this responsibility, as they too are involved in the business’s activities, may have 
some degree of influence over decisions relating to the business, and may have a common 
interest in the business’s purpose and projects. Therefore, I suggest that we think of a busi-
ness’s responsibilities along the lines of Young’s (2011) notion of shared responsibility dis-
cussed in the previous chapter. Young described the responsibility for structural injustices as 
shared between all those who contribute to the social processes that bring them about. Simi-
larly, the responsibility of a business could be seen as shared between all those who partake in 
the business’s activities and have a common interest in its purpose and aims.  
However, when leaning on Young’s (2011) analysis here, two concerns immediately 
arise. One is that Young clearly states that her notion of shared responsibility is not the same 
as a collective responsibility, as sometimes applied to corporations. She argues that the prob-
lem with collective responsibility is that it may hold the corporation responsible without any 
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of the persons working for it being held personally responsible. She emphasises that her no-
tion of shared responsibility is one that each person personally bears, albeit together with oth-
ers. The other concern relating to Young’s analysis is that she is sceptical to the idea of delin-
eating the exact contribution to the unjust outcome made by each party, maintaining that this 
form of responsibility is in essence shared and discharged only through collective action 
(Young, 2011, p. 109-110). In relation to determining the moral responsibility of businesses, I 
suggest we should accept Young’s insistence that a shared responsibility is one that we each 
personally bear, but I would maintain that the share of each person’s responsibility should, as 
far as possible, be determined. Thus, it should be possible to avoid the problem that the spe-
cifics of each person’s share of the responsibility disappear in the sheer enormity of the whole 
relational structure. It should be possible to determine, at least to some extent, the degree of 
each person’s responsibility for the business’s actions by considering their positions of power 
and influence within the corporate structure, their privilege through the business’s activities, 
their interest in changing or maintaining the business’s aims or the business culture, and their 
dependence on the business’s activities. It seems possible then to apply Young’s (2011) no-
tion of shared responsibility to the case of businesses by interpreting businesses as relational 
structures. All those who partake in the business’s projects and have a shared interest in its 
purpose, also share the responsibility for the business’s activities, though possibly to varying 
degrees.  
In the previous chapter I further argued that a care-ethical interpretation of responsibil-
ity would imply an ability to approach the question of responsibility from different angles. 
This follows from the general care-ethical focus on the particular relational context of moral 
problems, while also looking to the background causes manifested in larger social and politi-
cal structures. Thus, as I see it, the care-ethical approach involves balancing and shifting be-
tween a narrow and wide relational perspective. With regard to determining the responsibility 
of businesses, a care-ethical approach might then open for alternating between views on the 
personhood of businesses. I argue that while it should be acknowledged that all those who 
partake in the business’s activities bear some share of the business’s responsibility, a care-
ethical approach should also be able to recognise that a business is more than the collection of 
people working in it any point in time. A business is also an entity in its own right, with assets 
and liabilities, a brand identity, a purpose, a history and a culture. While these are characteris-
tics that evolve and change over time and through the influence of those working within the 
business, they are nevertheless features of the business itself not the specific group of people 
working there. The business as an entity in its own right may hold a position of power and 
influence, for instance through its brand identity, its market share or the value of its assets, 
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that stands apart from the power or influence of the group of people contributing to the busi-
ness’s activities at that time. Therefore, I see it as important that a business should also be 
held accountable in the standard liability sense, as recognised in the legal notion of an artifi-
cial person. In sum, I see it as possible to challenge the objection that questions the moral per-
sonhood of businesses. Businesses can be held morally accountable, in part through the shared 
responsibility of all those individual persons who partake in the business’s activities, and in 
part by the artificial person of the business as an entity in its own right. 
Let us then move on to the possibility of restraining the standard business aim of profit 
maximisation. When Friedman states that businesses should keep their activities within the 
law and in accordance with ethical custom, he argues in effect that the profit aim both can and 
should be restrained. The question, then, is where to set the boundaries of restraint. While the 
law ideally reflects a widely accepted and morally justified view of right and wrong, neverthe-
less it will likely not be a perfect representation of morality. In consequence, adhering to the 
law alone demands too little, as the law may be incomplete and leave loopholes that make 
some unethical activities legal. As many businesses now operate in global markets, this be-
comes even more apparent as the law varies significantly among nations and regions. One 
example is the avoidance of corporate tax by moving part of a business’s activities to a tax 
haven, a loophole that many businesses are ready to take advantage of.22 While such activity 
would be in line with the standard business aim of profit maximisation, it involves significant-
ly reducing the business’s contribution to public welfare through taxation and would be con-
sidered by many unethical. On the other hand, adhering to the law alone may also demand too 
much if the law itself is morally questionable, for instance if it involves discrimination of cer-
tain groups. Furthermore, the requirement that businesses adhere to ethical custom is also 
problematic. Ethical custom varies between different cultures and regions, and again, custom 
is not the same as a justified moral position. Thus, while Friedman sees the appropriate re-
straints on profit maximisation as the limits of law and ethical custom, I see this as an arbi-
trary and ill justified place to draw the line. Instead, I will argue that the appropriate bounda-
ries for profit maximisation should be determined by the normative values of care-ethics. 
 
 
The Problem of Profit Maximisation 
The third objection to Engster’s (2011) argument for the moral responsibility of businesses is 
one he briefly discusses himself. According to this objection, even if one accepts for the sake 
                                                
22 See, for instance, Richard Brooks’s comment in The Guardian, 5 November 2014: “Havens like 
Luxembourg turn ‘Tax Competition’ into a Global Race to the Bottom”. 
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of argument that businesses should support care, it could still be maintained that the most ef-
ficient way to do so is by single-mindedly pursuing the aim of profit maximisation, as this 
would generate the greatest supply of resources (Engster, 2011, p. 101). In part this objection 
rests on the empirical question of whether a single-minded pursuit of profit maximisation in 
fact yields the greatest profit. This seems to be the general approach of stakeholder theory, as 
it is argued here that while the aim of businesses is to create as much value as possible, the 
best way to do this is by building solid stakeholder relationships (Freeman et al., 2010, p. 10-
12). In part the objection rests on the question of a morally justified distribution of resources, 
and in particular the resources necessary for care. Would a single-minded pursuit of profit 
lead to an efficient distribution of care resources? Would this distribution be fair?  
Again, I see this objection as a variation of Friedman’s argument for the minimal in-
terpretation of the social responsibility of businesses as solely to comply with the sharehold-
ers’ aim of maximising profits. With reference to Adam Smith, Friedman argues that the gen-
eral good of society is most efficiently attained through individuals’ pursuit of their own in-
terest, though he adds that it is the responsibility of the rest of us to establish a framework of 
law that makes this feasible (1962 [2002], p. 133). Friedman’s reasoning is that if a business 
manager were to take some of the corporation’s resources and spend them on charitable pro-
jects that lie outside the business’s realm, the manager would actually be taking resources that 
belong to the shareholders, the employees or the customers. Friedman argues that in effect 
this would be the same as if the manager were to claim taxes and single-handedly decide how 
to use the tax revenues. Friedman concludes that it should not be up to the business manager, 
but a democratically elected official, to decide where and how to distribute society’s re-
sources. As a final point he argues that if the manager uses some of the corporation’s re-
sources on what looks like a charitable project but in fact yields a profit in the long run, then 
these are actually investments that are in the business’s own interest (Friedman, 1970). Note 
that Friedman’s argument implies that the business manager faces two opposing options: ei-
ther to pursue maximum profit, which is in the business’s self-interest, or to pursue unprofita-
ble charitable projects in the name of social responsibility. Thus, Friedman makes use of the 
dichotomy of self-interest and altruism, which I argued in chapter three is characteristic of 
market thinking. Friedman is then able to ridicule the very notion of a social responsibility of 
business, by equating this responsibility with unprofitable, altruistic charity. Yet, from a care-
ethical point of view the dichotomy of self-interest and altruism is neither very useful nor a 
correct representation of reality. It ignores how persons through their relationships may have 
common interests and shared aims. From a care-ethical point of view, there is no logical con-
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tradiction in a business pursuing projects that in the long run are profitable to the business but 
are also in the interests of some other groups or institutions.  
Furthermore, it is implied through Friedman’s (1962 [2002], 1970) discussion that 
profit maximisation means maximised shareholder value. This follows from his reasoning that 
the business manager is only responsible to the business’s shareholders, who again are usually 
interested in maximising profits. Consider the proposition that businesses should aim at max-
imised shareholder value in light of the initial objection that the most efficient way businesses 
can support care is to make available the greatest amount of resources through profits. While 
the maximisation of shareholder value might generate the largest net total value, there is no 
reason to think that the shareholders are the only ones in need of resources for care, or indeed 
those most in need. The efficiency of supporting care through the pursuit of profit depends 
largely on the distribution and use of the value created. In practical terms, this would depend 
on the levels of private and corporate taxation, and also on the business’s own decisions con-
cerning its investments, the projects it pursues, and the levels of wages, bonuses and returns to 
its employees and shareholders. While Friedman may be right that the details of the tax sys-
tem are the responsibility of democratically elected politicians and public officials, it still does 
not follow that businesses are automatically excluded from all forms of moral responsibility. 
In particular, it does not follow that businesses are justified in pursuing profits at all costs, nor 
that the principle share of a business’s profits should go to the shareholders.  
In effect, Friedman’s position is in line with Tronto’s description of the “responsibility 
passes” characteristic of the neoliberal interpretation of responsibility (2013, p. 58, 117-119). 
This is perhaps not too surprising considering that Friedman is well known as a neoclassical 
economist positioned on the political right. However, from a care-ethical point of view, 
Friedman’s argumentation is problematic as it allows businesses to disregard any responsibil-
ity beyond that of maximising profits and shareholder value. It involves the claim that as 
business activity is only about profit maximisation and as social responsibility is only about 
unprofitable charity, businesses cannot pursue social responsibility. Using Tronto’s terms, 
businesses are in effect granted a free pass out of responsibility by dint of the overriding busi-
ness aim of profit maximisation. Yet, no solid argumentation is provided for why this busi-
ness aim is justified in overriding all other moral considerations. Similarly, the initial objec-
tion that support for care is best achieved through profit maximisation also involves a respon-
sibility pass. It involves the claim that, as maximising profits makes the most resources avail-
able, businesses need not consider any further moral responsibility. The problem is, of course, 
that this approach does not ensure a fair distribution of resources. Nor does it ensure that the 
resources made available through business activity are used to support caring practices.  
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 Engster (2011) attempts to counter the objection that maximising profits is the most 
efficient way of making care resources available, by referring to a set of principles he has es-
tablished for prioritising between different subjects in need of care. According to these princi-
ples, we are justified in giving priority to: those who are in close proximity to ourselves, those 
who we stand in a close relationship to, and those whose needs are most urgent. He points out 
that the need for prioritising care rests on the fact that a person’s caring resources are limited 
and that no one will be able care for everyone. Engster acknowledges that the three principles 
may come into conflict with each other as they pull in different directions, and so he main-
tains that much still depends on the specifics of the situation at hand. He nevertheless sees 
them as providing general guidelines for the prioritisation of care resources. Engster therefore 
concludes that disregarding the question of whether the pursuit of profit maximisation leads to 
the greatest net total of resources, businesses are generally required to care first for those who 
stand in close proximity to them and those most dependent on their activities. He states that 
when the pursuit of profit directly hinders the ability to care for these groups, it violates caring 
values and is therefore morally wrong (Engster, 2011, p. 98-100; 2007, p. 56-58). Without 
going into the details or examining the soundness of Engster’s set of distributional principles, 
the main question of interest for the discussion here is why, or to what extent, the pursuit of 
profit is morally wrong in the first place. If, as Engster suggests, a single-minded pursuit of 
profit involves a morally wrong prioritisation of care resources, does he mean that the pursuit 
of profit is always wrong? I am fairly certain that he does not. After all, part of his initial ar-
gument for holding businesses morally responsible is that caring practices depend on econom-
ic resources being made available through business activity (Engster, 2007, p. 119-127; 2011, 
p. 100). Businesses cannot be expected to give up the pursuit of profit. The viability of any 
business requires that its costs do not consistently exceed its revenues. Profits ensure some 
flexibility above the minimum requirement of solvency, providing the business with an oppor-
tunity for growth and development. As I see it, the question is not whether the pursuit of profit 
in itself is acceptable, but rather whether an unrestricted pursuit of profit maximisation is 
morally acceptable. Furthermore, one should ask which groups or individuals in fact benefit 
from the business’s profits.  
According to Engster’s (2011) care-based stakeholder approach a business has a spe-
cial responsibility to its main stakeholder groups of shareholders and employees, as he sees 
both groups as depending directly on the business for resources necessary for their own care 
and caring activities. While consenting that few shareholders will go hungry without their 
annual return from a particular business, Engster still argues that many investors generally 
depend on their investments as income, pension or insurance. The business’s responsibility to 
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its employees involves paying at least a living wage, allowing them adequate time away from 
work to care for themselves and their dependents, ensuring a safe and healthy work environ-
ment, and providing work that does not undermine their basic capabilities. Apart from the 
responsibilities towards shareholders and employees, Engster sees the business as also having 
limited, secondary responsibilities to its customers and the local community. This involves 
not harming the local environment, and acknowledging the investment of local communities 
in terms of tax incentives, or access to land and infrastructure. In relation to its customers, a 
business is responsible for providing safe products and truthful information (Engster, 2011, p. 
101-106). Thus, on Engster’s stakeholder account, the business manager acting on behalf of 
the business would need to balance her responsibility to the shareholders with her responsibil-
ities to the other stakeholder groups. The distribution of the business’s profits should then 
reflect an acknowledgement of all the stakeholders’ interests and needs. Engster (2011) sees it 
as the general aim of the business executive to promote the continuation and success of the 
business. He further states that the goal of business survival has high priority. Within the lim-
its of this first goal, he sees the business executive as responsible for ensuring a fair balance 
between the interests and needs of the stakeholder groups. This would entail, among other 
things, providing a fair return for shareholders, paying workers at least a living wage, ensur-
ing a safe and healthy work environment and giving the workers sufficient time off to meet 
their care responsibilities. However, Engster also acknowledges that the general aim of busi-
ness survival may come into conflict with the business’s responsibilities to its stakeholder 
groups. In these cases he proposes that maintaining jobs, for instance, should generally be 
prioritised over profits and returns for shareholders. Still, he makes it clear that at some point 
the business’s solvency would set a limit to the business’s options. In the long run, cutting 
back on costs may be necessary for the survival of the business. Engster concludes that while 
the overall aim of business activity is to ensure the success and survival of the business, the 
interests and needs of the stakeholder groups generally weigh more. Thus, he states that when 
the pursuit of profit directly impedes the caring practices of those in closest proximity to the 
business’s activities or those most dependent on them, the business is committing a moral 
wrong (2011, p. 101, 105).  
From Engster’s discussion it is fairly clear that the pursuit of profit itself is not the 
problem. Rather, the key issue is the prioritisation of stakeholder groups in relation to the 
standard profit aim. I have argued that the proposition that profit maximisation would be the 
most efficient way for businesses to support care involves a responsibility pass in line with 
Tronto’s (2013) analysis. I find no justification, on Friedman’s account, for why the standard 
business aim of profit maximisation should override all other considerations. Yet, neither do I 
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find a solid justification on Engster’s account for why support for care should take the lead as 
the main purpose of businesses. Engster’s argument for why the responsibility for stakehold-
ers should be prioritised over profits is that: “Since the firm exists at root to promote the sur-
vival, health and functioning of its stakeholders, any action that directly infringes on these 
goods falls outside the scope of moral business activity” (Engster, 2011, p. 105). In short, the 
fundamental purpose of businesses is to support care in general, and to support the caring 
practices of its stakeholder groups in particular. Thus, we are again at the core of Engster’s 
argument for the moral responsibility of businesses. 
 
 
The Root of the Problem 
The viability of Engster’s whole stakeholder approach rests on his initial argument that busi-
ness activity fundamentally relies on care, and that the fundamental purpose of business is to 
support care. The problem of free riding addresses the first claim, pointing to the difficulty in 
making any particular business accept a general obligation to support of care without relying 
on an additional argument from fairness. However, Engster’s second claim, that the funda-
mental purpose of business activity is to support care, is also problematic. Engster states that 
economic production provides us with the resources necessary for care, like food, raw materi-
als, wages and others goods, and thus he sees economic production as fundamentally oriented 
towards the goal of supporting care (2007, p. 123). Engster makes the important point that 
caring is not a self-sustaining activity, but relies crucially on the availability of a range of 
goods, the economic prosperity of society at large, and not least the distribution of economic 
resources. This, then, is a similar argument to Kittay’s (1999) principle of doulia, which em-
phasises the importance of social support for those who have caring responsibilities for others. 
Kittay shows how any particular caring relationship is dependent on, and deeply interconnect-
ed with, the broader social community it is part of. While Kittay argues for the recognition of 
the social value of care, and uses this as the basis for an argument for social welfare, Engster 
(2011) wants to argue for the moral importance of care for business activity. Part of the prob-
lem with Engster’s account is that, although it is certainly clear that caring practices rely on 
commodities being made available from economic production, many commodities are never-
theless not used for caring aims. Unsustainable consumerism and warfare are activities that 
equally depend on commodities being made available through economic production, though I 
would maintain they are not caring activities. The question is in what way Engster sees busi-
ness activity and economic production as fundamentally oriented towards supporting care. 
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According to Engster (2007), caring involves directly helping individuals to meet their 
biological and developmental needs. He states that economic activities may be indirectly 
aimed at supporting care, but they usually have other more direct aims, like growing, harvest-
ing, manufacturing, shipping, selling, and so on. As discussed in chapter two, Engster differ-
entiates between caring and non-caring activities with reference to their direct aims. As he 
sees it, the test question is whether the activity could be successfully completed without meet-
ing the direct aims of caring. As examples, he mentions that the tomato farmer’s immediate 
aim is growing tomatoes, the truck driver’s immediate aim is to transport the tomatoes to the 
canning factory, and the restaurant chef’s immediate aim is to prepare meals. While the 
farmer, truck driver and chef are all indirectly working towards the ultimate aim of producing 
food which is a resource necessary for caring, Engster maintains that their efforts usually do 
not directly depend on whether the prepared meal is in fact eaten. Engster concludes that eco-
nomic production can be caring or non-caring depending on the activities’ direct aims. Yet, he 
also states that the fundamental purpose of most economic production is to support caring 
practices (Engster, 2007, p. 121-123). This suggests that when we peel away the most imme-
diate aims of economic production, like harvesting, producing, transporting, selling, and so 
on, the fundamental or underlying aim of most economic production is nevertheless to support 
care. 
 I argued in chapter two, that Engster’s reliance on a clear distinction between direct 
and indirect aims would in practice be difficult to uphold. The difference seems especially 
diffuse in relation to commodity production on a large scale. For example, in a large-scale 
production line, the concrete activities at each stage may have direct aims like “attach this part 
to that”, “sew this seam”, “design the packaging” or “create a program that will calculate an 
efficient transport route”. These activities may together result in the production of medical 
tents that are sent to regions in conflict or hit by natural disasters, and as such they would be 
used to support the work of meeting urgent care needs. The tents would then be commodities 
important to the care work of the doctors, nurses and volunteers on the ground. On the other 
hand, a batch of these tents could just as well be sold as party tents and used for activities un-
related to care. The point is that whether an activity’s aims are seen as direct or indirect de-
pends in part on what perspective one views the activity from. From a broad macro perspec-
tive the production of medical tents seem caring, while the production of party tents seems 
non-caring. Yet, the direct aims of the activities at each stage of the production of the tents 
may be exactly the same in both cases. From a narrow micro perspective, the activity of pro-
ducing the tents seem unrelated to their end purpose or use. The specific activity of sewing a 
seam, for instance, is successfully completed once the seam has been properly sewn. To me it 
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seems that the determination of the direct or indirect aims of an activity would vary according 
to the perspective from which it is viewed. Thus, I am sceptical to Engster’s approach to dif-
ferentiating caring and non-caring activities. 
 However, the main problem is that Engster’s (2007) argument apparently involves two 
contradictory propositions. On the one hand, he states that the fundamental purpose of busi-
ness activity and economic production is to support care. On the other hand, he defines caring 
activities as those directly aimed at caring. The problem is that Engster uses the distinction of 
direct and indirect aims as the defining characteristic of caring activities; this is what differen-
tiates caring activities from others. Yet, his notion of the fundamental purpose of an activity 
needs to be solid enough to give weight to the argument that businesses have a moral respon-
sibility. For, as Engster argues, the moral responsibility of businesses rests in part on their 
fundamental purpose to support care. Thus, he seems to be stating that economic production is 
not in general directly aimed at caring, while at the same time maintaining that economic ac-
tivity is fundamentally oriented towards caring. Engster presumably wants to exclude eco-
nomic production from his definition of caring practices to avoid the same problem that Tron-
to (1993; 2013) faces with her broad definition of care. If the definition of caring practices is 
stretched too wide then the meaning of care is washed out. Contrary to his intentions, howev-
er, Engster’s account is vulnerable to the same criticism. It seems to follow from his reasoning 
that economic activities are caring activities. Otherwise, how could the fundamental purpose 
of economic activity bear any weight in a claim for the moral responsibility of businesses? 
Alternatively, if Engster’s proposition means that economic activity is not caring, the justifi-
cation for his care-based stakeholder approach to businesses’ responsibility is at risk of crum-
bling altogether.  
If economic activity is in fact a caring practice, and economic relations are caring rela-
tionships, then it makes sense that these activities and relationships should be guided by the 
values and aims of care-ethics. While this line of thinking would give meaning to the idea of 
businesses having a moral responsibility for care, it is in other respects a problematic ap-
proach. From a care-ethical point of view, the problem with such a broad definition of care is 
that it would encompass activities like the production, distribution and sale of goods, and var-
ious financial services like banking, market analyses and financial trade. Caring would then 
include activities relating to objects, both physical and abstract. As I mentioned in chapter 
two, I see the relational ontology of care-ethics as demanding at least a living connection, as 
the relational aspect depends on some degree of reciprocity, communication and shared com-
mitment through a relationship. The proposition that economic activities should be seen as 
caring practices would likely be hard to swallow for business people too. It would involve 
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exchanging the standard business aim of profit maximisation –– or alternative business aims 
like producing quality goods, providing innovative solutions or meeting customer demands –– 
with the core values of care. As I also suggested in chapter two, caring practices should be 
informed by the principles of extended non-maleficence and restricted beneficence, as Petter-
sen (2008; 2011) argues. While caring involves an active commitment to do good and avoid 
causing harm, care should also involve a balance between the interests of each party and an 
acknowledgement of the potential harm involved in neglect or ignorance. Completely replac-
ing economic aims with the values of care would seem to demand too much of business activ-
ity.  
I suggest that economic activities and relations should not be interpreted as caring 
practices and caring relationships. Such an equation would seem to demand too much of eco-
nomic activities, and too little of the definition of care. I see this as the main problem with 
Engster’s argument for the moral responsibility of businesses. However, I still believe that 
care-ethics can provide an argument for the moral responsibility of businesses, and of eco-
nomic agents in general. In the following section I propose an alternative care-ethical reading 
that rests on the relational ontology of care-ethics and appeals to the normative values of care.  
 
 
An Alternative Care-Ethical Argument 
At the heart of the discussion of moral responsibility, I see two fundamental questions: First, 
can economic agents be held morally accountable for their actions, in the sense of having a 
moral personhood? Second, if economic activities are not caring practices, then why should 
they be informed or restrained by care values? 
 I argued in chapter three that the apparently deep-seated notion that economic agents 
and economic considerations lie outside the realm of ethics is in fact not well grounded. It 
rests on what I see as an implicit normative standard present in market thinking. With market 
thinking the standard assumptions of economic theory have been transformed from tools for 
descriptive analysis into an implicit normative proposition for acceptable economic behav-
iour. Thus, the assumptions that economic agents are driven by rational self-interest and pur-
suit of individual gain have acted both as an explanation and an implicit justification for ig-
noring moral considerations in economic decision-making. As a consequence, economic 
agents are not generally expected to take moral considerations into account. As I see it, the 
implicit normative standard of market thinking has in effect given economic agents a free pass 
out responsibility, as Tronto (2013) might have put it. 
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I argued in chapter three that economic activity does not belong to a sphere separate 
from the rest of human life, but is influenced by social values and norms, and often also has a 
real impact on people’s lives. Recognising that economic activity rests on human decision-
making and that businesses are human-made institutions should lead us to acknowledge that 
economic agents are generally not abstract entities, but ordinary persons. Economic agents are 
precisely the persons who bear the roles of employers, employees, consumers, business lead-
ers, shareholders, or investors. In their economic roles they may be concerned with various 
economic aims, have differing or shared economic interests, and engage in economic deci-
sion-making of various sorts. Yet, there is no reason to assume that these roles in themselves 
automatically absolve them from all form of moral responsibility or accountability. As human 
beings it is reasonable that employees, consumers and business leaders are held morally ac-
countable for their actions. Furthermore, in their roles as employees, consumers or business 
leaders, they will likely be driven by a plurality of motives and feelings. While it may be true 
that rationality and self-interest are present in many settings of economic decision-making, 
research in the field of behavioural economics has found that reciprocal motives are generally 
just as common. Either way, the motives people actually display in different decision-making 
settings, says little about the motives or reasons they ought to have followed.  
 On the other hand, it is true that the notion of economic agents does not merely de-
scribe individual persons in their roles as employees or consumers, but also encompasses eco-
nomic institutions like businesses. Determining the moral personhood of businesses is more 
troublesome, as a business consists of many individual persons, and moreover seems to be an 
entity in its own right. However, through the discussion in this chapter, I have suggested that a 
care-ethical approach would take both these considerations into account. Acknowledging that 
businesses are human-made structures would open for an interpretation of business responsi-
bility as shared between all those who partake in its activities and have a common interest in 
its purpose. Thus, from this angle, a business is interpreted as a relational structure that binds 
many individual persons to a shared responsibility for the impact of its activities. Thinking 
about businesses’ responsibility in terms of shared responsibility represents one approach to 
the question of businesses’ moral personhood. While businesses are certainly human-made 
institutions and structures, they are also something more than the collection of individuals that 
partake in the businesses’ activities at any point in time. Recognising that businesses may 
have power, influence and interests through the value of their assets, brand identities or mar-
ket positions, should make it clear that businesses are also entities in their own right. There-
fore, I argued that the legal notion of an artificial person is important as it works as a means to 
hold businesses accountable for harm inflicted in their name.  
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In sum, businesses’ moral personhood could be approached from two different angles. 
On the one hand, businesses could be seen as relational structures where all those who partake 
in the structure also share the responsibility for the business’s activities. On the other hand, 
businesses could be seen as entities in their own right, accountable in terms of their artificial 
personhood. Ideally, the two different perspectives would work together as complementary 
approaches to determining and assigning business responsibility. This implies an ability to 
alternate between perspectives, which I see as a characteristic feature of a care-ethical ap-
proach to moral problem solving. Thus, I suggest a care-ethical approach would entail the 
ability to alternate between different perspectives on responsibility, from legal accountability 
to shared responsibility, and from a broad perspective of relational structures to a narrow per-
spective of each individual’s or group’s position within that structure. Balancing these per-
spectives would likely involve relying both on a legal court system and on public discourse as 
a means to address problems of responsibility. However, a care-ethical approach would still 
hold fast that responsibilities are tied to the particular relationships or relational structures 
they arise within. Thus, going back to the question of whether economic agents can be held 
morally accountable for their actions, I maintain that with a care-ethical approach the answer 
is “yes”. 
 The second question was why economic activities should be informed or restrained by 
the values of care if they are not in fact caring practices. I maintain that a care-ethical inter-
pretation of responsibility would see responsibility as arising within the relationships we are 
each already part of. I suggested in the previous chapter that this relational understanding of 
responsibility would entail an emphasis on reciprocity through a shared commitment to the 
relationship’s purpose. It would also entail an active engagement in ensuring that the relation-
ship does not become harmful, and judge the strength of others’ claims on us in part by the 
relational context they arise within. In short, I see care-ethics as holding persons morally re-
sponsible through the relationships and relational structures they are part of. Our reasons for 
accepting this interpretation of responsibility fundamentally rest on our reasons for accepting 
the values of care and the approach of care-ethics in the first place. I suggested in the previous 
chapter that Kittay (1999) and Pettersen (2011) provide the most promising arguments here. 
Kittay argues for the universal entitlement to care by appealing to the fundamental link of 
human connection, and Pettersen argues that an appeal to empathy and rational identification 
through the universal experience of care should lead to the recognition of the values of care-
ethics.  
I argue, then, that although economic activity is not the same as a caring practice, still, 
care-ethics holds persons morally responsible through the relationships and relational struc-
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tures they are part of. Economic activity is informed by specific economic aims and economic 
considerations, and different economic questions will be important to a greater or lesser extent 
in different types of relationships. Yet, recognising that it is through human beings placed 
within a relational context that economic activity is initiated should lead us to acknowledge 
that economic activity is also relational. Thus, economic activity does not belong to a sphere 
that is separate from the rest of human life, but is instead already ingrained in specific human 
relationships and relational structures. This means that an appeal to the moral responsibility of 
economic agents is not an additional goal or requirement, simply added to the standard busi-
ness aim of profit maximisation or added to the standardly assumed aim of individual utility 
maximisation. If it were, there would seem to be an unsolvable conflict of interests. How 
could businesses, for instance, both pursue an unrestrained maximisation of profits and at the 
same time accept a responsibility for taking other moral considerations into account? If moral 
responsibilities were simply added to the standard business aim of profit maximisation, it 
would likely result in businesses accepting these responsibilities only as long as doing so 
would not restrict their pursuit of profit. However, that might defeat the whole purpose of the 
responsibility in the first place. In a conflict between profit maximisation and other moral 
considerations, there would be no clear reason why the latter should trump.  
Therefore, I maintain instead that the argument for the moral responsibility of eco-
nomic agents rests on an appeal to the recognition of the relational context of economic activi-
ty. Economic agents, whether as individual persons, larger collectives or human-made institu-
tions, are already part of particular relationships and relational structures. A care-ethical inter-
pretation of responsibility as relational would therefore hold economic agents responsible 
through their involvement in relationships or relational structures. Thus, I maintain that eco-
nomic agents should be held morally responsible in terms of sharing a commitment to the 
aims of the particular relationships they operate within and by actively seeking to ensure that 
the relationships do not becoming harmful. So, for instance, while the pursuit of profit seems 
to a large extent both reasonable and justified in business activity, I see no moral grounds for 
justifying the pursuit of profit at any cost. On the contrary, the normative care value of ex-
tended non-maleficence would justify a restraint on profit maximisation when the pursuit of 
profit actively inflicts harm or leads to harm through neglect or ignorance. Thus, while I disa-
gree with much of Engster’s argumentation, I largely agree with his conclusion: “When the 
pursuit of profits and production of goods directly interferes with the abilities of individuals 
who are close to us or dependent on us to care for themselves and others, it violates caring 
values” (Engster, 2011, p. 101). Although economic activities are not the same as caring prac-
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tices, the normative values of care may inform and restrain economic activity that has an im-
pact on people’s opportunities to care within a specific relational context.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The underlying question running through this thesis has been whether, and in what way, care-
ethics can inform our thinking around economic activity. Particularly, I have sought to answer 
the question of whether a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility could provide justifica-
tion for holding economic agents morally responsible.  
Looking at this question through the perspective of care-ethics has opened for an al-
ternative approach to the whole topic of the relevance of ethics to economics. Through the 
discussion in chapter two, we saw that the relational ontology of care-ethics emphasises the 
relational context of persons rather than their individual independence. With the normative 
values of care, as Pettersen (2008; 2011) argues, there is an appeal to an active commitment to 
do good and avoid harm, but also an acknowledgement of the limitation of each person’s care 
resources and an awareness of the possibility of harm being caused through neglect or igno-
rance. The relational ontology and the normative values of care-ethics make it clear that care 
is a relational activity. The perspective of care-ethics stands in stark contrast to the basic prin-
ciples and assumptions of mainstream economic theory, which depicts economic agents as 
largely rational, self-interested and driven by the pursuit of profit or individual utility. How-
ever, the discussion through the course of the thesis has demonstrated that, while the themes 
and methodology of care-ethics are very different to those of economics, the perspective of 
care-ethics can nevertheless lead to an important conclusion: Responsibility, too, is relational. 
Through the discussion in chapter three, I demonstrated how the standard economic 
assumptions of economic agents as rational and self-interested work as both descriptive and 
normative propositions, describing what is expected, but also what is accepted, behaviour in 
economic settings. Through market thinking, we are left with the impression that economics 
only deals with rational calculation and individual gain. This results in the view that economic 
agents are not expected to take ethical considerations into account, and that there is no room 
for ethical considerations in economic activity and economic decision-making. This is the 
general problem I wanted to address in this thesis: the presumption that economic activity and 
economic considerations lie outside the realm of ethics.  
The problem with the market view, as I demonstrated in chapter three, is not only that 
economic activities and institutions are the results of human decisions and human-made struc-
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tures, but also that economic conditions have real impact on people’s lives. I therefore argued 
that market thinking cannot be contained within the hypothetical sphere of “pure” economics, 
because economic activities and economic considerations are already deeply infused in human 
relationships. Through the discussion of Kittay’s (1999), Tronto’s (2013) and Young’s (2011) 
analyses in chapter three, it became clear that concerns relating to care responsibilities, de-
pendence and the existence of structural background constraints on people’s choices were 
ignored on the market view. I also argued that market thinking implies a dichotomy between 
self-interest and altruism, an assumption on which the motivation to care and the reality of 
care responsibilities make little sense. At the core, I found that the framework of market 
thinking rests on an individualistic ontology, highlighting individual independence, but ignor-
ing the relational context of persons. 
  I argued, in chapter four, that a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility as relation-
al would emphasise how responsibilities arise within, and are tied to, particular relationships 
or larger relational structures. Leaning on Kittay’s (1999) and Pettersen’s (2012) arguments, I 
suggested that this relational emphasis entails reciprocity, in that each party would be ex-
pected to share a commitment to the aim of the relationship and be actively engaged in pre-
venting the relationship from becoming harmful. Placing responsibilities within a relational 
context further implies that responsibilities could be shared or distributed through social net-
works or even extensive social structures. I here discussed Kittay’s (1999) notion of social 
responsibility for the support of care and Young’s (2011) notion of shared responsibility for 
addressing structural injustice. I argued that a care-ethical approach to determining and as-
signing responsibility would likely require the ability to alternate between a narrow and wide 
perspective, balancing a sensitivity to the details of particular contexts with an awareness of 
background structural causes. Thus, Young’s (2011) suggestion of considering each party’s 
position of power, privilege and interest would be important, but so would each party’s degree 
of dependence and their share of care burdens. 
 From the basis of the care-ethical interpretation of responsibility, I next provided an 
argument for the moral responsibility of economic agents. Contrary to what I suggested was 
the main flaw in Engster’s (2007; 2011) argumentation for the moral responsibility of busi-
nesses, I maintained that economic activities and market relations are not the same as caring 
practices and caring relationships. Rather, I argued that economic activities and constraints 
are already deeply ingrained in particular human relationships and broader relational struc-
tures. I suggested, therefore, that a care-ethical interpretation of responsibility as relational 
would make economic agents responsible through the particular relational context of their 
activities. This approach would justify holding individual persons morally responsible for 
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their actions, even in their economic capacities as consumers, employees, business leaders or 
investors. Moreover, businesses too would be held morally accountable, not only as entities in 
the form of an artificial person recognised by law, but also through the shared responsibility 
of all those who contribute to the business’s activities and share a common interest in its aims. 
Thus, while I maintained that economic activities are not caring practices, I nevertheless sug-
gested that the normative values of care would inform and restrain economic activities 
through the relational context of the economic agents themselves. This interpretation would 
justify a restraint on businesses’ pursuit of profit where this entails actively or inadvertently 
causing harm within the particular relational context of its activities. 
The main focus of the discussion has been on the reasons for accepting a care-ethical 
interpretation of responsibility and the justification for applying this to market relations. The 
importance of focusing on the underlying reasons for accepting a moral responsibility in the 
first place was demonstrated through the discussion of Engster’s (2011) account of a care-
based business approach. Without a solid argument for why economic agents should be held 
morally responsible, there seems little hope of bringing about real change in the conduct of 
economic agents.  
Therefore, it is crucial to first establish an argument that is strong enough to hold eco-
nomic agents to the requirements of moral responsibility, even when this leads to a conflict 
with the standard business aim of profit maximisation. My proposition is that a care-ethical 
interpretation of responsibility is able to do just that. If this is indeed the case, it would open 
for a profoundly new approach to assigning and determining responsibility in market rela-
tions.   
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